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Preface 
SEVERAL YEARS AGO the University Press of Kentucky asked me 
to prepare an "essay on urban Kentucky" for inclusion in its Bi-
centennial Bookshelf series. Accepting this invitation, I had to de-
velop a concept to govern the work as a whole, since no model 
existed for writing the urban history of a single state, and to devise 
a way to handle a very broad topic within the confines of a book of 
modest proportions. 
Rather than attempt to survey the entire subject lightly, I de-
cided to write in some detail about several themes central to the 
process of urbanization and to the character of city life: promotion 
or "boosterism" and rivalry, urban problems and services, cultural 
life, and the black urban experience. I used these themes to struc-
ture each of the chapters, which I planned as more or less inde-
pendent interpretive essays, and to guide my selection of evidence 
and my choice of illustrative examples. 
I further decided to focus the essays primarily upon episodes in 
the history of Lexington and Louisville. The Bluegrass city was the 
largest urban center in Kentucky from the late eighteenth century 
until the 1820s, while after 1830 Louisville reigned as the premier 
city in the state. As the largest cities in the Commonwealth during 
the pioneer and modern periods, Lexington and Louisville were 
also the most important. They were, for example, the only cities 
to have attained the necessary size, wealth, and talent to produce 
significant cultural achievements. In other areas of urban life, 
moreover, cities had tended to follow similar patterns, and it 
seemed appropriate in a concise work to concentrate on the course 
of events in Kentucky's major cities and to allude to related devel-
opments in other communities. 
One writer defined an essay as "a piece of writing principally 
for reflection and the recharging of the brain." Another suggested 
vzz 
that a series of essays should be put together "like organizing a 
meal. The various dishes must be so arranged as to rouse the appe-
tite and renew the pleasure with each course." If this volume of 
essays measures up to such standards of the genre, it will have ful-
ftlled one of its primary objectives. It will have fulfilled another if 
the individual essays raise at least as many questions as they an-
swer, provide some guidelines for further investigation, and en-
courage others to explore the rich yet neglected urban history of 
Kentucky. 
In any piece of historical writing, one accumulates a number of 
debts to one's colleagJes. In a work of synthesis, the extent of 
those debts is far greater than usual. I have indicated in the Bib-
liographical Note the authors to whom I am most deeply in-
debted, but it is impossible to acknowledge adequately the many 
colleagues and scholars upon whose work I have drawn and relied. 
Without the careful labors of my fellow historians the present 
work could never have been written. 
The following historians kindly permitted me to read their un-
published manuscripts and work in progress: Leonard P. Curry of 
the University of Louisville, Nancy Schrom Dye of the University 
of Kentucky, Judith Walzer Leavitt of the University of Wiscon-
sin, Lee Shai Weissbach of the University of Louisville, and 
George C. Wright of the University of Texas. Robert S. Whitney, 
conductor emeritus of the Louisville Orchestra, allowed me to 
read the drafts of his unpublished history of the orchestra. 
My good friends Steven A. Channing of the Department of 
History of the University of Kentucky andJames C. Anderson of 
the University of Louisville's Photographic Archives carefully read 
the entire manuscript and offered thoughtful comments and sug-
gestions. Steve gave me the benefit of his expertise in the areas of 
Kentucky and American history, and Andy helped me select 
photographs to accompany the text. 
Ann Taylor Allen of the Department of History of the Univer-
sity of Louisville encouraged the undertaking from the beginning, 
listened to my ideas as the project evolved, read successive drafts 
of the various chapters, and provided wise counsel on substantive 
Vttz 
and stylistic matters. She was at all times the best of colleagues 
and the best offriends. 
My students in the School of Medicine of the University of 
Louisville cheered me throughout the many weeks and weekends 
spent writing and revising these pages, and I thank them for being 
such good colleagues and companions and for making me glad 
each year that I became a teacher. 
I also thank the University of Louisville's Committee on Aca-
demic Publication for providing funds to help defray the costs of 
securing illustrations. 
My typist prepared the manuscript with the loving care and the 
attention to detail usually reserved for one's own work-which, in 
this case, it happened to be. 
Scholarly convention obliges me to declare that I am solely re-
sponsible for errors of fact or interpretation. Yet, as William Cam-
den observed in 1637, "it may be that I have been misled by the 
credit of authors and others whom I tooke to be most true, and 
worthy of credit .... Others may be more skilfull and more exact-
ly observe the particularities of the places where they are conver-
sant; if they, or any other, whosoever, will advertise mee wherein I 
am mistaken, I will amend it with manifold thankes. . . if it pro-
ceed from good meaning, and not from a spirit of contradiction 
and quarrelling, which doe not befit such as are well bred, and af-
fect the truth ... 
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CITIES IN THE 
WILDERNESS 
I N 177 3 THE WILDERNESS that would later become the Common-
wealth of Kentucky lay virtually untouched, inviting yet menac-
ing. "Odds were indeed great in 1773 against a settlement being 
planted in Kentucky," historian Thomas D. Clark observed. "It 
was still too far in advance of the spreading line of civilization for 
safety." But in August of that very year, hundreds of miles be-
yond the line of settlement, Captain Thomas Bullitt of Virginia 
and his small party were encamped just above the Falls of the 
Ohio on the south bank of the river, busily surveying land and 
laying out a town for speculator John Connolly. Having received a 
2,OOO-acre grant of land at the falls for his services to the British 
crown during the French and Indian War, Connolly took entre-
preneur John Campbell as a partner and the two advertised the 
sale of lots in their projected city in April 1774. Their exuberant 
proclamation of preordained metropolitan destiny heralded the 
birth of urban promotion and boosterism in the Ohio and Missis-
sippi valleys. "The advantageous situation of that place, formed 
by nature as a ... repository to receive the produce of the very ex-
tensive and fertile country on the Ohio and its branches, ... is 
sufficient to recommend it," they exclaimed; "but when it is con-
sidered how liberal, nay profuse, nature has been to it othetwise 
in stocking it so abundantly that the slightest industry may supply 
the most numerous family with the greatest plenty ... we may 
1 
with certainty affirm that it will in a short time be equalled by few 
inland places on the American continent." The outbreak of the 
American Revolution together with Indian unrest forced Connolly 
and Campbell to abandon their efforts. Yet, however tenuously-
and months before James Harrod's tiny expedition established the 
first permanent Anglo-American settlement in the trans-Appala-
chian West-these two town promoters had planted the seeds of 
an urban civilization in the future state of Kentucky. 
From the earliest days of settlement in Kentucky, as elsewhere 
in the Ohio Valley, the planting of cities at strategic military and 
commercial sites along the banks of major waterways and in the 
hearts of fertile farming districts was a vital economic and social 
activity. As historian Richard C. Wade demonstrated, these young 
towns functioned as "spearheads of the frontier," driving a wedge 
of urbanity into the raw wilderness and serving as bases that held 
the region in advance of intensive agricultural settlement. In his 
memoir on the late eighteenth-century mainsprings of trans-
Appalachian development, Daniel Drake, a prominent physician 
and one of the foremost citizens of early nineteenth-century Cin-
cinnati, Louisville, and Lexington, commented on the ctucial role 
of cities in frontier life. "It is worthy of remark, that those who 
made these beginnings of settlement projected towns, which they 
anticipated would grow into cities," Drake reflected. "And we 
may see in their origins one of the elements of the prevalent ten-
dency to rear up towns in advance of the country. . . .' The follow-
ers of the ftrst pioneers, like themselves, had a taste for commerce 
and the mechanic arts which cannot be gratifted without the con-
struction of cities." Like many others who moved to the Ohio Val-
ley in search of opportunities in promising young cities, Drake 
equated urbanization with progress and envisioned a West of 
great cities. "It will perhaps, to many persons appear altogether 
visionary, if not boastful to speak of cities on these western wat-
ers," he wrote in 181). "Yet it is certain ... that many of the vil-
lages which have sprung up within 30 years, on the banks of the 
Ohio and Mississippi are destined, before the termination of the 
present century, to attain the rank of populous and magniftcent 
cities. " 
That nature had ordained a future great city at the Falls of the 
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Ohio had been recognized by explorers, hunters, and traders for 
at least a century before a permanent community was established 
there. From the beginnings of colonial urban settlement, when 
cities were founded to serve the needs of a mercantilist empire, 
the exigencies of commerce dictated city location-at the mouths 
of magnificent harbors, at the junctures of major navigable rivers, 
at natural breaks in trade. The Falls of the Ohio, a violent stretch 
of rapids created by a fossilized coral reef running obliquely across 
the river, was the only significant obstacle to navigation along the 
entire course of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers from the head-
waters to the Gulf of Mexico. There the river dropped twenty-two 
feet in a distance of two miles, making passage dangerous at high 
water and all but impossible most of the year. "The ear is stunned 
with the sound of rushing waters," tourist James Hall remarked, 
"and the sight of waves dashing, and foaming, and whirling 
among the rocks and eddies below, is grand and fearful." Vessels 
had to put in at either end of this "boiling place" and transfer 
passengers and freight to overland carriers, thus insuring the rise 
of a city to serve as a transshipment point. 
Four years after Connolly and Campbell's enterprise collapsed, 
a permanent community was established at the Falls of the 
Ohio-the ftrst settlement along the lower reaches of the Ohio 
River and the remotest outpost of American settlement during the 
War for Independence. In May 1778 George Rogers Clark, carry-
ing secret orders to proceed against the British in the Old North-
west, set up a tiny military base on Corn Island, at the foot of 
present-day downtown Louisville. Here Clark trained his 150 sol-
diers, and here also the 50 civilians who had accompanied the ex-
pedition set about putting down roots. Receiving news the follow-
ing year of Clark's military victories in the Illinois country, the set-
tlers moved into another small stockade on the mainland. In April 
1779 the inhabitants organized a town government, elected trus-
tees, surveyed the site, and prepared a plan for the town. The fol-
lowing year the state of Virginia issued a charter which invested ti-
tle to the town in the trustees, making Louisville its own propri-
etor. With the completion in 1782 of Fort Nelson, an imposing 
stronghold designed to secure the area from British or Indian dep-
redations, the citizens began to improve and build up their town. 
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Despite its promlSlng circumstances, Louisville grew slowly 
during the last two decades of the eighteenth century. The major 
obstacle to expansion proved to be the terrifying menace posed by 
the Indians. In April 1781 resident John Floyd wrote to the gover-
nor of Virginia describing the perils he and others faced in the in-
fant community. "We are all obliged to live in our forts in this 
countty, and notwithstanding all the caution we use, forty-seven 
... have been killed or taken prisoners by the savages, besides a 
number wounded, since January. Whole families are destroyed 
without regard to age or sex; infants are torn from their mothers 
arms and their brains dashed out against trees .... Not a week 
passes, and some weeks scarcely a day, without some of our dis-
tressed inhabitants feeling the fatal effects of the infernal rage and 
fury of these execrable hell-hounds." Throughout the 1780s the 
Indians continued to "infest the roads," while immigrants travel-
ing on the river came in flatboats with high sides designed to 
block Indian arrows. 
Almost as serious as the Indian peril was the problem of disease 
and ill health, which early gave Louisville an unsavory reputation 
as the "Graveyard of the West." Stagnant pools of water dotted 
the low, marshy landscape, giving rise to epidemic yellow fever as 
well as to endemic malaria. Visitor William Winterbotham sug-
gested in 1795 that Louisville's "unhealthiness ... has consider-
ably retarded its growth," while a decade later traveler Thomas 
Ashe complained about the "character of unhealthiness in the 
place, which forbids the encouragement of any hope of its perma-
nency or improvement." Yet most commentators agreed with 
Pennsylvanian Josiah Espy, who in 1805 wrote that "it is to be pre-
sumed that its great natural advantages will finally get the better 
of the prejudices now existing against it on account of its being so 
sickly, and that it will yet . . . become a great and flourishing 
town." 
A third condition retarding Louisville's early growth was the 
difficulty of upriver travel during the age of keelboats, flatboats, 
and barges. The trip up the Mississippi and Ohio rivers from New 
Orleans to Louisville consumed between three and four months, 
while the journey from the Falls City to Pittsburgh required an ad-
ditional month. A crew of twenty to thirty strong men had to 
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use every device then known to overcome the obstacles to up-
stream navigation. They poled the river bottom when it was solid, 
used sails on wide expanses of water, rowed, hauled their craft for-
ward by means of heavy ropes tied to trees, and even resorted to 
"bushwhacking," grasping bushes or branches of trees in order to 
pull the boat up the river. The slow and arduous upstream voyage 
kept freight rates high, and upriver traffic averaged a mere tenth 
of downriver commerce. During the 1780s and 1790s trade also 
suffered from restrictive Spanish policies which effectively closed 
the Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans to American 
commerce. In 1800 the census counted only 359 inhabitants in the 
town, although travelers estimated the population at about 800, 
and Louisville lagged behind Lexington and Pittsburgh among 
the West's young cities. 
Despite such formidable obstacles to growth, the citizens of 
Louisville early created an enclave of culture and urbanity in the 
backwoods. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, the French-born es-
sayist and author of Letters from an American Farmer, registered 
his shock at the speed with which the amenities of urban life were 
springing up in the tiny outpost. As his boat drew close to shore in 
August 1784 Crevecoeur noticed that the male passengers on a 
nearby vessel wore silk stockings and that the women flaunted 
parasols. "What was my surprise when, in place of the huts, the 
tents, and the primitive cabins ... I saw numerous houses of two 
stories, elegant and well painted, and (as far as the stumps of trees 
would permit) that all the streets were spacious and well laid out," 
he exclaimed. "The sight of this suggestive gradation of houses 
finished, imperfect, just commenced, of cabins built against the 
trees; the aspect of the cradle of this young city, destined by its sit-
uation to become the metropolis of the surrounding country-all 
these objects impress me with a reverence and respect that I can-
not well define .... Never before have I experienced that feeling 
which ought, it seems to me, to attend those who are actively en-
gaged in founding a great settlement or a new city, and which 
should compensate them for their troubles and privations. . .. 
What movement, what activiry, on this little theater of Louis-
ville! " 
The pulse of the young town beat to a mercantile tempo, and 
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the small but growing volume of commerce provided a measure of 
prosperity and a basis for future expansion. Situated at the head 
of ascending and the foot of descending navigation on the Ohio, 
Louisville served as a regional distributing center for the flour, 
hemp, pork, tobacco, and other staple products being shipped 
south to New Orleans, and for the cotton, sugar, rice, seafood, 
and imported luxury items being shipped north from the Crescent 
City. The need to unload, transfer, and reload all goods at the 
falls stimulated the growth of a thriving portaging business for 
wagon masters and draymen, which in turn spurred the develop-
ment of busy warehousing concerns and a booming wholesale 
trade. As the fIrst American port that traders reached from New 
Orleans, Louisville was designated a port of entry for foreign com-
modities and the collection of customs duties, fIrst by Virginia in 
1783 and later by Congress in 1799. Local agents insured goods 
shipped from the city, and wayfarers patronized the growing 
number of hotels, restaurants, inns, saloons, general stores, and 
retail establishments. By 1810 traveler John Melish could affirm 
that "Louisville, being the principal port of the western part of 
the state of Kentucky, is a market for the purchase of all kinds of 
produce, and the quantity that is annually shipped down the river 
is immense." 
The thriving commerce on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers early 
gave rise to the building and equipping of boats and barges at the 
Falls of the Ohio. Other manufacturing activities began during 
the second decade of the nineteenth century, such as Paul Skid-
more's iron foundry which opened in 1812 for the production of 
steam engines. Three years later the Tarascon brothers invested 
$150,000 in their six-story Merchant Manufacturing Mill to pro-
duce flour, and in the same year, on an equally grand scale, the 
Hope Distillery Company put up a huge factory in order to carry 
on its business" in a much more extensive mode than any hitherto 
established in the United States." By 1815 Louisville boasted four 
rope walks, an equal number of soap factories, two tobacco manu-
factories, a nail factory, a steam saw mill, and a stoneware factory. 
There were many indications of rising prosperity and economic 
expansion during these years. The city's population rose to 1,357 
in 1810, and doubled again during the next five years. Louisville's 
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tax lists revealed the growing wealth of the community, as res-
idents paid $90,550 in taxes in 1803, $189,797 in 1813, and 
$326,705 in 1815. Land prices soared as real estate boomed, and 
lots on the principal streets which had sold for $ 700 to $1,400 dur-
ing the earlier years of setdement brought $4,000 to $5,000 by 
1815. The city was assuming the air of a place of importance, and 
visitor Fortescue Cuming declared that "the houses [are] generally 
superior to any I have seen in the western country with the excep-
tion of Lexington. Most are of handsome brick, and some are 
three stories, with a parapet wall on the top in the modern Euro-
pean taste . . . I had thought Cincinnati one of the most beauti-
ful towns I had seen in America, but Louisville, which is almost as 
large, equals it in beauty, and in the opinion of many excels it." 
The young city offered a range of cultural activities as well as 
less refIned amusements for the enjoyment of the growing pop-
ulation. Residents and visitors could watch horse races, theatrical 
productions, trained animal acts, and "weird dancers," play 
"roley-bolleys," card games, "foot-ball," and "a sober game of 
whist or the more scientillc one of billiards," or frequent bawdy 
houses, barbeques, fIsh-feasts, wedding parties, balls, and con-
scription dances. British traveler Henry Bradshaw Fearon identi-
fIed the polite sport of "gander pulling," a "diversion [which] 
consists in tying a live gander to a tree or pole, greasing its neck, 
riding past it at full gallop, and he who succeeds in pulling off the 
head of the victim, receives the laurel crown [and] the body of the 
gander." More decorous pastimes appeared early, such as Mr. 
Nickle's dancing school, which by 1786 was instructing "some 12 
or 15 young misses ... middling neady dressed." By 1819 the 
city's fust historian, Henry McMurtrie, could point to an emerg-
ing cultural establishment. "There is a circle, small 'tis true, but 
within whose magic round abounds every pleasure that wealth, 
regulated by taste, can produce, or urbanity bestow," he pro-
claimed. "There, the 'red heel' of Versailles may imagine himself 
in the emporium of fashion, and whilst leading a beauty through 
the mazes of the dance, forget that he is in the wilds of America." 
Early townspeople so rapidly transformed wilderness outposts 
into "emporia of fashion" because they defIned urbanism as, in 
part, a process of furnishing cultural and social amenities. As 
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Daniel Drake observed, many of these settlers had come from 
"those portions of the Union which cherish and build up cities." 
Evidence suggests that a large number of the people in policy-
making and leadership positions in the new towns knew a great 
deal about life in eastern cities, from having lived in and visited 
them. Town builders derived their standards of urbanity from the 
East's oldest and largest meuopolitan centers, and in everything 
from sueet plans and municipal services to cultural institutions 
and architectural styles, the urban frontiersmen studied, adopted, 
and adapted the ways and practices of Boston, New York, Balti-
more, and Philadelphia. 
The process by which Louisville established a public school sys-
tem in 1829 clearly reflected this urge to emulate the eastern me-
tropolises. The community'S council sent the new principal, Mann 
Butler, "to the eastern cities, to examine the most respectable of 
their monitorial establishments." Taking detailed notes on the 
systems of Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, and 
declaring that his uip "will save our city funds from . . . expen-
sive errors of others and from fruitless experiments," Butler sub-
mitted his report to the legislators, to the school's trustees, and, 
through the press, to the people of Louisville. The first report of 
the school committee indicated that the building itself was de-
signed "mainly after the plan of the High School of New York, 
united with the Public School Rooms of Philadelphia." Faculty 
were recruited from London and from Columbia and Yale univer-
sities, while the curriculum was patterned on those of "the High 
School of New York and some of the Boston establishments." 
Even such small items as slates and lesson cards were brought back 
to Louisville from Philadelphia by Butler and employed in the 
new system. Louisvillians were proud to have set up the fust free 
public school west of the Alleghenies, and equally proud that 
their achievements mirrored those in large metropolitan centers. 
"It is gratifying to us," the editor of the LouisVIlle Public Adver-
tiser announced, "that Louisville has the honor of taking the lead 
in the West, as New York did in the East, in the adoption of the 
monitorial system, which has been so thoroughly tried, and is now 
so highly approved, in London, Edinburgh, and in our sister states 
in the East. " 
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While Louisville became a regional metropolis because of its lo-
cation on the Ohio River, Lexington, alone among the important 
cities of the ftrst West, occupied an inland position. Planted at a 
site within the encircling arm of the Kentucky River, Lexington 
was a good ftfteen miles away from that artery, and the branch of 
Elkhorn Creek which cut through the town was far too shallow to 
sustain commerce. Yet Lexington was situated astride the major 
avenues of overland trade and migration, and it enjoyed an aston-
ishing commercial boom for almost forty years during the heyday 
of the turnpike era and before the introduction of steamboats rev-
olutionized western trade. Lexington grew and prospered as the 
supply depot and marketplace of the New West, outfttting trav-
elers and pioneers, provisioning a regional hinterland with essen-
tial supplies, and distributing the area's agricultural surpluses to 
far-flung markets. For a brief time Lexington eclipsed its now 
more famous rivals and became known as the "Athens of the 
West" -the economic and social, legal and political, intellectual 
and cultural capital of the new country and its largest and wealthi-
est city. 
Decades before the city was founded, the site it would grow 
upon had become a strategic focal point in the heart of the fertile 
Bluegrass region, the crossroads of buffalo and Indian trails. A 
band of hunters camped nearby in June 1775 named the place 
Lexington after receiving news of the opening battle of the Amer-
ican Revolution. But, like Louisville, Lexington had to wait four 
years before a permanent community could be established, pri-
marily because of Indian attacks. In April 1779 a party of twenty-
ftve pioneers erected cabins and a stockade. Three years later the 
Virginia legislature vested title to the recently laid out town in its 
ftve elected trustees, and in 1783 the ftrst buildings outside the 
fort were constructed. By 1790 the town had 835 inhabitants and 
was generally "reckoned the capital of Kentucky. " A decade later 
the city'S population stood at 1,795, and Lexington was the largest 
town in western America. 
During the 1780s and 1790s Lexington throve on trade, be-
coming the entrepot linking Europe and the eastern states with 
the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. "The market-place ... of this 
little metropolis . . . stretches over the whole breadth of the 
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The "old fort " at Lexington, built in 1782 
square, " traveler Alexander Wilson noted. "The numerous shops 
piled with goods, and the many well-dressed females I passed in 
the streets; the sound of social industry, and the gay scenery of 
'the busy haunts of men,' had a most exhilarating effect on my 
spirits, after being so long immured in the forest ." Fortescue 
Cuming reported in 1807 that twenty-two Lexington stores an-
nually retailed more than $300,000 worth of imported foreign 
goods, and by 1810 the largest retail merchants did a business 
during the fall and winter seasons estimated at up to $100,000 a 
month. Entrepreneur Thomas Hart, who amassed a fortune in his 
extensive wholesale and retail businesses, invited his colleagues in 
the East to join him " in raking up Money and spending it with 
our friends" in Lexington. 
The large and consistent profits from commerce enabled some 
businessmen to accumulate substantial capital reserves. The con-
tinuing unfavorable balance of trade with the East, along with the 
disruptions of trade both before and during the War of 1812, in-
creasingly encouraged wealthy merchants to invest some of this 
capital in local industry. Large surpluses of hemp, the demand for 
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cloth and rope in the West, and the rising market for rough cloth 
(called "cotton bagging") and twine in the South following the 
invention of the cotton gin, triggered the large-scale manufacture 
of cordage, bagging, and sailcloth. In 1809 John Melish, a Scot-
tish textile manufacturer, reported that the "13 extensive rope-
walks, five bagging manufactories, and one of duck[cloth]," com-
prising the city's principal industry, produced hempen goods 
worth $500,000. The chronic labor shortage, along with wartime 
disruptions of trade, promoted diversification during the first fif-
teen years of the nineteenth century. In 1810 Melish calculated 
that Lexington's industries had increased forty-fold over the 
course of the preceding decade, an.d by 1815 the city's workshops 
in the wilderness were capitalized at an estimated $2.5 million. 
New industries appeared so rapidly in a section of the city along 
the fork of the Elkhorn that residents referred to the district as 
"Manchester," and the community's entrepreneurs dreamed of 
"blowing the manufactures of Kentucky all over the Western 
World." Lexington's great strides in manufacturing, its substan-
tial commerce, and its rising population, up to 4,326 by 1810 and 
estimated at between 6,000 and 7,000 by 1815, all bred an infec-
tious optimism in the city'S future shared by residents, visitors, 
and speculators alike. 
Pioneer Lexington was an "instant city," transformed from 
outpost to metropolis in but a fraction of the time it had taken 
older eastern cities to mature. Samuel R. Brown, author of the 
widely read Western Gazetteer, had visited Lexington near the 
end of the eighteenth century and found fifty houses, "partly 
frame, and hewn logs, with chimnies on the outside," and town 
lots selling for thirty dollars each. Returning in 1816, he was 
stunned at the metamorphosis. "But how changed the scene," 
Brown exclaimed; "everything had assumed a new appearance. 
The beautiful vale of Town Fork, which in 1797, I saw variegated 
with cornfields, meadows and trees, had in my absence been cov-
ered with stately and elegant buildings-in short, a large and 
beautiful town had arisen by the creative genius of the West. The 
log cabins had disappeared, and in their places stood costly brick 
mansions, well painted and enclosed by fine yards, bespeaking 
the taste and wealth of their possessors. . . . The scenery around 
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Lexington almost equals that of the elysium of the ancients. Phil-
adelphia, with all its surrounding beauties scarcely equals it." 
Land values skyrocketed, the Kentucky Gazette reporting in 1813 
the sale of town lots "at the enormous price of $500 per foot," 
and Niles' Weekly Register noting two years later that "town lots 
sell nearly as high as in Boston, New York, Philadelphia or Balti-
more, which shows that this is not a place in the wilderness, as 
some people suppose it to be." 
Reflecting both its frontier origins and its increasing wealth 
and refinement, early Lexington society exhibited a curious blend 
of backwoods raucousness and eastern urbanity. The streets were 
noisy and crowded, and violence was an integral part of daily life. 
Irishman Thomas Ashe observed in 1806 that the community's 
churches "have all the glass struck out by boys in the day and the 
inside torn up by rogues and prostitutes who frequent them at 
night," while traveler Henty Franklin commented at about the 
same time that "the lower orders retain the faults for which they 
are distinguished-gaming, a love of spirituous liquors, and fero-
cious quarrels in consequence of intoxication." Yet by the turn of 
the century Lexington had assumed many of the characteristics of 
an established seaboard community. The trustees had by that 
time ordered the sheep and cow pens removed from the streets 
and forbidden the keeping of pet panthers. Schools of all types 
were thriving and offering day and evening instruction in subjects 
ranging from geometry and French to fencing and the dance. 
Transylvania Seminary had been elevated to the status of a univer-
sity, the first west of the Alleghenies, with departments of law, 
medicine, and the arts. The city boasted several newspapers, half a 
dozen publishing houses, bookstores, debating and literary clubs, 
dramatic societies, and a public subscription library. "The prog-
ress of the useful arts and all the refinements of civilized society 
advance even beyond the astonishing population," resident David 
Meade exclaimed in 1808, and the Kentucky Gazette referred to 
Lexington as "the Goshen of this Western World." Ashe had to 
admit that "the inhabitants show demonstrations of civilization," 
but he warned that "at particular times [they] exhibit many traits 
that should exclusively belong to untutored savages." The poet 
Thomas Moore captured the contradictory essence of the young 
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frontier metropolis when he mused: "'Tis one dull chaos, one un-
fertile strife I Betwixt half-polish'd and half-barbarous life." 
As a commercial emporium astride the main highways of trav-
el, Lexington experienced a high degree of transiency, which con-
tributed to the rough-and-tumble character of the place. Jobbers, 
wagon masters, itinerant salesmen, merchants, boatmen, traders, 
and migrants constantly moved in and out of the city. This large 
floating population, along with numbers of restless men and 
women who regularly pulled up stakes, rendered Lexington's soci-
ety highly volatile and unstable. The community's ftrst city direc-
tory, published in 1806, listed the surnames of only two of the 
twenty-ftve founders of the city, and evidence suggests that less 
than one-third of the founders remained in Lexington all of their 
lives. In all, only eleven of the ftfty-seven surnames borne by Lex-
ington's ftrst one hundred or so settlers appeared in the 1806 di-
rectory. Even accounting for death, the changing of daughters' 
names through marriage, and a partial and incomplete listing of 
residents in the city directory, the persistence rate was strikingly 
low. Lexington, in short, like Louisville and most other early 
American communities, large and small, was a loose confedera-
tion of transients unsettled by incessant movement and rapid 
turnover. 
This movement resulted in part from the quest for greater op-
ponunity and upward mobility, as countless westerners and trans-
planted easterners sought to make their fortunes in promising 
frontier communities. Western cities needed and attracted ambi-
tious artisans, merchants, and craftsmen, who either possessed or 
wished to develop special talents and skills. The demand for work-
ers usually exceeded the supply in Lexington and other western 
cities, producing high wages, good opponunities, and full em-
ployment. Chronic labor shortages often forced employers to re-
ctuit workingmen from the East with promises of better pay and 
rapid advancement, and Niles' Weekly Register reported in 1815 
that "nothing seems wanting [in Lexington] but artists of all 
classes, especially smiths, carpenters, joiners ... [and] cotton and 
wool machine makers." Most journeyman mechanics and skilled 
workers lived in "prosperous circumstances," owning their own 
houses and "driving about in their own carriages." They were con-
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stantly in demand, "the more so as the industrious journeymen 
very soon become masters," as John Melish observed. As young 
urban economies matured, occupational diversity increased, and 
in 1806 lexington's ftrst city directory listed over ftfty occupa-
tions, ranging from milliner and portrait painter to tallow candler 
and "umbrella & chip bonnet" manufacturer. Although there 
were always the destitute and the needy, there was nevertheless 
great opportunity for ordinary workingmen to succeed and a gen-
erallevel of high employment and modest prosperity. 
Class lines remained more flexible than in eastern cities, and 
movement both up and down the social ladder occurred con-
stantly. But socioeconomic stratification appeared early in Lexing-
ton and other frontier communities, and the distinctions between 
classes were noticeable, acknowledged, and considered meaning-
ful. As the amount of wealth increased, stratification became 
more pronounced and the elite enhanced and consolidated their 
positions. Lexington's assessment records indicate that in 1808 
over a third of the total valuation of more than $1 million be-
longed to only sixteen merchants and manufacturers. In Lexing-
ton as elsewhere the wealthiest citizens provided almost all of the 
leadership, ftlling political posts as trustees, formulating commu-
nity priorities and goals, and generally managing urban affairs. 
Successful Lexington merchants channeled most of their sur-
plus capital into land speculation and magnmcent country estates, 
in order to satisfy a taste for gracious living, take advantage of the 
relatively cheap price of land, and avoid the high costs and uncer-
tain returns associated with industrial development. Prosperous 
merchants, manufacturers, and lawyers established lavish rural re-
treats that became famous for their charm and conviviality. John 
Breckinridge hosted gatherings at his Cabell's Dale, Henry Clay 
presided over affairs at Ashland, and David Meade entertained 
ftfteen to twenty guests almost every evening at his resplendent 
Chaumiere du Prairie. Some of the "between ftfty and sixty vil-
las" counted by Samuel Brown in 1816 were said to resemble es-
tates in Languedoc and Provence with their "ftnely cultivated 
ftelds, rich gardens, and elegant mansions." In 1814 a surprised 
editor Hezekiah Niles reported that "society is polished and po-
lite, and their balls and assemblies are conducted with as much 
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grace and ease as they are anywhere else, and the dresses at the 
parties are as tasty and elegant. Strange things these in the 'back-
woods!'" 
Strange things indeed, and contemporaries were equally star-
tled by the rapid advances in culture and learning. "Thirty years 
ago we had no right to expect that literature and science would so 
soon appear among us," a Lexingtonian wrote in 1811. "We 
hardly dreamed, by this time, to have been exempted from the 
necessity of exciting our youth to savage warfare, by making an 
enemy's scalp the diploma of their merit." Two years later an 
Ohio Valley editor, referring to the entire West, proclaimed that 
"our advances in learning, as in every other kind of improvement, 
are altogether astonishing. We see everyday new schools estab-
lished for the education of youth; our towns teem with newspa-
pers . . . ; the number of our bookstores and presses is incessantly 
increasing; public libraries are instituted, societies are rising, ... 
and the Muses even have their worthy and successful Votaries." 
Another editor exulted that "cities have arisen in the very wilder-
ness, ... and form in their respective states the/oci of art and sci-
ence, of wealth and information." 
As early as 1795 traveler Lewis Condiet declared that Lexington 
had ,already emerged as the "Philadelphia of Kentucky," and two 
decades later the community's position of primacy in the Com-
monwealth appeared to many even stronger and more secure. Al-
ready "the seat of a great commerce, and ... many flourishing 
manufactures," the editor of Niles' Weekly Register exclaimed in 
1815, Lexington "promises to be the great inland city of the west-
ern world." Few Lexingtonians had paid any attention to French 
visitor Victor Collot's prediction in 1796 that" as this town has no 
navigation it is presumed that its increase will not be great." Few 
seemed terribly concerned when the census returns for 1810 
showed that Pittsburgh with 4,768 inhabitants had overtaken Lex-
ington with its population of 4,326. And few worried in 1815 
when the Enterprise made the first successful upstream voyage by 
a steamboat from New Orleans to Louisville in a mere twenty-five 
days and cut traveling time to less than half. Indeed, Lexingto-
nians applauded the voyage, viewed steamboat traffic on the west-
ern waters as yet another way to extend their city's commercial 
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hinterland, and looked to the future with optimism. Very few had 
any idea that, in but a few short years, this transportation innova-
tion would smash their community's economy and crush the 
hopes of the landlocked" Athens of the West." 
Lexington and Louisville were the most successful and prom-
inent urban enterprises in early Kentucky, but they were certainly 
not the only manifestations of the urge to rear up cities in the wil-
derness. In 1797 traveler Gilbert Imlay referred to the "rising vil-
lages" and "trading towns" of Kentucky, noting that "ten years 
have produced a difference in the population and comforts of this 
country, which to be pourtrayed in just colours would appear mar-
vellous." By 1800 a hub of settlements had grown up in the Blue-
grass region around Lexington, and several other places had been 
planted at sites along the Ohio River. Imlay's "rising villages" and 
"trading towns" all dreamed of becoming great metropolises, 
and, for a few at least, such dreams would become reality. 
But most of the little towns and villages never fulfilled the 
hopes and expectations of their founders, early residents, or pro-
moters. Some, located too close to a more powerful neighbor, 
were either incorporated into the metropolis or reduced to subor-
dinate satellites of it. Thus Portland and Shippingport were an-
nexed by Louisville, while Newport and Covington grew up in the 
shadow of Cincinnati. Other places, lacking the capital, entrepre-
neurial talent, or geographical advantages necessary to sustain a 
successful drive toward urban maturity, settled into patterns of 
slow and unimpressive growth, as did Bardstown, Georgetown, 
Danville, and Maysville. Small communities such as Shelbyville, 
Versailles, and Paris had their dreams dashed as technological 
changes in the means of transportation altered established com-
mercial and migration patterns and aided other localities. Larger 
places could suffer a similar fate, as did Lexington, which, after a 
meteoric rise and brilliant heyday, reluctantly relinquished trade 
and enterprise to the river cities. Frankfort owed its steady growth 
to the decision of state legislators to bypass larger Lexington and 
Louisville and locate the state capital "at the great meadow on the 
[Kentucky] River," and smaller places benefitted from the loca-
tion in them of land offices, county seats, educational institu-
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tions, religious centers, and hospitals and asylums. Still other 
hamlets declined after faint beginnings and disappeared entirely, 
their empty shacks and decaying mills the dreary signposts of the 
West's ftrst ghost towns. Commerce provided the major impetus 
to urban growth during these early decades, and the exigencies of 
trade to a considerable extent determined the outline and shape 
of Kentucky's urban matrix. 
As one western editor explained, "it requires the united influ-
ence of many individuals and various interests and the concur-
rence of a diversity of circumstances, to give impulse to the 
healthy groWth of a town." Such factors as natural and locational 
advantages, entrepreneurial leadership, technological innovation, 
outside capital investment, federal land policies, and luck, all 
played a role in determining urban success and failure. In Louis-
ville's ultimate victory over a handful of competing communities 
at the Falls of the Ohio, for example, geographical considerations 
proved of vital imponance. Resting on a broad alluvial plain, 
Louisville enjoyed unobstructed access to a rich and fenile interior 
hinterland. Moreover, Beargrass Creek, described as "a commodi-
ous little harbour without current [which] affords a safe and use-
ful harbour for boats," along with the calm pool of water between 
Corn Island and the south bank of the river, protected the keel-
boats, flatboats, and barges that tied up at Louisville from being 
sucked into the rapids. Neighboring Shippingpon and Portland, 
located below the falls on the Kentucky shore, were victimized by 
the river itself, which turned southward at the foot of the rapids 
and cut off their hinterlands. The Indiana towns-Jeffersonville 
above the falls and Clarksville and New Albany below them-
were similarly sealed off from the interior by the steep "knobs" 
that rose behind them. These places also suffered from the strong-
er Indian menace north of the Ohio that signiftcantly retarded set-
tlement in the Old Northwest. In time Louisville exploited its nat-
ural advantages to the utmost and crushed the hopes of rival 
claimants to hegemony at the Falls of the Ohio. 
A number of the projected townsites in Kentucky never got 
much further than an elaborate map, a grandiose advenisement, 
and a gleam in a speculator's eye. For three decades before the 
panic of 1819 there raged in the Ohio Valley what one newspaper 
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editor termed a "city-making mania" in which everyone went 
about "anticipating flourishing cities in vision, at the mouth of 
every creek and bayou." This "city-making mania" had its origins 
in Kentucky in the last years of the eighteenth century. In 1788 
Jacob Myers laid off a town on Slate Creek, which he assured read-
ers of his advertisement in the August 9, 1788, issue of the Ken-
tucky Gazette, had wide streets and a "public ground, sufficient 
for Courthouse, Meetinghouse and Schoolhouse." In what would 
later become standard practice, Myers offered free "in" and "out" 
lots to all persons settled in the town as of July 1, 1789. "The ad-
vantages of a Town with a public road through it to the Eastern 
states, and Navigable waters from it to the Ohio, must be obvious 
to every person," he concluded. "As soon as a crop of corn is 
raised on said land, I will erect a Grist mill, and further intend, as 
soon as possible, to erect iron works and slitting mill on the waters 
of Slate Creek." Town booming was apparently already catching 
on, for in the very same issue of the Gazette David Leitch ran an 
advenisement for his proposed town on the upper Blue Licks. 
In 1795 a group of speculators, probably English, began pro-
moting sales of lots in the projected towns of Franklinville and 
Lystra, described in glowing terms and depicted on elaborate 
maps as having churches, town halls, aqueducts, piers, colleges, 
markets, granaries, and "places of amusement." Both were laid 
out on "very eligible" plans "combining everything necessary for 
utility and ornament," so that "no doubt can be entertained but 
that a rapid progress will be made in settling them. " The crescents 
and circuses in these "backwoods baroque" plans were probably 
derived from the examples of London, Bath, Exeter, and other 
English cities. These plans contrasted with the regular grid pattern 
featuring straight streets crossing at right angles that had been 
adopted by Philadelphia and later copied by Lexington, Louis-
ville, and most of the other major Ohio Valley cities. The town of 
Lystra was laid out on the south creek of the Rolling Fork of the 
Salt River, with streets to be 100 feet wide and, anticipating the 
later common practice, free lots to be given to the fIrst schoolmas-
ter, the president of a college, the fIrst member of Congress, and 
the fIrst senator. The promoters had equally high hopes for Frank-
linville, described as "most commodiously situated between two 
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capital branches of that fine river which gives name to the state." 
Both Lystra and Franklinville were advertised in William Win-
terbotham's massive four-volume work entitled An Historical, 
Geographical, Commercial, and Philosophical View of the United 
States of Amenca, and of the European Settlements in Amenca 
and the West-Indies, published in 1796. Winterbotham also pub-
licized a proposed city with the lyrical name Ohiopiomingo, 
which he said "is to contain upwards of a thousand houses, forty-
three streets, a circus and several capital squares, which will be 
embellished with various suitable and handsome structures." This 
adventure in town booming was promoted by Pennsylvania fInan-
cier, entrepreneur, and land speculator John Nicholson, who had 
agents in London to encourage settlers from England, Ireland, 
and Wales to emigrate to his town. The promoters exclaimed that 
"Ohiopiomingo, now forming, will be a most capital township 
and town very advantageously situated about 20 miles from Lystra 
and 30 miles below Louisville, on the river Ohio, ... containing 
upwards of 100,000 acres of prime land, named in compliment to 
Piorningo, one of the Indian chiefs, a man greatly beloved and re-
spected." Settlers lured to Ohiopiomingo found themselves beset 
with rival land claims, and the proposed metropolis, like Lystra 
and Eranklinville, looked impressive only on paper. Indeed, many 
a naive investor in western property discovered to his dismay that 
he had purchased an underwater lot in a "city" which existed only 
in the imagination of an overzealous promoter or in the scheme of 
an unscrupulous swindler. Many of these speculative ventures 
came to nothing, and one Ohio Valley editor argued that "town 
making has not generally proved profItable. Of the vast number 
of towns which have been founded, but a small minority have 
prospered, nor do we think that, as a general rule, the founders of 
these have been greatly enriched by their prosperity." Only fIve 
years after he had extravagantly touted the splendors of Ohiopio-
mingo, John Nicholson died in debtors' prison, leaving behind a 
wife and eight children, an army of creditors, and debts amount-
ing to $12 million. 
The number of urban failures in the early days of Kentucky 
and the Ohio Valley may well have exceeded the number of suc-
cessful townsite promotions, but all of this activity highlights the 
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importance of cities in luring migrants and speculators westward 
and indicates the extent to which large numbers of people were 
involved in the city-building process. Pioneer Kentuckians 
brought with them across the mountains the Puritan conception 
of cities as bulwarks against the savagery of raw wilderness and as 
instruments by which civilization could be brought to a vast new 
land. The urban frontiersmen shared an optimistic and exuberant 
faith in progress and in the young nation's "un transacted des-
tiny," as well as a confident belief in the power of cities, industry, 
and technology to speed the transformation of the Ohio Valley 
from a gloomy wilderness to a flourishing region. Although small 
by twentieth-century standards, the early cities exened a dispro-
portionately large influence in the life of the Commonwealth, 
performing functions and providing services that were historically 
urban in nature. Even the tiny stockaded outposts that formed the 
nuclei of infant Louisville and Lexington served as havens for new 
migrants, shelters in time of attack, centers for religious worship 
and social gatherings, clearinghouses for economic and commer-
cial activities, and seats of administrative and governmental af-
fairs. As crucibles of culture, nurseries of enterprise, and focal 
points of scientific and intellectual activity, the towns spear-
headed advances in every major area of human endeavor. In so 
doing they fulftlled the classical role of cities as the agencies of civ-
ilization. 
By 1815 two societies had emerged in Kentucky, one rural and 
one urban, with distinct patterns of life, institutions, habits, and 
modes of thought. A farmer living near Lexington expressed this 
division in a dialogue between "Rusticus" and "Urbanus" that 
was printed in the Kentucky Reporter in 1811. "Urbanus" 
scorned the "rude, gross appearance" of his rural neighbor, add-
ing, "how strong you smell of your ploughed ground and corn 
fields. How dismal, how gloomy your green woods. What a mis-
erable clash your whistling woodland birds are continually mak-
ing." "Rusticus" responded with the rural stereotype of the city 
slicker. "What a fine smooth complexion you have, Urbanus: you 
look like a weed that has grown up in the shade. Can you walk 
your streets without inhaling the noxious fumes with which your 
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town is pregnant? . . . Can you engage in calm contemplation, 
when hammers are ringing in every direction-when there is as 
great a rattling as in a storm when the hail descends on our house-
tops?" 
The voyage of the steamboat Enterprise on the Ohio and Mis-
sissippi rivers in 1815 signaled the beginning of a transportation 
revolution that fundamentally transformed the economic and 
urban prospects of Kentucky and the Middle West. By that time 
the young cities of Louisville and Lexington had achieved a rel-
ative degree of urbanity and sophistication that the eastern sea-
ports and the cities of the Old World had reached only after cen-
turies of development. Editor Joseph Charless remembered that 
on his ftrst trip to the West in 1795 the banks of the Ohio were "a 
dreary wilderness, the haunt of ruthless savages," while only two 
decades later he found them "sprinkled with towns" boasting of 
"spinning and weaving establishments, steam mills, manufac-
tures in various metals, leather, wool, cotton and flax," and "sem-
inaries of learning conducted by excellent teachers." In 1795 
Charless and other sojourners still faced hazards on the western 
waters, and traveled aboard gunwale-enclosed vessels from which 
artillery and rifle ftre were employed to repulse Indian attacks. 
Two decades later ship companies advertised the scenic attractions 
of voyages aboard steamboats open on all sides, and the guns once 
vital for defense now saluted settlements along the way, although 
larger places quickly banned the practice as "disturbing to the 
peace." Travelers no longer "discovered" cities in the wilderness, 
but rather planned their itineraries around visits to Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, St. Louis, New Orleans, and 
other thriving communities. Thus by 1815 the roots of an urban 
civilization had been ftrmly planted in Kentucky, and the ftrst era 





GAIN! GAIN! GAIN! Gain is the beginning, the middle, and the 
end, the alpha and omega of the founders of American towns," 
English traveler Morris Birkbeck exclaimed in 1817. In the period 
immediately following the War of 1812 a wave of urban specula-
tion swept Kentucky and the Ohio Valley, set off by the optimism 
and prosperity of the era, the increasingly cultivated and settled 
character of the surrounding country, and the fact that a few 
places like Louisville, Lexington, and Cincinnati had already be-
come populous and thriving cities. The boom was spurred on by 
an extraordinary currency inflation, widespread credit buying, 
and the reckless wholesale chartering of banks. "On any spot 
where a few settlers cluster together," Birkbeck continued, "some 
enterprising proprietor finds in his selection what he deems a 
good site for a town; he has it surveyed and laid out in lots, which 
he sells, or offers for sale by auction .... Hundreds of these spec-
ulations may have failed but hundreds prosper." 
Emphasizing geographical advantages, proximity to estab-
lished communities, and location astride existing or projected 
highways of commerce, the promoters of cities in the Common-
wealth boldly named their tiny settlements after historic world 
centers such as Utica, Paris, and Versailles. The "large and beauti-
ful" site once known as "M'Cool's bottom" became the envi-
sioned city of Ghent, Simpson's Ferry was renamed Marion, and 
two likely prospects were grandiosely denominated Manchester 
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and Savannah. Throughout the state city boosters touted the ad-
vantages of places like Elba, thirteen miles from Russellville on 
the "Wolf Lick fork of Muddy River," Ragarsville, "recently laid 
off by order of the honorable court of Christian," and Frances-
burg, "near Highland Creek, Union County, ... surpassed by no 
site on the river below Louisville." "Scaevola," writing in Lexing-
ton's Kentucky Reporter in 1819, claimed that "evetywhere with-
in the state has property of this description [town lots] at some 
time or another within the last few years been pushed up to the 
most enormous prices justified by no present uses to which it 
would be applied nor profits which it could yield." Although the 
panic of 1819 burst the speculative bubble, town booming con-
tinued in antebellum Kentucky during succeeding periods of 
prosperity. In 1835, for example, the proprietors of Midway "on 
the Railroad" advertised the sale of lots, while twenty years later 
boosters heralded the advantages of Morganza, located at the 
junction of three railroads at the mouth of the Big Sandy. 
Typically, all of the projected towns were hailed as future great 
cities. Transylvania, eight miles above Louisville at "the mouth of 
Harrod's Creek," was "unquestionably the best port on the 
Ohio" and had the additional albeit dubious advantage of being 
located "immediately opposite the new town of Utica." The pro-
moters of Dover at "the mouth of Lee's Creek" declared that "a 
delightful road can be got up the hill leading to Minerva," and 
confidently proclaimed that aspiring rivals "Calais, which lays just 
opposite, and Ripley, three miles above, from the narrowness of 
the river and other disadvantages can never cope with Dover." 
Palermo, in Union County "immediately opposite the mouth of 
the Saline," would not only become a thriving commercial empo-
rium but was also" destined to become one of the great places on 
the whole river for steam works, having an inexhaustible coal 
mine within half a mile of the river, and the coal not above a foot 
below the surface." Nature had further blessed it with "one of the 
richest iron ore banks in the western country." Tiny Shippingport, 
sandwiched between Louisville and Portland, was touted as "the 
natural and inevitable port of navigation with New Orleans, Saint 
Louis and all other places situated on the Mississippi, Missouri, 




"This was the era of imaginary villages," one observer ex-
claimed. "Common sense was entirely thrown aside in the calcula-
tions of village and city-makers, and impossibilities were deemed 
feasible of execution." The most elaborately planned Kentucky 
city during this era was the proposed town of Hygeia, located on 
the Ohio River opposite Cincinnati. Purchasing a tract of land 
from a wealthy Kentuckian in 1827, English traveler and lecturer 
William Bullock planned to build a "town of retirement, in the 
vicinity of a populous manufacturing city." On his return to En-
gland, "determined to have it laid out to the best possible advan-
tage, with professional assistance," Bullock engaged John Buona-
rotti Papworth, self-proclaimed "Architect to the King of Wir-
temburg," as his town planner. An architect of some reputation, 
Papworth prepared a detailed baroque plan that incorporated 
most of the forms and building types developed in England dur-
ing the preceding century. Even though the English traveler Fran-
ces Trollope, then living in Cincinnati, praised the "taste and art 
lavished" on the place, Hygeia soon joined Lystra, Franklinville, 
and Ohiopiomingo on the growing list of speculative-paper towns 
that never materialized. 
By 1830, however, the rise of the city had already become one 
of the dominant facts of Kentucky and Ohio Valley life. Traveler 
Simon Ansley O'Ferrall wrote of "towns springing into impor-
tance within the memory of comparatively young men," and of 
log cabins still standing and "shown as the ftrst habitations built 
by the backwoodsmen, who squatted in the forest where now 
stand handsome and flourishing cities." Speaking of the entire 
Ohio Valley, Morgan Neville remarked that "the stranger views 
here with wonder, the rapidity with which cities sprang up in the 
forests; and with which barbarism retreats before the approach of 
art and civilization. " 
If the achievements of art and civilization nurtured civic pride, 
the conflicting ambitions of rival cities bred suspicion, jealousy, 
and vindictiveness, and injected increasing bitterness into inter-
urban affairs. Urban historian Richard C. Wade argued that "one 
of the most striking characteristics of this period was the develop-
ment of an urban imperialism which saw rising young giants seek 
to spread their power and influence over the entire new coun-
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try. The drive for supremacy ... was quite conscious, infusing an 
extraordinary dynamic into city growth, but also breeding bitter 
rivalries among the claimants." Seeking widespread commercial 
empires, communities reached out with turnpikes, canals, and 
railroads to tap far-flung hinterlands. "Like imperial states, cities 
carved out extensive dependencies, extended their influence over 
the economic and political life of the hinterland, and fought with 
contending places over strategic trade routes." The ensuing strug-
gles smashed young villages, smothered promising towns, and 
even brought down established metropolises. 
The most important city in Kentucky to falter was Lexington, 
dealt a crippling blow by the rise of steamboat traffic on the west-
ern rivers. The downward spiral began in 1818 and gathered mo-
mentum as the panic of 1819 and the ensuing depression acceler-
ated the pace of the city's decline. Lexington's newspapers in-
creasingly reported bankruptcies, the failure of commercial 
houses, unemployment, "languishing manufactures," "low 
prices," "hard times," and "drooping spirits." Property valu-
ations, which had soared from $1,696,249 in 1809 to $3,136,455 
in 1816, plummeted thereafter and barely climbed back up to $2 
million by 1830. The census of 1820 counted only 5,279 people in 
Lexington, an increase of but 953 inhabitants over 1810. Louisvil-
lians lost no opportunity to taunt their troubled adversary, and a 
writer in the Louisvzlle Correspondent gloated that "Lexington is, 
from the concurring reports of all, . . . most deeply shocked 
throughout all her business, ... [and is] to Louisville, compara-
tively in prospect, what Lancaster, Pa. is to Philadelphia." In-
deed, by 1830 Lexington, with a population of 6,026, ranked only 
forty-eighth in size nationally and had fallen behind such places 
as Taunton, Massachusetts, Alexandria, Virginia, and Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania. By that time Louisville had surged past her faltering 
rival, and the once proud "Philadelphia of Kentucky" had been 
reduced to serving as the commercial center of the Bluegrass re-
gion only. A Baltimore traveler who had known Lexington during 
its golden age was appalled on his return visit to the city in 1829. 
"I am sorry to say it has degenerated beyond measure," he re-
ported. "The homes and tenants seemed to me to have suffered 
an equal or similar dilapidation. Where was once the dwel-
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ling of gaiety and friendship, with every good and noble senti-
ment, was now a rusty and moss-grown mansion of ill nature and 
repulsive indifference." By the mid-1850s Lexington had finally 
secured its long-sought rail connections with the Ohio River, but 
this came far too late to enable the city to recapture its position of 
primacy in the West or even within the Commonwealth. The cen-
sus of 1860 revealed that Lexington, with a population of9,321, 
had fallen to fourth place among the cities of Kentucky. 
A number of Lexington's leaders early came to believe that the 
steamboat so altered all the circumstances of western life that only 
a radical shift in the town's economy could save it from ruin. They 
proposed to transform Lexington from a commercial and manu-
facturing emporium into a cultural mecca, with Transylvania Uni-
versity as the central attraction and magnet. Such a program, a 
writer in the Kentucky Reporter asserted in 1820, "will fill her 
empty streets, ... people her tenandess houses, [and] afford a 
market to her manufactures and [the] produce of that charming 
and fertile country with which she is surrounded. She will be filled 
and surrounded with rich men who will patronize the arts, en-
courage genius and afford a society equal in refinement and intel-
ligence to any of which the world can boast." During the 1820s 
Lexingtonians consciously adhered to a policy of promoting edu-
cation and culture in order to reinvigorate their city'S crippled 
economy. This "cultural pump priming," involving municipal, 
state, and private funds, ultimately proved a poor substitute for 
genuine economic recovery. But in the short run it provided wel-
come relief and sustained a number of merchants and landlords 
who would otherwise have bee:n ruined. 
Although the state supplied most of the financial aid to the 
university, Lexington's municipal government and the city's pri-
vate citizens were well aware of the institution's economic value 
and supported it in a variety of ways. In 1820 the city lent the 
medical division $6,000 for a library and anatomical museum, 
and gave $500 for a grammar school to be attached to the univer-
sity. In succeeding years the town council insured Transylvania's 
buildings for $10,000, endowed a "Lexington Professorship" with 
$800, and offered $1,300 in scholarships to young men through-
out Kentucky. Within five years of his arrival in 1818, Transyl-
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vania's President Horace Holley had transformed a small and 
struggling institution into the highly regarded and influential 
"Harvard of the West," one of the largest and most prestigious 
universities in the country. In 1826 the Kentucky Reporter de-
clared that "the fact that you cannot find an empry house in Lex-
ington, where in 1818 you may have found many, tells loudly 
what [the university] has done for the town." By that time a num-
ber of academies and girls' schools had grown up around the uni-
versity, attracting younger students from the state and region; an 
Atheneum combining a natural history museum with a well-sup-
plied reading room served both scholars and writers; and the city 
boasted a school of art headed by the well-patronized portraitist 
Matthew Jouett. Visitors reported that Lexington had definitely 
"taken on the tone of a literary place," and had become more 
than ever "the capital of fashion" and "a Paris in miniature" 
where "a taste for [life's] elegance and luxuries prevails [and 
where] the fashions and manners of polished Europe are found." 
Lexington "wears an air of neatness, opulence, and repose, indi-
cating leisure and studiousness, rather than the bustle of business 
and commerce," Timothy Flint observed in 1832. "There are now 
much larger towns in the West," he concluded, "but none pre-
senting more beauty and intelligence." 
Lexington's cultural renaissance bred jealousy in rival cities, 
particularly in Cincinnati and Louisville. The editor of the Ohio 
city's Liberty Hall conceded in 1820 that "Cincinnati may be the 
Tyre, but Lexington is unquestionably the Athens of the West." 
A desire for total urban supremacy nourished in Cincinnati a 
gnawing inferiority complex and a seething envy of Lexington's 
sophistication and polish. One resident maintained that "it may 
be well for us, when we can catch a moment from the grovelling 
pursuits of commercial operations, to cull and admire the varied 
sweets of those literary and scientific effusions, which have 
stamped Lexington as the headquarters of Science and Letters in 
the Western country." Another Cincinnatian, who believed his 
city'S problem to be more one of public relations, suggested that 
an ambitious lecture program might "convince those persons at a 
distance who pronounced us as a Commercial people alone, that 
we have here, both the Tyre and the Athens of the West. " The re-
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markable success of Transylvania University only heightened Cin-
cinnati's envy, and the editor of the Western Spy admitted that it 
was "particularly mortifying to see the College of a neighboring 
state attract both Students and Professors" away from home. In 
the early 1820s Cincinnati established a medical school which it 
hoped would become "a powerful rival of [Transylvania's college 
of medicine], and ultimately go beyond it. " 
During the 1830s Louisville attempted to have Transylvania's 
medical school moved to the Falls City, alarming and enraging the 
citizens of Lexington. "No one else," the editor of the Lexington 
Intelligencerfumed onJanuaty 30, 1837, "except those who have 
such a thievish propensity that they can not resist their inclination 
to appropriate that which belongs to others," could behave as 
shamelessly as had the denizens of Louisville. Louisville's actions 
toward Lexington, the Kentucky Gazette cried out, were bot-
tomed in "grasping ambition and rapaciousness." The following 
week the editor of the LouisvilleJournai responded to these accu-
sations. "The Lexington Intelligencer of Friday speaks of the pecu-
liar 'advantages of a small city for the quiet purposes of education 
and the acquisition of medical science,'" he sneered. "And so the 
'modern Athens' really condescends at last to plead her pigmy 
size as a reason why she should maintain the Medical College. We 
have little doubt, that the reason will, in her case, become 
stronger and stronger every year. " 
The rivalry between Louisville and Lexington had deep roots 
and was frequently bitter. Both places had early vied to become 
the capital of Kentucky. During the early nineteenth century the 
inland city's dependence on manufacturing created a demand for 
strong protective tariffs, while the river port's reliance on com-
merce dictated a policy that favored free trade. By the 1820s Lex-
ington resented Louisville for having acquired much of its former 
business, while the Falls City coveted Lexington's educational and 
cultural institutions. When one city helped the other, motives of 
self-interest could usually be found. The editor of the Louisvzlle 
Public Advertiser supported Lexington's bid for state funds to 
build a hospital only because he reasoned that if the Bluegrass city 
obtained such an institution, then "one of the same kind at this 
place cannot, consistently, be refused." Only the threat of a hos-
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tile outsider such as Cincinnati forced the two Kentucky cities to 
discover their mutual interests and to work together against the 
common enemy. Thus Lexington supported the Falls City when 
Cincinnati threatened to build a canal on the Indiana side of the 
river, while Louisville reciprocated by supporting Transylvania 
University's request for additional state aid when Cincinnati an-
nounced plans to open a competing medical school. 
Instances of mutual support were rare, however, and the gen-
eral tenor of relations between the two communities was acrimoni-
ous. Indeed, Louisville far more frequently attacked than came to 
the aid of Transylvania University, for the school was both the 
symbol of Lexington's cultural supremacy and the Bluegrass city's 
most vulnerable institution. "If you wish to jeopardize every ami-
able trait in the private character of your son, send him to Lexing-
ton," the editor of the Louisville Public Advertiser warned in 
1820, linking the college with political radicalism. "If you wish 
him to become a Robespierre or a Marat, send him to Lexington to 
learn the rudiments of Jacobinism and disorganization." Nine 
years later the newspaper was still hammering away at the school's 
reputation, cautioning parents that at Transylvania their children 
would be "surrounded by political desperadoes" and that "the 
very atmosphere of the place has been calculated to pollute the 
morals and principles of the youth attending it." Lexingtonians 
were stunned by the ferocity of the attack, believing that of all 
their institutions, Transylvania "was the pride and boast of the 
town" and the one "least calculated to excite the envy and stir up 
the opposition of any individual or section of the country." They 
defended their university by detailing its achievements, publiciz-
ing testimonials written by graduates and local citizens, and extol-
ling Transylvania's positive influence on students and its role in 
improving the healthfulness and the "literary atmosphere" of the 
new country. But by the late 1820s the institution's administrators 
and trustees had alienated Jacksonian Democrats, farmers, and 
conservative religious forces, thereby rendering Transylvania's al-
ready weakened position all but untenable. President Holley's res-
ignation, chronic financial problems, and a calamitous fire 
brought about the end of the university's golden age and com-
pleted the destruction Louisvillians had long sought of 
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their rival's most substantial economic prop. Ironically, the Falls 
City had thus helped pave the way for equally hated rival Cincin-
nati to emerge as both the "Athens" and the "Tyre" of the West. 
The steamboat that had spelled Lexington's decline also sig-
naled Louisville's ascendance. By slashing distances and travel 
time, steam navigation transformed the Ohio Valley into a settled 
and cultivated region in a single generation. A northward and 
eastward movement of goods came to supplement downriver com-
merce, as steamboats and a series of canals constructed in the 
1820s and 1830s connected the Ohio Valley to the Great Lakes 
and to the Atlantic seaboard. British observer Henry Bradshaw 
Fearon noted in 1817 that Louisville was "daily becoming a most 
imponant town, being the connecting link between New Orleans 
and the whole western country," while Falls City printer Richard 
W. Otis likened the steamboat to "an enchanted rod waved over 
progress." The city's population more than doubled during the 
1820s, jumping from 4,012 to 10,341, and in 1823 Italian visitor 
).c. Beltrami proclaimed that "if Pittsburgh be the Tyre, and 
Cincinnati the Carthage of the Ohio, Louisville is its Syracuse." 
Commerce remained the heart of the city's economy and the 
mainspring of its growth. By 1830 Louisville had become the cen-
ter of steamboat operations on the Ohio, handling the bulk of the 
immense tonnage that moved over the river. "The gun of the ar-
riving or departing steamboats is heard at every hour of the day 
and the night," Timothy Flint asserted in 1828, "and no person 
has an adequate idea of the business and bustle of Louisville, until 
he has arrived at the town." In 1836 Gabriel Collins, employing 
the geographical determinism typical of urban promotion during 
this period, proclaimed in his city directory that "Louisville is as 
clearly marked out by nature, as the great heart of western com-
merce, as New Orleans is, as the great mart of the South." 
By the 1830s Louisville had begun to fulfill the dreams of its 
early prophets, assuming the characteristics of a prosperous re-
gional metropolis. "Main Street, for the distance of about one 
mile, presents a proud display of wealth and grandeur," visitor 
Caleb Atwater wrote in 1831. "The stores, filled with the com-
modities and manufactures of every clime, and every art, dazzle 
the eye, [and] the ringing of the bells and the roaring of the guns 
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belonging to the numerous steamboats in the harbor, the cracking 
of the coachman's whip, and the sound of the stage driver's horn, 
salute the ear." Between 1830 and 1860 Louisville strengthened 
its commercial position and remained the largest urban center on 
the Ohio River below Cincinnati. During the 1840s manufactur-
ing began to increase in importance, and by the eve of the Civil 
War Louisville had become the twelfth largest manufacturing cen-
ter in the country and the largest industrial center in the South. 
Louisville "has grown withall at a Western rapidity," traveler 
Frederick Law Olmsted reported in 1857, having "great business, 
both as an entrep6t and as itself, a manufacturing producer." Al-
though lacking the charm of New Orleans or the "whirr" of Cin-
cinnati, the Falls City represented "a good specimen of a brisk and 
well-furnished city." 
The dramatic increase in the volume of trade on the western 
rivers following the introduction of the steamboat sharpened the 
already bitter commercial rivalry between Louisville and Cincin-
nati. From the earliest days of settlement, Cincinnatians envi-
sioned and conspired to build some kind of canal at the Falls of 
the Ohio that would facilitate the flow of commerce on the river. 
During the opening decades of the nineteenth century, Cincin-
nati-described as a "hot bed of projects" -supported various 
schemes to build a canal at the falls, usually on the Indiana side of 
the river. Louisville residents fought these efforts at every turn, 
fearing that a canal would eliminate the transshipment business 
and perhaps destroy their city's economic foundations. They at-
tempted to counter every Cincinnati initiative by promoting rival 
canal plans of their own, suggesting alternative projects such as 
improved roads around the falls, mounting propaganda cam-
paigns, and devising ingenious delaying tactics. Queen City 
spokesmen depicted Louisville as "a little town" that was trying to 
keep "all the upper country tributary to it" by compelling mer-
chants to deposit their goods in its warehouses and to pay extrav-
agant prices for transportation around the falls. 
Cincinnati, anxious both to loosen commerce on the Ohio and 
to weaken its economic rival, had a deep stake in a canal at the 
falls. "No question was ever agitated here that involved more im-
portant consequences to this town," the editor of Ltberty Hall an-
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nounced in 1817. The newspaper lent its support to the Jefferson-
ville Ohio Canal Company, chartered in 1817 by the Indiana leg-
islature, and assured potential investors that "the wealth, influ-
ence, enterprise and talents of Cincinnati are at the head of this 
measure." If Queen City residents failed to support the project, 
the editor warned, they "deserved to be hewers of wood and 
drawers of water" for Louisville. Cincinnatians responded by con-
tributing funds, providing more than half the company's direc-
tors, and sending one of their most prominent spokesmen to give 
the ceremonial address as digging began. "If the obstruction con-
tinues," the editor of the Cincinnati Advertiser cautioned in 
1818, "Louisville will be the place of deposit, and will un-
doubtedly become rich and populous; but it will be at the expense 
of all the country above it. The prosperity of Cincinnati, which 
has increased in wealth and population beyond example, will be 
checked; its capital transferred to Louisville; its population di-
verted to the same place." Thus, he concluded, "the increasing 
importance of a canal round the Falls of the Ohio, is rendered 
more evident by every day's experience. " 
Residents of the Queen City found it difficult to believe that 
anyone in Louisville could truly support a canal. "The future 
growth of [the Falls City] depends upon the obstruction," the edi-
tor of Liberty Hall declared in 1818; "remove it and Louisville 
dwindles into insignificance; the very unwholesomeness of its at-
mosphere, after the stir of business had subsided, would make it a 
deserted village." The Cincinnati Advertiser charged that "it is 
the people above the falls, whose interest it is to cut a canal, and it 
is vain and absurd for them to expect assistance from those whose 
interests are diametrically opposed." The Western Spy concurred, 
predicting that if Louisville built the channel it would be "of no 
real advantage to the country above the falls; for Louisville can af-
ford . . . several hundred thousand dollars, to construct an ineffi-
cient canal, if by that means a removal of the obstacles in the river 
could be prevented; which, if they remain, are worth millions to 
that town." 
The editor of the Louisvtlle Public Advertiser responded to 
these charges by branding Cincinnatians a suspicious, greedy, cal-
culating lot. "The people of Cincinnati, if they are like their jour-
34 
nalists, cannot believe, that those of Louisville will assist in open-
ing a canal, for the same reason that a miser always despairs of be-
ing befriended by his neighbor," he self-righteously proclaimed. 
"He is incapable of experiencing a single manly or generous emo-
tion of the heart, and his despicable selfishness leads him to sup-
pose, the balance of mankind are influenced by the same detest-
able causes." The Western Spy simply repeated its charges and as-
serted that the Falls City'S days of prosperity were numbered. "If 
Louisville really is a small town now, with the profits of trade of 
the Upper Ohio flowing into. her hands, what must she become 
when the route of this trade shall be changed? Will not her epi-
taph be written?" 
The increase in river traffic stimulated by the steamboat inten-
sified the feelings of envy and bitterness in the contending cities. 
"I discovered two ruling passions in Cincinnati," a visitor claimed 
in 1819; "enmity against Pittsburgh and jealousy of Louisville." 
The editor of Cincinnati's Western Spy ridiculed the suggestion 
that the Queen City might be jealous of her smaller downstream 
rival. "Louisville is little else than a place of deposit; Cincinnati is 
a great commercial city, with an immense extent of country, rich, 
well watered, and thickly inhabited, depending on it both for a 
market and supply," he trumpeted. "Louisville rises from the 
bosom of an extensive marsh, whose pestiferous exhalations sicken 
and destroy one third of its inhabitants yearly; Cincinnati on her 
hills is the abode of health herself. The imponance of Louisville 
sinks when the route of transportation is changed; Cincinnati 
would have grown in strength and grandeur had such a place as 
Louisville never existed. Look at the age, and present condition of 
the two places. In fine, Cincinnati is the emporium of all territory 
northwest of the Ohio; Louisville is a small trading town at the 
Falls of the Ohio River, which is now struggling to avoid a dissolu-
tion which is foreseen .... Jealousy of Louisville could have never 
entered the mind of any thinking man in Cincinnati. If such a 
mean passion exists, it must be found in Louisville towards Cin-
cinnati. " 
Jeffersonville, Indiana, tied its own metropolitan ambitions to 
those of the Queen City, and bitterly resented Louisville's at-
tempts to sabotage a canal on the northern shore of the Ohio River 
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above the falls. "Louisville with all her display is a town to let," 
the Jeffersonville Indianian charged in 1819, "and if exposed to 
public auction and the whole world for bidders, would not fetch 
enough to pay the debts of its inhabitants." The editor of the 
Louisville Public Advertiser replied that "it is better to have a 
town for let than no town at all," and dismissed the Jeffersonville 
Canal as a "contemptible ditch, which a respectable Dutch farmer 
would not consider a respectable mill-race." The irate editor of 
the Indianian retorted that his counterpart on the Public Adver-
tiser had become diseased with "sub phobia canalis villaeJefferso-
. . " mensts. 
Louisvillians reluctantly came to support a canal in order to 
prevent their rivals from building a channel on the Indiana side of 
the river. In 1825 Kentucky incorporated the Louisville and Port-
land Canal Company, which after many delays finally completed 
its work in 1833. Despite fears of diminished commercial impor-
tance, Louisville actually flourished as never before, as the volume 
and the value of commerce on the Ohio grew during the 1830s 
and 1840s. Even the transshipment business rebounded after an 
initial setback, as the much larger steamboats constructed after 
1830 simply could not negotiate locks designed to handle the 
smaller vessels of an earlier era. Indeed, ftustrated merchants in 
rival cities began calling for the enlargement of the canal almost 
from the day it opened, but new construction would not begin 
until 1860 and would then take a dozen years to complete. 
As the commercial rivalry between Louisville and Cincinnati 
provided the backdrop against which the Louisville and Portland 
Canal was built, so the economic struggle between Louisville and 
Nashville set the stage for the construction of the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad. Each community saw the railroad as a major 
weapon in its campaign to achieve commercial dominance over 
the other as well as over regional competitors such as Cincinnati, 
Chattanooga, Atlanta, Mobile, and New Orleans. During dry sea-
sons of the year the Falls City found itself challenged by Nashville, 
located at the head of navigation on the Cumberland River, as a 
distributing center for the border region, and also found itself cut 
off from outside sources of coal and other essential supplies. A 
railroad to the South would enable Louisville to break through its 
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commercial isolation when the Ohio was impassable, to neutralize 
rival Nashville, and to gain the jump on Cincinnati in the quest 
for southern markets. Ambitious Nashville interests supported 
railroads in order to end their city's dependence on the river, to 
capture southern markets, and to build their community into the 
great distributing center of the South. 
A serious challenge from Nashville in the late 1840s prompted 
Louisville entrepreneurs to revive railroad schemes that had been 
temporarily abandoned following the economic panic of 1837. 
When the Tennessee capital, with encouragement from the Ken-
tucky communities of Bowling Green and Glasgow, threatened to 
build a railroad far enough north to penetrate Louisville's markets 
but without actually entering the city, Falls City interests were 
roused to action. Fearing that Louisville might become effectively 
isolated between Cincinnati and Nashville, citizens attending a 
mass meeting in early 1850 adopted a resolution offering to sub-
scribe $1 million of city funds in a railroad to run from Louisville 
to the South. The following year the Louisville General Council 
approved a subscription for that amount, which enabled the city 
to name seven directors to the board of the newly chartered Louis-
ville and Nashville Railroad, and later in the decade the city sub-
scribed another $825,000 to the company. The L&N would both 
thwart Nashville's projected railway into Kentucky and enable 
Louisville merchants and manufacturers to tap Nashville's rail line 
to Atlanta. The decision of Louisville's business leaders to strike 
out toward Memphis from the main stem of the L&N at Bowling 
Green would also enable the Falls City to siphon off some of the 
Mississippi River trade at the Tennessee emporium. The Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad, completed to Nashville in 1859 and to 
Memphis the following year, established Louisville as the "Gate-
way to the South" and provided the best channel of trade between 
the Ohio Valley and the South until the completion of the Cincin-
nati Southern Railroad nearly twenty years later. 
In January 1856 a writer in the Commercial Review, the organ 
of the Louisville Chamber of Commerce, argued that railroads 
had "already become our great channels of trade and travel, 
throwing canals completely in the shade and rendering rivers, so 
far as human movements are concerned, of secondary impor-
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tance." So influential was the railroad considered that in 1855 the 
city council altered Louisville's official seal from "a representation 
of a wharf with boxes and bales thereon [and] a steamboat ap-
proaching the wharf" to a depiction of "a locomotive under way" 
with the motto "Progress." 
At mid-century, "progress" seemed a most appropriate motto 
for the burgeoning city at the Falls of the Ohio. The community's 
population had risen steadily from 10,341 in 1830 to 21,210 in 
1840 to 43,194 in 1850, and Louisville had moved up in rank 
from seventeenth to eleventh to tenth largest city in the country. 
In a promotional work published in 1852, Ben Casseday lyrically 
proclaimed Louisville's prospects in a style and manner reminis-
cent of Connolly and Campbell's 1774 advertisement. "Here is a 
space of level country beyond the reach of any flood, all parts of 
which are equally well adapted to the purposes of the builder, suf-
ficiently large to contain within its limits the cities of London, 
Paris, and St. Petersburg, with the foundation for a large city al-
ready laid, with a location which, in reference to facilities of inter-
course with the rest of the United States, is unsurpassed; at the 
only point of obstruction in a continuous line of two thousand 
miles of inland navigation; a half-way house between North and 
South; a point through which all the great railroad arteries must 
of necessity pass; in the center of the most fertile and productive 
agricultural lands in the Union .... What is there, in view of all 
these circumstances, to prevent it from becoming the Great City 
of the West?" 
Large-scale forces were already at work, however, that would 
soon shatter Louisville's dreams. During the 1840s St. Louis took 
its place as the commercial metropolis of the rapidly expanding 
upper Middle West, while Cincinnati appropriated the lion's 
share of the mounting commerce of the Ohio Valley and became 
the nexus of trade lines stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Gulf of Mexico. During the following decade, moreover, the 
long-range prospects of all of the river cities were diminished as 
several trunk railroad lines connected the Atlantic seaports with 
the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, reinforcing the shift of the main 
axis of trade away from a predominantly north-south orientation 
on the rivers toward an east-west flow along canals and railways. 
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By the eve of the Civil War Cincinnati had emerged as the reign-
ing metropolis of the Ohio Valley and the sixth largest city in the 
nation, with a population of 161,044. Although Louisville's pop-
ulation had climbed to 68,033 by 1860, the Falls City had 
dropped a notch from tenth to eleventh rank in size, marking the 
onset of a prolonged slide. "To all intents and purposes [Louis-
ville] is a completely finished city, evidently presenting no 
change," a Cincinnati editor gloated. "There appears to be some 
stir of business on Main Street which serves to relieve the otherwise 
dull monotony of the place. A walk of one square from this street, 
in any direction, places you in comparative retirement. " 
At times during the antebellum decades Cincinnati's expan-
sion program had threatened almost all of the cities in the Com-
monwealth, forcing them to band together to try to stymie the 
imperial ambitions of the Ohio metropolis. In 1835 Cincinnati 
promoter Daniel Drake spearheaded a drive to investigate "the 
practicality and advantage" of constructing a $7 million railroad 
between the Queen City and Charleston, South Carolina, de-
scribed by the American Rail-Road Journal and Advocate o/Inter-
nal Improvements as "the noblest work of inland communication 
ever projected." Kentucky, with its mighty river system, seemed 
to have little to gain, and as the editor of the Maysville Eagle de-
clared, "it would by no means become our State to contribute to 
the prosperity of the rival city, by allowing the road to pass 
through our territory." Only Covington, situated directly across 
the Ohio River from Cincinnati, viewed the railway as a means of 
furthering its own plans for growth and approved the original pro-
posal. Louisville, Lexington, Maysville, and Frankfort all believed 
the Cincinnati project endangered their own urban aspirations, 
and when the Kentucky legislature debated granting a charter to 
the railroad in January 1836, they suggested alternative northern 
termini within the Commonwealth. "It was properly made to ap-
pear to be an effort on the part of the cities of Charleston and Cin-
cinnati, to divert trade from the channel which God and Nature 
had prepared," the Eagle's editor asserted. The bill would cause 
"the ruin and destruction of the cities, towns, and the capitalists 
situated on those great waters" of the Ohio and Mississippi unless 
the legislature protected them. "The cities of Kentucky are strug-
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gling for self-preservation; Cincinnati through her friends in the 
Kentucky Legislature, is out to engross the entire commerce of 
Kentucky, establish and perpetuate her supremacy, and, as a nec-
essary consequence, ensure the prostration of the commercial in-
terests of the cities." A compromise was finally reached by which 
branch lines would run to Louisville and Maysville, and the com-
pany was officially organized in January 1837 as the Louisville, 
Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad. Attempts to recharter the rail-
road to provide banking privileges produced renewed tension, 
and South Carolina's Governor George McDuffie complained 
that the corporation had been "required to construct two 
branches, making together 150 miles of rail road, obviously 
against their own interest, and merely to accommodate two towns 
in Kentucky." The editor of the Louisville Public Advertiser re-
plied straightforwardly that "Kentucky was unwilling to destroy 
her own towns." Had Kentucky given its assent to the original 
plan, he continued, "Cincinnati would have been made the New 
York of the Ohio Valley." The Louisville newspaper continued its 
efforts to defeat the bill, the new charter failed by six votes, and 
the economic depression which followed the panic of 1837 along 
with other circumstances finally killed the project in 1839. 
The proposed railroad from Cincinnati to Charleston sharp-
ened the urban rivalry between Louisville and Covington. Al-
though Covington defended itself as "no contemptible rival of 
Cincinnati," the editor of the Louisville Public Advertiser re-
flected the opinion of most Kentuckians when in 1837 he branded 
the community a mere pawn of the Queen City. Dismissing Cov-
ington as "'one of the suburbs of Cincinnati," he relegated the 
town along with nearby Newport to the status of subversive and 
submissive satellites betraying their homeland in the interests of a 
foreign power. "Covington is overshadowed by Cincinnati, and so 
she must remain," the editor charged. "Competition between the 
two places is out of the question; and we think it is unreasonable 
to urge Kentucky to sacrifice her principal towns in order to give 
Covington an opportunity to assist augmenting the commerce and 
wealth and influence of Cincinnati .... The' engulphing city' of 
which the-[Covington] North Kentuckian should complain, is 
Cincinnati. That place controls and partly owns Newport and 
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Covington. It has literally colonized [the two towns], ... and 
makes them battle for her in the Legislative Halls of Kentucky . 
. . . We are sorry Newport and Covington cannot become impor-
tant points." 
The furious editor of the North Kentuckian responded by 
branding the Falls City a greedy, voracious, unscrupulous adver-
sary. "The rank, unmitigated selfishness of her policy, her unjust, 
aye, and unwise attempt to check every improvement which does 
not directly throw treasure into her lap, to prevent any other por-
tion of the state from acquiring new advantages, and even to filch 
those it may already possess, are characteristics it were well for the 
people to understand." The editor of the Public Advertiser re-
plied that some Covingtonians "might be materially edified by 
reading the story of the fly perched on the coach wheel, exclaim-
ing as the vehicle drove onward, 'Gods! what a dust I make.' ... 
Covington is not selfish, not she. It would be cruel to charge her 
with 'selfishness,' when she is so zealously laboring to remove Lex-
ington to Cincinnati; to draw half the trade of Cincinnati to her . 
. . . An infant City that would make sacrifices so large, for a pros-
pective return so small, must be pronounced extremely liberal. " 
By 1860 Covington and Newport had become the second and 
third largest cities in Kentucky, with 16,471 and 10,046 inhab-
itants, respectively, yet they remained extensions of Cincinnati. 
Traveler John Melish early observed that Newport was "a small 
place . . . quite eclipsed by the splendour of Cincinnati," while 
visitor George Ogden noticed that the streets of Covington were 
"laid out as to appear as a continuation of those of Cincinnati. " 
Other visitors echoed Ogden's observation and included Newport 
as well. "The streets of these towns," John Woods wrote in 1822, 
"are laid out to correspond with those of Cincinnati, so that from 
the upper part of the city you see the streets of Newport and Cov-
ington, without perceiving the river between them, and thus the 
whole appears but one town." Covington and Newport were more 
closely bound to Cincinnati than were New Albany and Jefferson-
ville to Louisville, but all of these smaller communities grew up in 
the shadows of their cross-river metropolitan neighbors and be-
came economic appendages of them. 
Conflicting urban aspirations also exacerbated tensions be-
41 
tween Louisville and her Ohio falls neighbor New Albany, Indi-
ana's largest city until the mid-1850s. Eager to tap the rapidly ex-
panding market to the north, Louisville entrepreneurs decided in 
1836 to construct a bridge across the Ohio to link up with Indi-
ana's proposed railroads. "The stock is taken; the funds are 
ready," the editor of the Louisville Journal announced; "so that 
our goodly sister New Albany, if she has any objection to living 
hereafter in close proximity with Louisville, and reposing under 
the generous shadow of her outstretched wing, cannot pack up 
and be off down the river or into the interior a moment too soon." 
The outraged editor of the New-Albany Gazette quickly re-
sponded to Louisville's proffered shelter. "We are saluted with 
the 'generous shadow 0/ the outstretched wing o/Louisville, '" he 
thundered. "Rather a Upas poison, or Anaconda embrace, de-
vouring everything it can feed upon .... We think the fishes of 
the Falls may rest assured that they are to have yet many years of 
sweet repose before they will be disturbed in their watery beds by 
this great 'enterprise,' crossing the river." (The fishes would in-
deed enjoy their "sweet repose" for more than another thirty 
years.) Louisville continued to covet the trade centered at New Al-
bany, and the editor of the Louisville Democrat advised in 1850 
that "a plank road to some suitable point below the Falls, would, 
without doubt, bring to Louisville the trade of a large extent of 
country on the Indiana side, which, for the want of this facility 
and transportation, is now centered in New Albany." Louisville 
businessmen also prepared plans for a railway between their city 
and Portland as well as for a new wharf below Portland at a point 
more nearly opposite New Albany. These projects would enable 
Kentucky merchants and shippers "to reap the full advantage of 
the enterprise that is constructing a railroad from New Albany 
through some of the richest portions ofIndiana up to the lakes," 
as the Louisvzlle Journal suggested. The editor of the New Albany 
Daily Ledger complained that the plan for a new wharf at "West 
Louisville . . . exhibits plainly the designs of Louisville upon the 
legitimate business of New Albany-business which it has cost 
them, individually and collectively, much of their means and ef-
forts to secure. . . . It shows that no exertion will be spared by 
Louisville to secure to herself the fruits of our labor and enterprise, 
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to which she has no more claim or right than has a town in the 
island ofJapan." 
The fate of youthful communities in Kentucky often hinged on 
timely action and aggressive entrepreneurship. When the Louis-
ville and Nashville Railroad was chartered in 1850, every hamlet 
between the two terminal cities viewed the project as a potential 
vehicle for its own urban ambitions. There ensued a mad scramble 
among these places to try to persuade the new company to run its 
tracks through their respective towns. There were two alternative 
routes through Kentucky, the lower route which would pass 
through Elizabethtown, Bowling Green, and Franklin, and the 
upper or "air-line" route which would pass through Bardstown, 
Glasgow, Scottsville, and New Haven. In September 1851 the 
L&N's board shrewdly passed a resolution stating that it had no 
preference as to route and that local subscription pledges should 
decide the matter. Proponents of both routes began a bidding 
war, and the dispute crystallized around the conflicting ambitions 
of Bowling Green on the lower route and Glasgow on the upper. 
Glasgow moved slowly and eventually offered $300,000. But 
Bowling Green took decisive action. Recognizing that a railroad 
would be the key to their city'S aspirations, Bowling Green entre-
preneurs refused to play the L&N's waiting game. They procured 
a charter similar to the L&N's from the Tennessee legislature in 
February 1852 and announced their intention of building their 
own railroad from Bowling Green to Nashville. The company 
promptly put surveyors in the field and opened subscription 
books, while the citizens of the city approved a subscription of $1 
million to the company's stock. The board of the L&N could no 
longer ignore the threat of a competing line, and in May 1852 it 
authorized a consolidation of the two companies. Although the 
lower route offered fewer serious engineering problems, passed 
through some large coal beds, and could easily be linked to Mem-
phis, Bowling Green's bold and independent action played a 
major role in the ultimate decision to follow the lower route. The 
different responses of Bowling Green and Glasgow to the same 
challenge helped shape the destinies of both places. 
By 1860 more than 120,000 people, or slightly over 10 percent 
of Kentucky'S total population, lived in the eight urban places 
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in the state having 2,500 people or more. In 1840 towns and cities 
were still concentrated in the inner Bluegrass region, along the 
Ohio River, and between the inner Bluegrass and Louisville. Only 
two decades later urbanization had begun to transform all but the 
southeastern and south-central portions of the Commonwealth. 
Although the Bluegrass centers still predominated, cities were ris-
ing from Ashland and Catlettsburg in the east where the Big 
Sandy joins the Ohio, to Columbus and Hickman in the far west 
on the Mississippi River. In between, places like Maysville, New-
port, Covington, Carrollton, Louisville, Owensboro, Henderson, 
and Paducah thrived on the trade carried along the Ohio River, 
while other communities emerged along Kentucky's principal 
tributary rivers. In the west-central portion of the state away from 
the Ohio and Mississippi, places like Russellville, Hopkinsville, 
Bowling Green, Franklin, and Madisonville had begun to grow. 
Paducah had attained a population of 4,590, Frankfort had 
reached 3,702, and Owensboro and Hopkinsville had climbed to 
2,308 and 2,289, respectively. 
By 1860 a half-century of vigorous urban imperialism and rival-
ry had established the outlines of the emerging urban network in 
Kentucky. Urban ambitions had given rise to a haphazard trans-
portation matrix comprised of turnpikes, canals, and railroads, 
which connected the sections of the Commonwealth, provided ac-
cess to distant markets, and formed one of the cornerstones of a 
developing regional economy. The hunger for power and pri-
macy, the fear of failure, and the constant search for new markets 
drove aspiring communities to provide the funds and leadership 
for, to determine the routes of, and generally to reap the largest 
rewards from the transportation revolution. When the Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad was completed in 1859, the celebration 
held in the Falls City was described as "the greatest occasion in the 
Annals of the West." A "feu de joie of champagne corks kept rat-
tling like hail on a sky-light," and proud Louisvillians confidently 
maintained that their city was destined to become "the very center 
of a vast network of [rail]roads." As urban historians Charles N. 
Glaab and A. Theodore Brown pointed out, "town rivalry was one 
of the great games of nineteenth-century America .... [The] ur-
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ban rallying cry, . . . heard through the land at every promising 
spot on road and river, ... reflect[ed] the creating of magnificent 
cities in the wilderness through hope, enthusiasm, and energy." 
Urban imperialism provided an incalculable stimulus to commer-
cial and industrial enterprise, and success bred a strong pride in 
communiry accomplishment. 
Defeat in an urban rivalry, however, bred bitterness, jealousy, 
and resentment. Early in its history Portland, at the lower end of 
the Falls of the Ohio, had ambitions to become a large place, and 
Henry McMurtrie predicted in 1819 that "its future destinies may 
be considered as those of a highly flourishing and important 
town." But in 1852 Portland was annexed by the city ofLouisville, 
and Ben Casseday reported in that year that" it has never equalled 
the least sanguine hopes of its friends [and] has no history of its 
own worthy of relation." On the evening of December 13, 1860, 
residents of the former town of Portland met at Fred Duckwall's 
saloon and voted to reestablish their independence as the "Con-
federacy of Portland." The headline of the Courier on the ftf-
teenth screamed: "AWFUL! TERRIBLE! GRAND! GLOOMY! AND 
PECUUAR! PORTIAND SECEDED!!" The delegates resolved "that all 
drivers of drays, hacks, baggage and express wagons, and other ve-
hicles of transport and travel, ... pay such a per cent of duty be-
fore entering the port as will enable the Confederacy of Portland 
to be perfectly independent of all nations of the world." In other 
resolu tions the citizens of "glorious old Portland" proclaimed that 
"the lower end of the Louisville and Portland Canal where the 
tolls are collected belongs to us," laid claim to public buildings 
and property throughout the city of Louisville, stated that "we do 
not care whether Shippingport joins us or not," and adopted their 
own flag displaying "two CatfIsh, saltant, on a market stall for a 
background." Behind this jest lay a still smoldering resentment 
the residents of Portland felt toward the metropolis that had de-
voured their town, a resentment not dissimilar to the antipathy 
agrarian southerners harbored toward what they perceived to be a 
rapacious, imperialistic, urban North. Neither for Portland nor 
for the South was a self-proclaimed confederacy destined to be-





DURING THE EARLY decades of the nineteenth century, the 
cities in the Commonwealth were challenged by an urban crisis of 
formidable proportions and frustrating complexity. As young 
communities with little knowledge of the workings of municipal 
government, they had to struggle to meet the basic needs of rap-
idly expanding populations with inadequate revenues and with 
antiquated customs derived from rural and village experiences. 
Urbanization overwhelmed municipal administrations in Ken-
tucky as elsewhere, and across the country civic leaders turned in 
desperation to temporary expedients, haphazard methods, and 
stopgap measures. "In nearly every field of municipal authority-
police, fire, streets, water, and health-conditions deteriorated so 
rapidly that a series of emergencies appeared, requiring decisive 
action," historian Richard C. Wade argued. "Anyone of these 
was grave enough to tax the ingenuity of local authorities, yet the 
crises came on many fronts. Indeed, the multiplicity of issues was 
the real danger. Communities could handle some of the chal-
lenges, but not all. Yet their interrelatedness made success in any 
single one difficult." Confronting an unprecedented array of 
probl.ems during this era, city governments moved haltingly yet 
progressively to define and provide a range of urban services. 
Those Kentucky cities that had attained substantial popula-
tion.s by 1860 had done so almost overnight. Louisville's popula-
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tion more than doubled during every decade between 1800 and 
1850, mushrooming from a mere 500 or so up to nearly 45,000. 
Newport and Covington grew from tiny hamlets of 715 and 743 
inhabitants in 1830 into burgeoning cities of 10,046 and 16,471, 
respectively, in 1860. During the same thirty-year period Owens-
boro's population increased from 229 to 2,308, while Paducah's 
jumped from 105 to 4,590. 
Rapid population growth led to increasing congestion, haphaz-
ard construction, the filling in of vacant and rear lots, and the sell-
ing off of remaining public lands. As once picturesque vistas of 
countryside and rivers disappeared behind warehouses, factories, 
and shops, residents and visitors alike bemoaned the absence of 
thoughtful urban planning and orderly development. As early as 
1797 traveler Moses Austin complained that "Louis Ville by na-
ture is beautiful but the handy work of Man has instead of im-
proving destroyed the works of Nature and made it a detestable 
place." Henry McMurtrie lamented the despoiling of the Falls 
City'S riverfront and criticized early residents for their "flagrant 
want of taste .... Had the first, or Main street, been laid off so as 
to have extended 90 feet from the brink of the second bank, form-
ing an avenue [in] front of the town, and had no houses been per-
mitted to exist north of that avenue. . . Louisville would have ex-
hibited a coup d' Dei I, surpassed, in point of beauty, by few in the 
world. As it is, the town has turned its back upon the varied and 
interesting prospect presented by the Ohio and its Falls." 
The pressure of increasing population also led to the begin-
nings of suburban growth. As early as 1832 the proprietor of 
Woodland Garden, adjacent to the Butchertown section of Louis-
ville, promoted his community as "not only THE NEAREST 
RETREAT FROM THE CITY, but ... the most extensive; affording 
many acres of land under high cultivation, Groves of native trees 
and a GARDEN abounding in all the necessaries and luxuries of 
life." Tensions and conflicts between cities and their suburbs 
emerged early. Lexington's assessor complained in 1813 that res-
idents in the out-lots "alleged no benefit resulted to them from 
either the Watch, Lamps, fire buckets or fire companies," and 
hence refused to pay their taxes. Louisvillians charged that res-
idents of Shippingport and Portland enjoyed municipal services 
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without paying for them, and in the late 1820s the Falls City 
launched a movement to incorporate the two communities in 
order to widen its tax base. 
As the cities grew, tensions between urban and rural interests 
increased and became a major factor in political and legislative af-
fairs. In local and regional elections, even though rural inhab-
itants easily outnumbered urbanites, the city dwellers were able to 
wield disproportionate power by virtue of their better organiza-
tion and leadership. During the 1820s, for example, residents of 
Louisville cast but one-fourth of a combined total of 3,200 votes 
in Jefferson and Oldham counties, yet the state senator and both 
representatives came from the city. When a third assemblyman 
was added in 1829, rural interests pleaded with Louisville leaders 
to name someone from outside the city. One observer wrote in the 
Louisville Public Advertiser that "it may seem strange that it 
would be necessary thus to ask for the liberality of 800 voters, in 
favor of2,400 .... Nevertheless, the concentrated energies of 800 
do entirely outweigh the scattered influence of the 2,400-that all 
past experience teaches." The cities were keen to have representa-
tives in Frankfort who would be "warmly attached" to urban in-
terests. When there was an attempt in 1828 to pass a reapportion-
ment bill that would have gerrymandered Kentucky's assembly 
districts to the detriment of the cities, the editor of the Louisville 
Public Advertiser charged that the sole object of the measure was 
"to curtail the weight and influence of both town [Louisville] and 
county Uefferson] in the councils of the state." 
Although cities could dominate their immediate regions, rural 
interests early gained control of the state legislature and the 
"councils of the state." The rural-dominated legislature parceled 
out privileges to the cities reluctantly and by dribs and drabs, re-
sponding to petitions for incorporation with specific grants of 
meager privileges in charters that narrowly defined the limits of 
town authority and failed to allow for urban expansion. Louis-
ville's and Lexington's first rights extended merely over land, and 
as the cities grew, problems arose which necessitated additional 
legislation and almost constant charter revision. Louisville's basic 
document had to be amended twenty-two times before 1815, as 
the Kentucky legislature needed to be convinced year after year 
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that, as it admitted in 1808, "the several laws heretofore passed 
relative to the town of Louisville, are inadequate to the purposes 
intended." State authorities did, however, rapidly grant munic-
ipalities the responsibility for providing basic urban services such 
as the paving, cleaning, and repairing of streets, fIre and police 
protection, the provision of water and lighting, the regulation of 
markets, and the removal of nuisances. 
But the legislature hamstrung local authorities by including in 
all charters stringent limitations on taxation. Denied the power to 
tax freely, Kentucky cities continually pleaded with state author-
ities to increase their allowances. "Are we to be constantly run-
ning down to Frankfort-pray give us 1000 dollars, this year-500 
more the year after-and 100 more the next?" the exasperated 
editor of Lexington's Kentucky Reporter asked in 1810. The legis-
lature increased Louisville's maximum assessment from the orig-
inal £25 to $200 in 1803, $800 in 1805, and $2,000 in 1812, but 
the rate never surpassed 1 percent of real and personal property. 
The cities turned to other sources of revenue, such as rent from 
market stalls, wagon and cart fees, tavern licenses, and court fInes, 
but these never amounted to more than one-fourth of the whole 
income. When local governments resorted to fInancing improve-
ments by borrowing, either from private banks or by issuing their 
own notes, the state responded by enacting debt-limitation legis-
lation. 
During their formative decades, therefore, Kentucky cities had 
barely enough revenue to provide the essential urban services they 
were given responsibility for, let alone sufficient funds to meet 
emergency needs. "The proceeds of seven years taxes," the trus-
tees of Lexington argued in 1796, "will be insufficient to build 
stone bridges, and to make sewers for carrying off water, to sink 
wells and erect pumps . . . and to make such other repairs, as are 
necessary for the health, safety and convenience of their fellow cit-
izens." Two decades later the trustees of Louisville declared that 
their income was "entirely insufficient to answer the purposes of 
the town." Towns petitioned to become cities in part to secure the 
increased fiscal responsibility and more substantial home rule em-
bodied in city charters in provisions for greater revenue, loosened 
debt restrictions, and broadened enforcement powers. In 1828, 
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when Louisville became a city, the annual budget climbed to 
$40,000, and the following year a special committee reported that 
"the finances of the city are favorable to a vigorous prosecution of 
the system of improvements by the extending of the graduation 
and paving of the streets, filling & draining of the ponds," and 
other programs. 
Yet neither Louisville nor any other city in the state enjoyed 
sufficient revenue to enable it to provide a full range of urban ser-
vices. Priorities had to be established, programs carefully chosen, 
and some projects delayed indefinitely. That the wealthiest mer-
chants dominated the city councils and boards of trustees guaran-
teed that mercantile considerations would govern the allocation of 
scarce resources. Projects deemed essential for the growth of trade, 
such as market facilities, wharves, and improved streets, were gen-
erally given preference over the provision of schools, drainage of 
stagnant pools of water, and establishment of an effective watch. 
In 1819 McMurtrie accused Louisville's trustees of allowing police 
protection to deteriorate while they concentrated on commercial 
issues, and warned that "as long as the trustees or other officers 
are chosen from among mercantile men. . . so long will the town 
have to take care of itself. " 
Because commercial enterprise depended on the ability to 
move men and merchandise rapidly into and through the towns, 
the primary concern of the young communities became the paving 
of main arteries and central thoroughfares. Indeed, the quest for 
adequate all-weather streets occasioned more legislation and con-
sumed more revenue than any other single issue. Trustees fre-
quently devoted entire meetings to grading and paving, and bud-
gets regularly allocated between one-fourth and one-half of all 
disbursements to these projects. In 1811, for example, Lexington 
spent $1,790 out of a total budget of $4,300 on street improve-
ment and repair, while in 1830 Louisville allocated $17,031 out of 
$46,245 for surfacing and cleaning. 
Despite such large expenditures, most streets and thorough-
fares in and around Kentucky's cities remained unimproved and 
unpaved, dusty in good weather and muddy in bad. A resident of 
the Falls City declared in 1822 that "there is not a worse mud-hole 
within 20 miles of Louisville, than our much admired MAIN 
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STREET." He estimated that the "unwary traveller" would need an 
escort of four policemen in order to "circumnavigate that' Slough 
of Despond.'" Mrs. Basil Hall, visiting Louisville in 1828, re-
poned that the city had "the worst paved streets I ever saw." In 
1852 the editor of the Louisville Daily Courier advised that any-
one traveling the plank road from Louisville to Portland "had bet-
ter take a life preserver along," while in 1860 his counterpart at 
the Louisville Daily Journal suggested that the approaches to the 
city were "vile and execrable passwamps ... in a most disgraceful 
condition." Major avenues in the center of town were in no better 
condition. "In one patticular Louisville has gained an unenviable 
notoriety," the editor of the Courier charged. "We allude to the 
careless and dirty condition of the streets. In dry weather we are 
suffocated with constant clouds of dust, and in wet weather the 
streets are almost impassable on account of the accumulated mud 
and ftlth." Editor George D. Prentice of the Journal argued in a 
similar vein that Louisville's thoroughfares were either "uncom-
monly dusty" or so inundated that "skiffs would be useful con-
veyances to cross them." In July 1860 a draft authorizing the issu-
ance of $1 million in bonds to be used for the improvement of 
streets and sewers was submitted to Louisville's General Council, 
which was once again preoccupied with "bouldering," paving, 
cleaning, and repairing the streets. 
Municipal officials enacted ordinance after ordinance in a vain 
attempt to ease congestion and smooth the flow of traffic. As early 
as the 1780s Lexington's trustees ordered "all persons having cab-
ins, cow pens, hog pens or other enclosures whatever within the 
main streets" of the city to remove them within sixty days. Louis-
ville's trustees imposed fines for loitering, double parking, and 
galloping horses within the city limits. They forbade blacksmiths 
to shoe horses in the middle of the street, builders to block traffic 
with their equipment, and haulers to let wagons and vans stand 
for more than six hours while loading or unloading. But such leg-
islation was routinely ignored, and streets remained choked with 
traffic and debris as congestion grew steadily worse. "One of the 
most thronged of our public thoroughfares is Market Street, be-
tween Third and Fourth," the editor of the Louisville Daily Jour-
nal announced in 1860. "There is a continual, in fact, unintermit-
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ting passage of vehicles. The paving contractors have deposited 
their heavy curbing stones and blockaded very nicely the entire 
street. It is barricaded equal to any of the Paris avenues during the 
revolutions of 1830, or that of 1848." 
City streets were rarely cleaned, and their foul state evoked 
constant complaint from residents and travelers alike. In 1805 
Louisville's trustees reported that the city's thoroughfares were 
cluttered with an assortment of "fire wood, ... hog and pig 
fecus, dead animals, stable manure, [and] shavings and litter from 
buildings." During the same year the trustees of Lexington hired 
a free Negro named Davy to take four dead cows out of the street, 
while in 1811 officials in Louisville ordered watchmen to remove 
"all dead carcases ... to some remote part of Town. " Each of the 
many horses that passed through the towns relieved itself of be-
tween twenty and twenty-five pounds of manure a day. In wet 
weather the excrement turned streets into cesspools, while during 
dry spells it was refined into "pulverized horse dung" which blew 
"as a sharp, piercing powder" to cover people's clothes and irri-
tate their eyes and nostrils. The trustees of Louisville enacted legis-
lation to try to curb the numbers of "mad dogs" roaming the 
streets, and in 1828 the city officials offered a one-cent bounty for 
every rat killed and its scalp presented as evidence. (One citizen 
collected $1.36 for a single evening's work!) In his 1849 report to 
the American Medical Association on the "Sanitary Condition of 
Louisville," Dr. Lunsford Pitts Yandell declared that "it would 
certainly be difficult to find anywhere more uncleanly lanes and 
thoroughfares than Louisville exhibits. The refuse from the houses 
is deposited in the streets and alleys, and, with the filth produced 
by every other cause, is allowed to accumulate in heaps." By the 
eve of the Civil War conditions had not improved, and the editor 
of the Louisville Datly ] oumal argued that Market Street "is a per-
fect maelstrom and whirlpool of filth. All that alludes and effer-
vesces from the lager beer saloons is deposited in the streets. There 
is garbage of every imaginable description of noxious substances. 
We are sure that our friend Dr. Weatherford, the Street Commis-
sioner, if he ever passes that way, will elevate his nose to so great 
an angle that he will immediately set to work and have a cleansing 
of these Augean stables. " 
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Residents of a typical frontier city wading through flooded 
streets and battling swarms of rats, circa 1858 
The early system by which individual householders and shop 
owners were responsible for sweeping the streets and removing 
nuisances broke down as rapid urbanization transformed hamlets 
into towns and cities. Local governments increasingly assumed re-
sponsibility for these services, hiring full-time street cleaners or 
appointing commissioners who organized their own crews. In 
1813, for example, Lexington's trustees divided the city into ten 
wards or sanitary districts for "the purpose of employing scaven-
gers to clean the streets of mud, dirt, filth &c." Ordinances were 
poorly enforced, however, and citizens became ever more aggra-
vated. "We have had Hog Laws, Dog Laws, Theatre Laws, and 
Laws about the Hay Scale ... Kitchen Slops, Soap Suds, and 
Filth of every kind, and in no single instance have they been exe-
cuted," irate Lexingtonians charged. 
In Kentucky cities, as in communities throughout the country, 
bands of hogs, protected by law and allowed to roam the streets to 
consume the garbage and refuse deposited in them, formed the 
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first line of defense against filth. Charles Dickens visited Louisville 
and reponed in 1842 that the streets were "perfectly alive with 
pigs of all ages, lying about in every direction fast asleep, or grunt-
ing along in quest of hidden dainties." Dickens was particularly 
interested in the peregrinations of "a very delicate porker with 
several straws sticking about his nose, betokening recent investiga-
tions in a dunghill." In 1850 Lady Emmeline Stuan-Wortley con-
cluded that Louisville was evidently preparing for a "pronuncia-
mento of pigs, they carry their snouts so high already, and seem so 
bristling with imponance." Although residents occasionally com-
plained when rampaging pigs ran down children in the street or 
crashed through parlor and storefront windows, town dwellers 
generally recognized the "Herculean" and indispensable service 
these animals performed and hence tolerated their presence. 
During the early nineteenth century, progress in street cleaning 
was impeded by primitive methods of sanitation which were still 
largely those of the farm. Privies and water closets emptied into 
vaults and cesspools, and the waste products were either infre-
quently hauled away or allowed to soak into the soil to possibly 
contaminate water supplies. In Lexington, for example, the trus-
tees feared in 1814 that the water table lay so close to the surface 
that cesspools threatened "to communicate with these wells ... 
to jeopardize the health of our citizens." Fecal waste, urine, and 
kitchen slops were deposited in open drains which ran down either 
the middle or the sides of the streets and which depended upon 
rainfall and gravity to carry off the refuse. These primitive sewers 
were poorly constructed and became clogged with putrifying ani-
mal and vegetable matter when they were not dry. Angry res-
idents constantly complained about the "filthiness of the gutters 
and sewers," the "greenish hue" of the accumulations, and the 
"noxious exhalations" which obstructed passage and endangered 
health. One Louisvillian recalled that on the eve of the Civil War 
pigs still roamed the downtown streets of the city and that "York 
Street ... was an open sewer, possibly intended as a drain for that 
immediate locality." 
At night, city streets were virtually pitch black. A few tavern 
owners and residents put their own oil lamps on the street in the 
early days, but since lamp-breaking became one of the more pop-
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ular outdoor sports among western teenagers, not many individ-
uals took the risk. In 1819 McMurtrie observed that in Louisville 
"not a single lamp lends its cheering light to the nocturnal passen-
ger, who frequently stands a good chance of breaking his neck." 
As late as 1860, "Reform," writing in the Louisvtlle Datly Cou-
ner, complained that the condition of the streets was such "that it 
is hardly safe for a vehicle to pass in the night." While Lexington 
became the first frontier city to provide its citizens with a public 
lighting system in 1812, and Louisville became the fust city in the 
West to provide gas lamps in 1837, most streets and thoroughfares 
remained without illumination. British visitor James Silk Buck-
ingham reported in 1840 that in Louisville "the principal streets 
are lighted with gas; but by far the larger portion of the town is 
without lights or lamps. " 
Dark streets and alleys became increasingly unsafe as rising 
crime rates accompanied expanding population and wealth. Bur-
geoning commerce brought growing numbers of boisterous and 
semi barbarous transients to the cities-boatmen, adventurers, 
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wagoners, drifters, migrant laborers, and ne'er-do-wells-de-
scribed by contemporaries as "thoughtless, profligate, and degen-
erate" and "the most riotous and lawless set of people in Amer-
ica." When they hit town they' spent much of their time gam-
bling, carousing, fighting, drinking, consorting with "ladies of 
pleasure" and "nymphs of the pave," and terrorizing local inhab-
itants. This low life came to center in the grog shops, tippling 
houses, and brothels located on downtown streets and alleys, 
which formed small but ugly enclaves of vice and lawlessness. 
Havens for partially organized crime and the "dangerous classes, " 
they harbored gangs of teenagers, criminals, and local riffraff who 
brutally assaulted local inhabitants and stole or destroyed their 
property. In 1820 a Louisville grand jury referred to a few down-
town blocks as the "nurseries of vice and immorality" and the 
"sinks of society," and complained about "the great and unusual 
increase of tippling houses and houses of ill fame" in this district. 
Four years later a town meeting established a committee of thirty 
prominent citizens to "suppress" those engaged in "gambling, 
drunkenness, and other practices subversive to the peace, comfort 
and good order of society." No effective action followed, how-
ever, and complaints against this unsavory element continued to 
mount. 
Lexington and Louisville early organized systems for police pro-
tection, supported largely or wholly by public funds, which be-
came the most advanced in the West. The fear of Negroes and the 
desire to control growing urban slave populations seem to have 
been the primary incentives. In 1800, for example, Lexington ex-
panded its watch to cover nights and Sundays when citizens com-
plained that "large assemblages of Negroes [had] become trouble-
some to the Citizens," while Louisville added a fourth watchman 
to its patrol in 1826 with instructions "to be very particular as it 
regards collections of colored people. . . about the Market House 
and groceries." Louisville's trustees proclaimed that "it shall be 
the duty of the Watchmen as far as possible to prevent conflagra-
tions, Felonies, Riots, routs, breaches of the peace and all unlaw-
ful assemblies of negroes." To carry out these tasks each watch-
man was armed with "a staff with a pike and hook on one end, a 
dark lantern, a rattle and trumpet, a small ladder and flambeau, a 
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pair of scissors and a tin pot with a spout for the purpose of filling 
the lamps of this town with oil." So outfitted the night watchmen 
went about their rounds crying "in a shrill, unearthly tone, the 
time of night, and the weather." For undercover work Lexington 
hired "two confidential persons" and Louisville employed a "se-
cret patrol. " 
Although these early police forces compared favorably with 
those in other cities, they were nevertheless small, untrained, 
poorly paid, ineffective against periodic waves of vandalism and 
major riots, and less than professional in their conduct. Poor en-
forcement was everywhere lamented, and Lexington authorities 
heard repeated allegations regarding the "improprieties," "delin-
quency," and "sundry misdemeanors and neglect of duty" of 
their watchmen. Local governments waged a constant battle to 
raise standards, maintain discipline, and improve morale, but 
with little success. Lexington officials in 1820 upbraided the cap-
tain of the watch for not breaking up a riot, fired the entire force 
five years later, and in 1827 received a petition attacking the chief 
"for sleeping in the watch house 6 to 8 hours in the night" and 
certain others who "sometimes intoxicate themselves with ardent 
spirits to the manifest injury of the public interest." In Louisville 
the trustees discharged almost every member of the patrol in 1822 
and issued a call for "vigilant and temperate men." Seven years 
later they had to warn the guard not to "frequent the theatre, cir-
cus or any exhibition during watch hours," and had to fire one 
Peter Schwartz for the" improper treatment of an unprotected fe-
male." Teenagers and rowdies loved to "bait the watch," and 
even adults obstructed their work. In 1856, a year after Louisville's 
"Bloody Monday" nativist riot left between fourteen and one 
hundred persons dead and many more wounded and beaten, the 
city's General Council established a police department patterned 
after those in New York, Boston, and other eastern cities. The 
force consisted of a chief, his two assistants, eleven regular day 
watchmen, twenty-two regular night watchmen, and sixteen 
"supernumerary" watchmen. In spite of this change, the patrol-
men continued to be largely undisciplined and incompetent, and 
the lives and property of the residents remained insecure. 
Ineffective police forces also weakened the defenses of cities 
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against fire, as the evening watch was designed in part to be an 
alarm system. Crowding increased as jerry-built structures were 
thrown together contiguously, and although the number of brick 
and stone houses rose steadily, builders continued to use wood ex-
tensively. The hastily constructed, closely packed buildings made 
fires difftcult to contain, and primitive equipment worked badly 
or not at all. Arson early became a favorite weapon employed by 
disgruntled slaves. Small fires broke out so regularly that they re-
ceived only passing notice in the newspapers, and serious confla-
grations erupted with alarming frequency. In 1806 fire destroyed 
Hart and Dodge's rope factory in Lexington causing $8,000 in 
damages, and in 1827 flames swept through downtown Louisville 
destroying $20,000 worth of property. In the aftermath of the lat-
ter fire, the editor of the Louisvzlle Public Advertiser admitted 
that "we are alike destitute of fire hooks and scaling ladders, and 
two of the three engines were out of repair." Looting must also 
have constituted a problem because" A Sufferer" wrote an open 
letter to the same newspaper stating that "he has no reason to be-
lieve, but that every individual who has become possessed of any 
of his property, will take the earliest occasion to return it." In 
1840 the Falls City suffered a spectacular blaze that consumed 
thirty or more buildings worth approximately $300,000. The total 
damages from fire exceeded losses sustained in all other ways in 
these young cities, a fact reflected in the rates of the Kentucky 
Mutual Assurance Fire Company. 
Initially the entire community was expected to respond to a 
fire, considered a city emergency, and residents were required to 
keep leather buckets in readiness. Lexington's trustees, for exam-
pie, ordered all those between sixteen and sixty to appear at every 
blaze and form a bucket brigade. This system may have suited the 
needs of small villages, but it proved clumsy and impractical in 
rapidly growing cities, which turned increasingly to quasi-public 
volunteer fire companies. These volunteer companies were largely 
self-governing entities which were supported by city funds and 
equipment and by housing and other ordinances designed to 
minimize risks. The volunteer fire laddies, often dressed in color-
ful costumes, developed great esprit de corps, and their com-
panies served more as social and political clubs than as the service 
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organizations they were chartered to be. The various companies 
engaged in spirited and often bloody rivalries, and the "vamps" 
were frequently more interested in fighting each other than in 
battling the blaze. A Louisville observer remembered that "the 
dispositions on the part of one company to out-do another in val-
orous deeds and appear first upon the scene of a fire, often caused 
open hostilities while on their way to the conflagration, and the 
result was an abandonment of the apparatus and a general 'set to' 
until one or the other succumbed from mere exhaustion." In 
Louisville during 1855 a group belonging to a German hook and 
ladder company seriously injured a member of a rival company by 
pulling a ladder out from under him. Shortly thereafter, the 
members of the rival company set a trap for their antagonists by 
turning in a false alarm, then ambushed them, smashing their 
equipment and rolling it into the Ohio River. During the same 
year, after a newly built public school burned to the ground, the 
Louisvtlle Daily Journal reported that the loss was due "more to 
lack of harmony among the several fire companies than want of 
water." 
Local authorities increasingly assumed wider reponsibility for 
fire protection, screening applicants, supervising company fi-
nances, purchasing new pieces of equipment and keeping them in 
good repair, and generally circumscribing the independence of 
the volunteer companies. In 1858 Louisville's insurance under-
writers forced the city's General Council to replace the unruly vol-
unteer companies with a small, professional, paid fire depart-
ment. The chief engineer of the new company boasted that this 
shift eliminated "the rioting and shedding of blood which have 
been attendant upon fire alarms, while the volunteer system was 
in existence. " 
Effective fire fighting depended in part on an ample supply of 
water, but rapidly growing cities frequently faced a crisis in pro-
vision of water both for battling blazes and for drinking. Ken-
tucky cities early undertook to provide their citizens with water, 
erecting public wells equipped initially with a curb and buckets 
and later fitted with pumps. Pioneer settlers relied on these wells 
along with streams, springs, and rivers for their water ~upplies. 
Without the germ theory of disease to inform public opinion, 
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early residents chose their drinking water on the basis of taste and 
appearance rather than purity. Although McMurtrie thought the 
Ohio an "extremely pure" river, he noted that Louisvillians pre-
ferred well water, which he found "extremely bad, containing, 
besides a considerable quantity of lime, a large portion of decom-
posed vegetable matter." The construction of a water works in the 
Falls City would not begin until 1857, and the system would not 
be placed in operation until 1860. 
Pools of stagnant water posed an additional problem for Louis-
ville, Henderson, and other Kentucky communities. Louisville in 
particular suffered from these "depots of universal mischief," 
which brought sickness during the summer months and gave the 
city its reputation as the "graveyard" of the Ohio Valley. Richard 
Clough Anderson, Jr., wrote in his diaty in 1815 that the "fatal 
sickliness of the place . . . must continue until the ponds are 
drained of stagnant water." In 1822 several hundred Louisvillians 
perished in a tragic yellow fever epidemic which, in the words of 
Dr. Daniel Drake, "scoured [the city] almost to desolation." The 
editor of the Louisvtlle Public Advertiser again complained about 
the ponds, "those intolerable and life destroying nuisances," 
while the following year Italian visitor].C. Beltrami observed that 
"a great number of the inhabitants [of this town] yearly fall a sac-
rifice to the pestilential exhalations of the surrounding marshes." 
For the next six years the effort to drain the ponds became the 
chief business of the town, and other projects were cut back or 
postponed. The state authorized a $60,000 lottety in 1823 to help 
finance the project, the Louisville Theatre held benefit perfor-
mances for the "Pond Fund," and a town engineer was appointed 
to superintend the draining effort. By 1849, Dr. Lunsford Pitts 
Yandell could assert that "within the city limits [the ponds] are 
nowhere to be seen," but he admitted that "south of the city, and 
extending twenty miles. . . , is a district of country known by the 
ominous name of the' Pond Settlement .. " 
Fetid pools of stagnant water, poor sanitation. shortages of 
pure water, overcrowding, erroneous beliefs about the causes of 
disease, and a laissez-faire governmental tradition which made 
measures of public control difficult. all contributed to the most 
terrifying problem in the early history of Kentucky cities-
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epidemic. Although endemic diseases such as malaria and tuber-
culosis regularly killed far more inhabitants than did the periodic 
waves of pestilence, it was the spectacular presence of plague that 
produced a widespread awareness of the filthy and unhealthful 
conditions in the cities and contributed to concerted efforts to 
bring about sanitary reform. Communities at first reacted to epi-
demics by hastily setting up haphazard and temporary boards of 
health that disappeared with the diseases that had brought them 
into being. In 1822, for example, Louisville established a board of 
health and invested it with the responsibility to secure the city 
"from the evils, distresses, and calamities of contagious, malig-
nant, and infectious diseases." But as early as May 1823 the editor 
of the Louisville Public Advertiser, concerned about the possibil-
ity of another outbreak of yellow fever, charged that "no sooner 
are we completely over the effects of a 'spell of sickness,' than av-
arice seems to resume her sway, and each man begins to look out 
for himself." Five decades later municipalities recognized their 
obligation to maintain permanent boards of health invested with 
sweeping powers to curtail the liberties of individuals in order to 
protect the welfare of the community. Fear of epidemic disease, 
and the growing realization that epidemics could be prevented 
through sanitary measures, more than any other factors worked to 
modify the extreme individualism that early city dwellers had 
brought with them from rural and frontier areas. 
Asiatic cholera was the classic epidemic disease of the nine-
teenth century, as bubonic plague had been of the fourteenth. It 
struck the United States in 1832, 1849, 1866, and 1873, the peri-
od during which public health and sanitary engineering were 
straining to catch up with rapid urbanization and the transporta-
tion revolution. Cholera was spread through contaminated water 
supplies, but neither the cause nor the etiology of the disease were 
known at the time. (It was not until 1883 that Robert Koch iso-
lated the Vibrio cholerae, the motile, comma-shaped bacillus that 
caused cholera.) The highly explosive character of the epidemic 
outbreaks and the spectacular symptoms of the disease spread fear 
and panic in Kentucky, as elsewhere. Cholera had a short incuba-
tion period and a high fatality rate, and its symptoms were strik-
ingly similar to those of acute arsenical poisoning. Diarrhea, acute 
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spasmodic vomiting, and severe abdominal cramps led rapidly to 
dehydration, cyanosis, and frequently death. Individuals who ap-
peared quite well in the morning could be dead by nightfall, and 
physicians were largely helpless in the face of a plague they could 
neither understand nor cure. 
When Asiatic cholera first struck Kentucky in the years be-
tween 1832 and 1835, it spread terror and confusion along with 
illness and death. Thousands fled cities and towns in a "perfect 
stampede," but cholera infected rural areas as well, leaving one 
frightened Lexingtonian to relate that "when I thought of flight, I 
knew not where to go-the country [was] filled with cholera." As 
the demand for coffins outstripped the supply, the bodies of chol-
era victims were hastily deposited in jumbled heaps at cemetery 
gates in boxes, trunks, and even the bed linens in which they had 
died. The dead were frequently buried in long, shallow trenches, 
producing an unmistakable and unforgettable stench. "Great fear 
fell over the people [of Danville] and paleness spread over every 
face," Dr. J.J. Polk recalled. A Lexington newspaper editor con-
fessed that "the stoutest hearts seemed to quail before the relent-
less destroyer ... [and everyone] seemed to be seized with an aw-
ful dread." During the summer of 1833, one-third of Lexington's 
population fled and over 500 residents of the city died. An un-
identified Lexingtonian observed that "the distress is beyond de-
scription! No city police,-(at least not visible)-no board of 
health-no medical reports-and the streets have for the most 
part the stillness which pervades the ruins of Palmyra .... The 
markets are suspended and the bakers' shops shut, with one ex-
ception. Not a pound of beef to be got-and very little else. Not 
even a cracker for sale. . . . I leave you to imagine the picture of 
our despair." A Russellville woman wrote two years later that 
"every description of business made a full stop. The printer and 
all the magistrates died, the postmaster and clerks were at the 
point of death, every store shut up, their owners either dead or 
fled into the country. I have never seen such a scene of calamity in 
my life." 
Most physicians subscribed to the miasmatic theory of disease, 
believing that illness was spread by poisonous gases or "pestilen-
tial exhalations" emanating from rotting organic and vegetable 
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matter, decaying garbage and filth, and fetid pools of stagnant 
water. Although this environmentalist theory of disease was un-
sound, it nevertheless provided a strong argument for cleaning up 
cities and for instituting sanitary and health reforms. In June 1832 
the editor of the Louisville Public Advertiser urged local author-
ities to emulate the preventative efforts of Philadelphia and Cin-
cinnati by inaugurating a campaign to "clean and purify the ciry" 
and "cleanse our streets and alleys from every impurity." He 
warned that "no expense, no pains should be spared to accom-
plish this object. The lives of our citizens should not be sacrificed 
to a cold calculation of dollars and cents. Precautionary steps can-
not be taken too soon-when pestilence shall be seen stalking 
through our ciry, and filling our dwellings with desolation and 
death, it will be too late to begin the work ... recommended by 
every consideration of humanity." Despite such warnings, the ini-
tial cholera outbreak in Kentucky did not excite city or state offi-
cials to enact sanitary measures to prevent the return of the 
pestilence. 
When news of cholera's return to the United States in 1849 
reached Kentucky, however, a few communities embarked on or-
ganized clean-up campaigns as preventative measures. Coving-
ton's municipal officials, at the urging of the community's physi-
cians, divided the city into districts and established a board of 
health for each area. These boards were to supervise the cleaning 
of cellars, privies, stables, backyards, streets, gutters, and sewers, 
to provide for drainage of nearby ponds, to use whitewash, lime, 
and nitrate of lead to disinfect and remove offensive odors from 
cleansed areas, to establish dispensaries where the poor could ob-
tain free medical advice, and to keep accurate morbidity and mor-
tality statistics. The clean-up campaign was credited with prevent-
ing a serious epidemic in Covington. In Louisville, when cholera 
broke out in the same filthy section of riverfront dwellings and 
warehouses that had been most severely stricken in 1832, the 
mayor and city council appointed a board of health and charged it 
to improve conditions throughout the city but especially to scour 
that foul area. Several Louisvillians who refused to clean their 
yards were placed under arrest. The clean-up campaign continued 
through the fall and winter, and when cholera returned during 
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the summer of 1850, no cases were reported in the newly cleansed 
area. On June 16, 1850, the editor of the Louisville Journal re-
ferred to Asiatic cholera as "a health inspector that speaks in a lan-
guage that no one can misunderstand." 
Although in 1832 some Kentuckians viewed cholera as "a dis-
pensation of DivineJustice in consequence of our national and in-
dividual sins," as the Kentucky Conference of Methodist Preach-
ers proclaimed, the scourge increasingly came to be seen by inhab-
itants of the cities as a byproduct of remediable faults in sanita-
tion. Between 1849 and 1854 London physician John Snow 
proved experimentally that cholera was spread through contam-
inated water and that, even though it still could not be cured, it 
could be prevented through disinfection and quarantine. In 1866 
New York City established its Metropolitan Board of Health, and 
the agency's achievements reinforced the growing conviction that 
cities had an obligation to vigorously enforce sanitary regulations 
to protect the public health, circumscribing designated individual 
freedoms where necessary. "When 125,000 people are gathered 
together on 10 square miles of land they must of necessity give up 
certain of their liberties," Dr. Charles V. Chapin, a pioneering 
champion of public health, contended. "It is the sacrifice they 
make for the advantages of city life." As historian Charles E. 
Rosenberg pointed out, cholera acted as a catalyst in helping "to 
bring about the creation of the public health reforms demanded 
by the almost unendurable conditions of the nineteenth-century 
city." By fits and starts, Kentucky cities moved to embrace the 
gospel of public health, establish permanent and powerful boards 
of health, and enforce standards of cleanliness and healthfulness. 
. In 1873 Asiatic cholera returned for its final visit to the United 
States. Although the pestilence probably ravaged Kentucky more 
severely than any other state in the union, most of the larger cities 
across the state remained relatively unscathed, and Lexington re-
ported no cases of the disease at all. But residents of small towns 
and villages had not learned the lessons that cholera had so pro-
foundly impressed upon urban inhabitants, and they suffered ac-
cordingly. Columbia, Kentucky, a hamlet of 600, was devastated 
by the pestilence in 1873, and some charged that the truculence of 
a few individuals" proved to be the cause of much suffering." The 
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owner of a particularly vile hotel and stable stubbornly insisted 
that the request of authorities that he clean up his establishment 
represented an "unwarranted interference with his property." 
Two months after cholera had spread through his hotel and local 
authorities had ordered it closed and disinfected, a visitor inspect-
ing the hotel rooms in which victims of the pestilence had died 
discovered that the quarters had been neither cleaned nor disin-
fected. The error of not having cleansed these rooms was "most 
earnestly impressed upon the person in charge of the property, 
with the only result of eliciting an expression of displeasure at 
such interference-a closing demonstration of the same foolish 
obstinacy that had subjected the town to a fearful epidemic" that 
had killed one hundred of Columbia's inhabitants. 
As the cholera years drew to a close, the cities in the Common-
wealth were increasingly replacing casual, semiprivate systems for 
provision of basic urban services with formal, publicly financed 
and governmentally operated programs. The magnitude and ur-
gency of the first urban crisis had bred civic responsibility, leader-
ship, and a new kind of urban statesmanship. Municipalities had 
begun to experiment on a modest scale with long-range programs 
and city-wide planning, reflecting a growing awareness of the in-
terdependence and scope of the problems. Asiatic cholera had 
come as "a health inspector that speaks in a language that no one 
can misunderstand." It had taught that municipal government 
had the obligation to expand its powers in order to provide essen-
tial services and protect the general welfare. And it had taught 
that, in the words of one city health officer, "good privies are far 





AT THE CLOSE of the Civil War, both Louisville and Cincinnati 
impatiently stood ready to reopen trade with the South and to re-
new their economic rivalry with each other. On April 29, 1865, 
the editor of the Louisvzlle Daily Journal announced that "we 
deem it a matter of the utmost importance that the freedom of 
trade [with the South] should be established at the earliest day 
possible which may be consistent with the idea of withholding 
supplies from the enemy." He warned Falls City merchants that 
"none of our natural tributaries must be diverted from us by supe-
rior inducements, either in price or transportation, which may be 
offered by our competitors." Several weeks later he cautioned that 
"we may rest assured that other communities will not remain idle. 
Chicago, Cincinnati, St. Louis, etc., will be astir, and unless we 
intend to surrender at discretion and give up this new contest 
without an effort, we had better gird up our loins for the friendly 
fight without a moment's delay." In fact, the Cincinnati Cham-
ber of Commerce had already passed a resolution calling upon the 
federal government to restore commerce in noncontraband articles 
with the South as expeditiously as possible. In both cities devel-
opers with grandiose visions of metropolis were eager to get on 
with the business of town building and urban promotion. 
Louisville's commercial success, after the Civil War as before it, 
stemmed in large measure from the willingness of the city's lead-
ing merchants and men of affairs to devote their time, money, 
66 
and energy to enterprises designed to stimulate growth. Like busi-
nessmen elsewhere, they displayed tenacious urban loyalties and a 
fierce brand of civic patriotism, believing that personal ambition 
and community welfare were intimately related. As historian 
Daniel). Boorstin observed, the American businessman's "start-
ing belief was in the interfusing of public and private prosperity . 
. . . Not to boost your city showed both a lack of community spirit 
and a lack of business sense .... Here was a new breed: the com-
munity builder in a mushrooming city where personal and public 
growth, personal and public prosperity intermingled." In this 
spirit the Falls City'S business leaders contributed financial sup-
port to railroads, packet lines, and river transportation improve-
ment projects. They mapped out defensive strategies to thwart the 
schemes of economic rivals, formulated promotional campaigns, 
sponsored community projects, directed mercantile organizations, 
and influenced corporation directorates. They also filled most of 
the important positions in local politics from their own ranks, 
thereby insuring that Louisville's municipal government would be 
responsive to their needs. After the war these merchants and en-
trepreneurs had to adjust to three important changes in the nature 
of the southern trade: the partial collapse of the plantation econ-
omy, the rise of the southern country store, and the continuing 
decline of long-haul river commerce. As historian Leonard P. 
Curry demonstrated, the Louisville business community's creative 
response to these challenges sparked an impressive surge in trade 
and enabled the Falls City to sustain its drive for commercial em-
pire in the South. 
Louisville merchants. recognized earlier than most that the 
commercial importance of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers would 
continue to decline and that the age of the palatial steamboat had 
passed. They perceived the beginnings of a new era in river nav-
igation in which fast packet boats would playa major role, making 
frequent trips on tributary waterways and serving as feeders to the 
railroads. In 1867 Louisville's Board of Trade signed contracts to 
support the establishment of scheduled packet lines on the Arkan-
sas, Tennessee, and White rivers. A subsidy of more than $20,000 
was raised by subscription, and board members promised to give 
preference to these boats in shipping their merchandise. In June 
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1868 the editor of the Louisville Datly Journal gloated that the 
lines on the Arkansas and the White had already "succeeded in 
breaking up the business intercourse ... that existed between Ar-
kansas merchants and St. Louis, Memphis, and New Orleans mer-
chants. . . . Most generously have [the merchants and farmers of 
the area] manifested their appreciation by giving in return a larger 
portion of their trade to Louisville than to any other city. " 
The altered circumstances of the southern trade also prompted 
Louisville merchants to develop innovative marketing methods. 
Their most important customers were no longer the plantation 
owners who had formerly come to them, but rather country store-
keepers who needed to be visited regularly at their own establish-
ments. Louisville wholesale houses responded to this change by 
dispatching commercial agents known as drummers to every town 
and crossroads village between the Falls of the Ohio and Mont-
gomery, Alabama. These traveling salesmen were imbued with 
the prevailing civic patriotism and worked as hard to further the 
commercial interests of the city as to augment their own commis-
sions. One contemporary acknowledged that throughout the 
southern states it was well known that "if a [Louisville] hardware 
drummer could sell a consignment of groceries for a Louisville 
house, he always took the order and passed it on to the Louisville 
groceryman." Historian James P. Sullivan concluded that "the 
Board of Trade looked upon the drummers as missionaries who in 
carr,ying the gospel of trade represented 'Main Street' as well as 
their individual houses. " 
Many of Louisville's drummers were ex-Confederates, for the 
community'S merchants recognized that the city's "southernness" 
could be an important psychological weapon in the battle with 
Cincinnati for the trade of the South. Louisvillians frequently 
characterized their city as a "live western town" as distinguished 
from an "old fogy city in the East" when discussing its civic virtues 
in either a local or a national context. But they invariably depicted 
their. community as a southern metropolis when directing appeals 
to potential customers in Dixie. Falls City publicists and promot-
ers courted southern business by emphasizing Louisville's location 
within a former slave state, proclaiming the city's identity of in-
terest with the South, and vilifying Cincinnati for its alleged 
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"Yankee" proclivities. As early asJanuary 1866 the Louisville In-
dustrial and Commercial Gazette declared that southern mer-
chants should trade with Louisville "because money spent at 
home-in the South-is money saved, while money spent abroad 
is gone forever," and "because in Louisville they can deal with 
their life-long friends and neighbors, who are here doing business 
from every part of the South." While this appeal for the trade of 
the South also contained arguments based on competitive prices 
and superior transportation facilities, a similar entreaty published 
eighteen months later in the Louisville Daily Journal emphasized 
the city'S southern ties almost exclusively. "Since the close of the 
war, our merchants have acted toward those of the South in a 
spirit of truest magnanimity," the editor proclaimed. "This gen-
erous example has scarcely had one imitator in the opulent cities 
of Cincinnati, Philadelphia, New York, or Boston, whose mer-
chants have enjoyed and grown fat on the custom of the South in 
years past .... [Louisville] is the metropolis of a gallant Southern 
State claiming full identity of blood and interest with the whole 
sunny cordon. " 
As Radical Reconstruction deepened southern distrust of all 
things northern, Louisville propagandists intensified their appeals 
to defensive regional loyalties. Cincinnati was branded a "hotbed 
of radicalism" and a "northern city that has aided to rob us of half 
of our property." In September 1870, several weeks before a 
"Southern Commercial Convention" was due to convene in Cin-
cinnati, CourierJournai editor Henry Watterson protested that 
"to locate a Southern Convention there is doing violence to all 
·outline maps of geography, common sense, history, and decency. 
There is nothing Southern in or about Cincinnati. In all the broad 
Southern land it is on record that Cincinnati is Southern, precisely 
as the carpet-baggers are Southern. She now reaches out her long, 
bony fingers for ... Southern dollars and cents, just as she 
reached them out during the war for Southern cotton and South-
ern plantations." When Robert E. Lee died less than a month 
later and obituaries in Cincinnati newspapers labeled the Confed-
erate general a "traitor," Watterson thundered that "the people 
of the South will remember Cincinnati. They ought to remember 
it. Among the cities of the North it has signalized itself the most 
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vindictive, and this with the less excuse, because its malice is gra-
tuitous and brutal, displaying itself at the wine table and at the 
open grave; and treacherous likewise, because but a fortnight ago 
the men who are now bawling 'rebel' and 'traitor' had their hands 
in our pockets and were whining 'friends' and 'brothers,' whilst 
they picked them." Louisvillians lost no opportunity to use prop-
aganda as a tactical weapon to strengthen their city's ties to the 
South and to weaken those of the Queen City, and there were in-
dications that the desired results were being achieved. Journalist 
Charles Dudley Warner reported that "sentiment does playa con-
siderable part in business, and it is within the knowledge of the 
writer that prominent merchants . . . have refused trade con-
tracts, thin should have been advantageous to Cincinnati, on ac-
count of this partisan spirit, as if the war were not over." 
Louisville entrepreneurs recognized that, while propaganda 
could give their city an advantage in its trade rivalries with Cincin-
nati and other communities, in the long run success would de-
pend upon the continued and vigorous prosecution of an ambi-
tious transportation program. The city'S business leaders early 
concluded that railroads would be the decisive weapons in the 
struggle for southern commerce in the post-Civil War era. In 
April 1867 the editor of the Louisvzlle Daily Journal declared that 
"we must rely upon railroads, more than ever, to develop and re-
store the country .... The iron horse is king. Railroads are the 
great civilizers and developers of cities, states, and nations." The 
city's businessmen encouraged the L&N to consolidate and extend 
its network south and southeast of Nashville, to establish fast 
freight connections between the Falls City and the South, and to 
construct new rail lines to tap markets in central and western Ken-
tucky. The city continued its pre-Civil War policy of purchasing 
corporation stock with community funds, subscribing $1 million 
to the L&N in 1867 and $1 million to the Elizabethtown and Pa-
ducah Railroad in 1868. By the end of 1868 Louisville had issued 
more than $3.5 million in bonds to aid various railroad projects 
radiating out into the city's commercial hinterland. 
The city of Louisville supported railroads in part as defensive 
weapons to undermine the transportation plans of economic 
rivals. For example, Falls City entrepreneurs sponsored the Eliza-
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bethtown and Paducah Railroad in order to frustrate the bid of 
Evansville, Indiana, to siphon off some of the southern trade by 
constructing a railroad south through Henderson, Kentucky, and 
connecting with the Memphis branch of the L&N. "Already 
Evansville, a small but thriving city in a foreign state, is preparing 
to grasp the prize that should by all fair means belong to Louis-
ville," the editor of the Louisville Daily Journal warned in April 
1867. "The road now projected from Evansville to Nashville, tap-
ping the Edgefield and Kentucky road at its intersection with the 
Memphis and Clarksville road, ... will cut short all intercourse 
between us and our imploring friends in Hardin, Grayson, 
Muhlenberg, Caldwell, and other intervening and adjoining 
counties. The only effectual check that can be put upon the 
Evansville scheme is to build the road from Elizabethtown to Pa-
ducah." The railroad would have the additional advantage of ex-
panding Louisville's market in western Kentucky, where as one 
traveler had reported there were "a great many Kentucky mer-
chants buying their goods in Evansville, that should be induced to 
make their purchases in Louisville. " 
Louisville's city council also -authorized a subscription of 
$100,000 in March 1867 to a branch line of the Louisville and 
Nashville to run from Stanford to Richmond, in order to stymie 
the plans of Cincinnati interests to build a line from Lexington 
through Richmond to a point on the Lebanon branch of the L&N 
near Mount Vernon. "Our belief," the editor of the Louisville 
Daily Journal announced, "is that if [the people of Madison, Gar-
rard, and Lincoln counties] do not guard well their assailable 
points, they will be worse victimized by wily Cincinnati than even 
Boyle county has been. We caution them to repudiate the love-
making of Cincinnati .... The true interests of these counties lie 
in the direction of Louisville." Even though the people of Mad-
ison County "had been divided by the machinations of vulture-
like Cincinnati and her aiders and abettors in Lexington," ulti-
mately "victory was seen to perch upon the standard of Progress, 
and defeat was emblazoned upon the trailing banners of Old-
fogyism." The editor of the Cincinnati Times complained that 
"there seems to have come upon the stage of Kentucky life a race 
of dwarfs that take a very minute view of public affairs, and exhib-
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it a puerile incapacity to comprehend great results that are em-
bosomed in the immediate future." 
Cincinnati railroad interests had "aiders and abettors in Lex-
ington" in part because Louisville's efforts to deny the Queen City 
rail access to southern markets had the effect of denying the Blue-
grass region rail lines as well. Despite the postwar spurt in railroad 
construction, by the early 1870s Kentucky still had fewer miles of 
track in proportion to its size than most neighboring states, and to 
the south and east of Lexington rail lines were practically nonexis-
tent. Although this deficiency could have been blamed as much 
on shortages of capital as on the defensive tactics of Louisville's 
mercantile community, residents of the Bluegrass region looked 
upon the Falls City as the primary source of their transportation 
miseries. Irate central Kentuckians threatened to cut off trade 
with the "dull, stale, flat and miasmatic city of Louisville," and 
zealously supported the Cincinnati Southern Railroad bill in the 
Kentucky legislature. "Now we do most fervently wish that for-
eigners would come in and build us roads everywhere through the 
state and run them for us," the editor of Lexington's Kentucky 
Gazette wailed in February 1870. "If Cincinnati will build us a 
railroad, then, in the name of God, let her have a charter properly 
guarded and let her have such aid from the counties as they may 
think the road is worth to them." Forecasting victory, he pre-
dicted that Louisville "will have reaped a harvest of odium which 
will stick to her like the leprosy of Gehazi, and the people of the 
South will avoid her marts as if a pestilence were raging in her 
streets. " 
Throughout this era, small towns in Kentucky attempted to ex-
ploit the rivalry between Louisville and Cincinnati in order to ac-
quire the precious rail connections which might enable them to 
realize their own visions of metropolis. In the summer of 1866, for 
example, residents of Somerset and Stanford tried to spur the fur-
ther extension of the Lebanon branch of the L&N past Crab Or-
chard. A resident of Somerset suggested that "the energetic man-
ner in which this road has been pushed forward to Crab Orchard, 
and the promise it gives of continuing to the Tennessee line, 
shoufd disturb, if it does not wake, from their lethargic sleep the 
old fogy, Rip Van Winkle merchants of the Queen City .... Will 
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Kentucky enterprise continue this road to the mountains and 
catch from Cincinnati's grasp the commerce of that section?" 
Danville promoters eager to entice the L&N to build a branch line 
to their community argued that "it is for the interest of Louisville 
that the road be put through at once, in order to secure the trade 
before Cincinnati can reach that important point." The officials 
of the Tuscumbia and Opelika Railroad assured the Falls City'S 
Board of Trade that the completion of their line "would impreg-
nably fortify Louisville against the possibility of successful trade ri-
valry on the part of Cincinnati, for the trade of South Alabama 
and Georgia." Similarly, the proponents of a railroad from Louis-
ville to Norfolk, Virginia, via the Cumberland Gap, declared that 
"it would soon make Louisville the peer of Cincinnati in all re-
spects, and give her superiority in some." Others claimed that 
Louisville would surely surpass Cincinnati if Falls City entrepre-
neurs would only recognize the wisdom of helping to construct a 
railroad from Elizabethtown to Greensburg, or from Gallatin, 
Tennessee, to Lebanon, Tennessee, or from Elizabethtown to 
McMinnville, Tennessee. 
Owensboro's "dream of glory" during these years centered 
upon building a railroad to Russellville. "We must get up more 
steam, and send the 'iron horse' over the plains and through the 
hills of this rich but underdeveloped country," the editor of the 
Owensboro Monitor announced in 1866. "A road from here to 
Russellville is of the utmost importance to this whole section of 
the country." One Owensboroan asserted that the line was neces-
sary to insure that the community would become "the first city in 
point of population and wealth between Louisville and Mem-
phis," and he warned his fellow citizens not to "let Evansville and 
Henderson entirely eclipse us." In 1867, when the General As-
sembly chartered the Owensboro and Russellville Railroad and 
voters approved the Daviess County Court's purchase of$250,OOO 
worth of stock in the line, the Monitor's editor was overjoyed. 
"THE PEOPLE SPEAK," he exulted, "and the Shriek of the Iron 
Horse Responds!" Chronic financial problems, however, caused 
delays, bankruptcies, and reorganizations. The road was ultimate-
ly completed to Russellville, enabling Owensboro to tap the rich 
coal, timber, and agricultural areas of Daviess, Mdean, Muhlen-
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berg, and Logan counties, but the lofty dreams of the city's 
prophets of destiny were not realized. 
In April 1879 CourierJournal editor Henry Watterson per-
ceived his own city's metropolitan dreams in jeopardy. In an im-
passioned address to Louisville's leading merchants and manufac-
turers, he exhorted the businessmen to launch a counterattack 
against the community's adversaries before it was too late. "Time 
was," he declared, "when holding the one great railway artery 
that extended itself into the South, we could afford to look with 
complacence upon the fruitless wriggling and dolorous writhing 
of our rivals. That time is gone. Cincinnati to the right of us, St. 
Louis to the left of us, Chicago in front of us-sending their vol-
leys into flank, face and rear-it behooves us to shake ourselves . 
. . . I see danger on every hand. Injuns on the upper road and 
Death upon the lower. The time has come to realize the situation 
... so that every man may be around to put his shoulder to the 
wheel. " 
Watterson might well have added 'Nashville to the south of 
us.' For between 1879 and 1880 Louisville faced a new challenge 
from the Tennessee capital in the form of a grandiose scheme in-
volving the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railroad and a 
contemplated trunk line from St. Louis to Savannah. The direc-
tors of the Nashville railroad, much of which would parallel the 
L&N, denounced the Louisville railway as a "foreign corporation" 
whose "aggressive policy" made it "a menace to the rights of this 
company." Edmund W. "King" Cole, the dynamic president of 
the Nashville line, purchased controlling interest in the unfin-
ished and moribund Owensboro and Nashville Railroad in July 
1879 and proceeded with his plans to acquire other rail connec-
tions through Georgia. Suddenly, however, in January 1880 the 
L&N acquired enough stock in the Nashville, Chattanooga and 
St. Louis to gain control of the line. In one brilliant maneuver the 
L&N both eliminated a dangerous rival and absorbed "King" 
Cole's entire system. The CourierJournal rejoiced that "the scoop 
of the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis is a stroke of magnif-
icent railroad diplomacy," termed the take-over "a coup de 
chemin de fer," and sneered that "King Cole was a monarch de-
throned as Nashville weeped." The newspaper compared 
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President Elisha D. Standiford and Vice-President H. Victor New-
comb of the L&N to "Kaiser Wilhelm and Count [Otto] von Bis-
marck," respectively, and proclaimed that the two railroad men 
were "making a 'United Germany' of the Southern railways which 
were lying about loose ... instead of leading to Louisville as they 
should." The Nashville Banner complained about "the supreme 
and unparalleled impertinence of Louisville," charging that the 
Kentucky emporium had been a "two faced Janus" whose most 
consistent policy was its "frog like puff and strut." The Banner 
branded Louisville a "shoddy, codflSh city" which with its "usual 
low cunning" had turned both itself and its railroad over to the 
Yankees during the Civil War. When Louisvillians boasted that 
their achievement represented a major victory over Cincinnati as 
well, the Banner ridiculed the notion. "The notion of little Louis-
ville comparing herself to Cincinnati and talking of making Cin-
cinnati tributary to her reminds one of what the rooster said in the 
stable with the horses, 'Be careful, gentlemen, don't let us step on 
each other.' " 
Following the take-over of the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. 
Louis Railroad, Louisville's Board of Trade passed a resolution 
congratulating the management of the L&N for having pursued 
"so masterly a policy, consolidating as it does a truly imperial sys-
tem of roads, and enhancing the importance of Louisville as a rail-
road center." In the years following the conclusion of the Civil 
War, the L&N had acquired control of no less than nineteen rail-
roads and had become a regional giant stretching from the Falls of 
the Ohio to the Gulf of Mexico. By the summer of 1880 the Louis-
ville and Nashville system controlled directly or indirectly some 
2,348 miles of track, and railroad circles buzzed with news of the 
breathtaking expansion of the railway. "Only a short time ago the 
Louisville and Nashville could have been described with tolerable 
accuracy as simply a line extending from Louisville to Memphis in 
one direction, and from Louisville through Nashville to Mont-
gomery, Alabama, in another direction," one observer reported in 
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle in April 1880. "It now 
... extends from St. Louis, Louisville, Evansville, Hickman, and 
Memphis, to New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, and Savannah, 
and touches such important points as Nashville, Chattanooga, 
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Selma, Montgomery, Eufaula, Columbus, Macon, Atlanta, and 
Augusta .... It is not to be wondered at that a combination so 
vast as this should excite jealousy, and give rise to schemes for the 
formation of opposition lines." 
After 1880 there were significant changes in the organization 
of the L&N, in the political leadership of the Falls City, and in the 
structure of Louisville's economy. Until that date, the Board of 
Directors of the railroad had been made up largely of local busi-
nessmen. But at the 1880 stockholders meeting "outsiders" repre-
senting New York and British investors were elected to the board, 
and five years later the city of Louisville sold its stock in the cor-
poration. The city's close economic ties to the South had been 
weakened by a number of developments. The completion of the 
Cincinnati Southern Railroad to Chattanooga in February 1880 
had destroyed the L&N's twenty-year monopoly over through 
traffic between the Ohio River and the Gulf of Mexico. The L&N, 
with extensions to the northeast and to the northwest, had ceased 
to be an exclusively southern railway. The South itself had become 
more self-reliant, drawing on its own resources and on other cities 
both within and outside the region's borders. And Louisville mer-
chants and manufacturers had begun to develop outlets for their 
wares beyond the South. After 1880 industry became relatively 
more important in the city's economy, and commercial interests 
lost the political power they had exercised for so many decades. 
Professional politicians began to assume positions in municipal 
government, while businessmen with ties to manufacturing and 
production took over the leadership of the Board of Trade. As rail-
roads had earlier superseded steamboats, so industry had begun to 
overshadow commerce in the economic life of the Falls City. 
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Louisville experienced an impressive expansion of its industrial 
sector. In 1875 a local writer proclaimed that "the secret of sub-
stantial and steady growth is found in workshops teeming with 
mechanics and laborers." By 1885 an estimated 22,000 operatives 
worked in some 1 ,300 manufacturing establishments and annual-
ly produced goods valued at $50 million. Pork packing, tobacco 
manufacturing, and whiskey distilling remained the city'S leading 
industries, prompting Henry Watterson to boast that "a union of 
pork, tobacco and whiskey will make us all wealthy, healthy and 
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frisky." Industrialists organized new and varied manufacturing 
concerns, erected large-scale factories, and replaced small, family-
owned firms with giant corporations. In 1883 the people of Louis-
ville set out to "secure the greatest Industrial Exposition ever held 
in America," and launched the Southern Exposition, which ran 
for five years. Watterson hailed "the beginning of a new indus-
trial era" in the city's history, and the central feature of the suc-
ceeding decades was the growth and development of Louisville's 
manufacturing sector. In 1927 a report in Forbes magazine con-
cluded that "Louisville, when she started her boosting, employed 
the slogan 'Gateway to the South.' She still employs it, but more 
and more she is now using 'Premier Industrial Location' instead. 
For Louisville, still sentimentally attached to the South, has dis-
covered that modern industry . . . is not a matter of geography. 
. . . A gateway, moreover, can not be open in the one direction 
without being open in the other. Louisville is finding herself 
equally a gateway to the North, and her prosperity is all tied up 
with prosperity in every other section." 
As a thriving regional metropolis and a gateway to both North 
and South, Louisville needed an impressive ciry gate. This need 
was fulftlled by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad's Union Sta-
tion, a magnificent cathedral-like structure completed in 1891 
and the first monumental and architecturally significant railway 
station in the South. The Romanesque exterior of light gray, 
heavy-cut rusticated stone featured a soaring clock tower, spires 
and turrets, and two leaded, stained-glass rose windows. The wait-
ing room displayed a mosaic tile floor, polished brass and marble 
fixtures, carved Corinthian capitals on the interior columns, and a 
stained-glass skylight. One editor explained that "when it is re-
membered that a railway station is the entrance door to a town, 
... and all who enter the town get their first impression there, we 
begin to see how important the terminal is." 
During the great age of city growth between 1880 and 1930, 
railway stations built as Romanesque cathedrals, Gothic castles, 
and Roman baths served as the architectural embodiments of cor-
porate prosperiry and the physical symbols of urban maturity. 
This was the "age of the great depots," when, as historian Keith 
L. Bryant, Jr., observed, "steel, iron, brick, and glass merged in 
monumental structures to provide visual proof of metropolitan 
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The L&N's Union Station, Louisville, completed in 1891 
progress." The railway station was the ideal symbol of urban de-
velopment, for the iron horse enabled cities to expand their hin-
terlands and to tap new markets, carried the commercial and in-
dustrial products of an urban age to distant localities, and tied 
together an emerging national network of cities and towns. "Rail-
way t~rmini and hotels are to the nineteenth century what monas-
teries and cathedrals were to the thirteenth century," the editor of 
the But/ding News of London declared in 1875. "They are ttuly 
the only real representative kind of building we possess ." 
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The "age of the great depots" was also the great era of "the rise 
of the city" -the period during which burgeoning metropolises 
erected not only magnificent railway stations but huge public 
buildings, giant factories, and gleaming skyscrapers. Americans 
generally celebrated urbanization as the hallmark of material 
growth and progress, and hailed great cities as the preeminent 
symbols of a rising standard of living and of the emergence of the 
United States as a powerful industrial nation. These were the dec-
ades during which the lure of the city became compelling to hun-
dreds of thousands of restless rural youngsters, who moved to the 
cities seeking adventure, romance, and success. Novelist Harold 
Frederic, himself swept up in this massive cityward tide, caught 
the essence of the age in 1887. "The nineteenth century is a cen-
tury of cities," Frederic wrote; "they have given their own twist to 
the progress of the age-and the farmer is as far out of it as if he 
lived in Alaska. Perhaps there was a time when a man could live in 
what the poet calls daily communication with nature and not 
starve his mind and dwarf his soul, but this isn't the century." 
Between 1870 and 1930 thousands of Kentuckians joined the 
nationwide migration to the cities. By the latter year 800,000 
Kentuckians, representing almost one-third of the state's entire 
population, lived in the fifty-three urban places of 2,500 people 
or more, and thirteen cities in the Commonwealth registered pop-
ulations in excess of 10,000 inhabitants. A number of new cities 
developed as satellites of such established centers as Louisville in 
Jefferson County and Covington and Newport in northern Ken-
tucky. Throughout the period the intensification of urbanization 
led to the rise of cities in portions of the state previously un-
touched by the process. During the late nineteenth century, 
Princeton, Providence, and Morganfield began to develop in west-
central Kentucky, and Mayfield, Fulton, and Murray sprang up in 
the far western section of the Commonwealth. In the southeastern 
corner of the state, Middlesboro, Somerset, Pineville, Corbin, and 
Williamsburg were planted before 1900, while during the open-
ing decades of the new century the eastern and southeastern sec-
tions witnessed the beginnings of Jenkins, Hazard, Harlan, 
Lynch, Barbourville, Wayland, Elkhorn City, Pikeville, Prestons-
burg, Van Lear, and Paintsville. Between 1900 and 1930 Dawson 
Springs, Greenville, and Sturgis began to grow in west-central 
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Kentucky. Some of the mountain towns were overgrown mining 
camps dominated by a single great mining company, as Jenkins, 
Lynch, Benham, and Stearns. Other mountain communities, al-
though primarily dependent upon coal mining, developed inde-
pendently of a single mining company and built up manufactur-
ing establishments such as lumber mills, canning factories, and 
clay working plants which relied heavily upon local resources. 
One town developed by a single corporation was Lynch, located 
in the heart of a magnificent coal field in Harlan County. In 1917 
the United States Coal and Coke Company, a subsidiary of the 
United States Steel Corporation, set up a mining camp, opened a 
coal mine, extended railroad tracks toward the locality, and began 
to build a town. "At the far northern end of the county the great-
est corporation in the world was creating a city overnight," a con-
temporary remarked in 1920, "blasting its streets into the side of 
the mountains, moving a river from side to side of the valley, 
erecting a metropolitan hotel where stood a log cabin barely two 
years ago, bending every resource of large capital and the trained 
intelligence which money can buy to the making of a modern 
town." Between 1917 and 1925 a complete town was constructed 
that covered all of the available valley and climbed both sides of 
the mountain. Lynch had churches, schools, a hospital, an amuse-
ment center, a hotel, a company store, 600 houses, ten miles of 
paved streets, and over twenty miles of concrete sidewalks. A labor 
shortage prompted the company to recruit workers from central 
and eastern Europe, and by 1930 the still unincorporated town 
numbered about 6,000 inhabitants. "During the 1920s Lynch was 
a coal town demonstrating both enlightened paternalism and 
company domination," historian Thomas A. Kelemen concluded. 
The city "could lay little claim to being an ideal community, but 
it could make a strong case in the 1920s for being the greatest coal 
town in the world. " 
The great Appalachian iron and coal town boom of 1889-1893 
intensified the pace of urbanization in the southeastern section of 
Kentucky and reflected the optimism and exuberance of the age. 
During this brief period more than 125 cities were promoted 
throughout the Appalachian region. A correspondent of the New 
York Herald proclaimed in 1890 that "from Roanoke, through 
Southwest Virginia, to Birmingham, Alabama, a wave of specula-
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tion is rolling, white capped with the dollars of the rich and the 
poor .... Dazzling, bewildered excitement is everywhere. Where 
the cannons boomed in the sixties, dollars are rattling now. Towns 
are founded here with a rapidity and ease that is simply aston-
ishing." Another observer stated that "towns which were obscure 
little villages ten years ago, have become cities, counting their in-
habitants by the thousands and tens of thousands." There was 
talk of "a law of accelerating demand" for iron products, and 
there was the "wildest plunging" in "brand new towns or cities 
yet to be established." A reporter for the New York Herald-
Tnbune tried to convey the amazingly buoyant spirit of the boom 
in 1890. "It impregnates the air, the earth-is omnipresent," he 
shouted. "It is gluttonous, rapacious, insatiable. It permeates 
your clothing, gets into your pockets, tickles your ribs, deafens 
your ears, flies into your mouth." 
The Appalachian region of eastern Kentucky was hailed as a 
land of "inexhaustible wealth" destined to become "a luminous 
spot in some bright chapter in our country's history." In Novem-
ber 1888 the editor of the London Mountain Echo declared that 
"this section of Kentucky is destined at no distant date to become 
the richest part of the state." A Couner-journal correspondent 
wrote that "this land of hills is a land of wonderful resources, and 
the day will come when it will hold its head with the wealthiest re-
gions." The editor of the Hazel Green Herald proclaimed in 1893 
that "while the mountains of Eastern Kentucky are now in a posi-
tion that they 'never get nothing no how' by reason of the selfish-
ness of the other sections, the time is fast approaching when the 
balance of the state must kneel at the feet of these same moun-
tains and beg favors. We hardly hope to realize this state of af-
fairs, but the younger generation now coming on will be the auto-
crats and that part of the state east of Winchester will have both 
the population and the wealth. That time is as sure to come as tax-
ation and death." 
The greatest boom town in the Kentucky mountains was Mid-
dlesboro, transformed from a tiny hamlet into a bustling city al-
most overnight. Hailed as "the Magic City of the Mountains," 
"the Queen of Them All," and "the Pittsburgh of the South," 
the city was planned by Scottish investor Alexander Arthur, who 
toured the area in 1886 and envisioned another industrial Mid-
81 
lands in the lovely Yellow Creek Valley. Returning to England, 
Arthur formed the American Association Limited in 1887 and se-
cured a reported $10 million in financial backing. He then went 
back to Kentucky to layout the projected "Anglo-American me-
tropolis" he named Middlesborough. In early 1888 work was 
begun on a railroad to Knoxville, a tunnel to run under the Cum-
berland Gap, and a branch of the L&N from Corbin south to the 
new community. Coal and iron mines were opened, coke ovens 
built, steel mills and blast furnaces erected, and other industries 
established. A tent city sprang up, and almost as quickly wooden 
structures replaced the canvas shelters. Speculative fever ran high, 
with twenty-five-foot-wide lots bringing $250 to $350 a front foot 
by 1890. A single great land sale netted more than $700,000. 
"Who has anything on Cumberland Avenue?" anxious investors 
asked one another. "What have you got on Petersburg?" "How 
much on Avondale and the Oval?" "How's lots?" By 1890 the 
city contained half a dozen churches, a public library, an opera 
house, a golf course, and a sumptuous hotel which was built 
"with money being no consideration on its beautiful decorations 
and ornaments." Estimates of the size of the city at the height of 
the boom ran as high as 17,000, and boosters claimed that the 
community's population would reach 100,000 by 1900. Enthusi-
astic local businessmen boasted that" instead of a boom or mush-
room city ... we have in Middlesborough a model city, built 
upon the most modern and substantial plans and ideas, and a city 
designed more as a metropolis as aught else." 
In 1890, however, a calamitous fire tore through the heart of 
Middlesboro's central business district. The failure of the Baring 
Brothers Bank of London that same year jolted the American As-
sociation, caused the value of individual shares in the company to 
plummet from £40 to £1.5 in less than six months, and led to the 
dismissal of Alexander Arthur for mismanagement and incompe-
tence. The panic of 1893 totally destroyed the already weakened 
enterprise. Banks failed, mines closed, giant iron furnaces shut 
down, and stores boarded up their doors. The Middlesborough 
Town Company auctioned off all of its properties, and the Amer-
ican Association mortgaged 70,000 acres of land to a New York 
bank. On October 27, 1893, at an extraordinary general meeting 
of the American Association in London, shareholders passed a res-
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olution declaring bankruptcy. In 1900 census officials could find 
only 4,162 people in the town, and a Middlesboro journalist sug-
gested that "it may be doubted if ever in the history of 'boom' 
towns there had been so complete a collapse." 
When the promoters of tiny Glasgow, Virginia, declared in 
1890 that "the history of Middlesborough, Kentucky, is to be re-
peated," they did not realize how accurate and ironic their predic-
tion would become. For the great boom was inevitably followed 
by the great bust. The nonexistent paper towns promoted by un-
scrupulous land sharks never got started in the first place. Once-
hopeful speculative ventures declined as thin beds of low quality 
iron or coal ore were played out. Other struggling communities 
could not survive the acute economic depression which followed 
the financial panic of 1893. Land prices fell sharply, mining 
camps shut down, and "instant cities" vanished. Only a tiny frac-
tion of the mining communities ever developed the diversified 
economic foundations necessary to sustain significant and long-
term urban growth. In general, nearby established commercial or 
industrial centers benefitted the most from the mining of coal and 
iron, and provided marketing, banking, and other urban services 
to the mining districts. The very topography of the mountains 
militated against the growth of large cities, cutting off access to 
tributary hinterlands and severely limiting stretches of levelland 
suitable for expansion. The only substantial communities in the 
Appalachian region of Kentucky-Ashland and Catlettsburg to 
the north on the Ohio River and Middlesboro in the extreme 
southeastern corner of the state at Cumberland Gap-are located 
on the periphery of the mountains. 
During the boom the promoters of upstart cities touted the ad-
vantages of speculative city building. "Boom towns are good 
things," one publicist argued in 1890. "They bring population 
and increase general prosperity. Let the boomers continue and 
give the boomer a banquet. He deserves it." Another editor sug-
gested, in the true spirit of the New South, that "the man who 
builds a factory and furnishes employment for labor . . . is the 
Sou th' s greatest benefactor." Boosters pointed to Birmingham 
and to such successful western cities as Chicago, Kansas City, and 
Wichita to support the claims that their own promotional ven-
tures would inevitably flourish. The developers dismissed critics of 
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boosterism as "kickers" and "knockers." One contemptuous ed-
itor maintained that "after God had finished the Rattlesnake, the 
Toad and the Vampire, he had some awful substance left, from 
which he made the Knocker. A Knocker is a two-legged animal 
with a corkscrew soul [and] a water sogged brain .... When he 
comes down the street honest men turn their backs; the angels in 
heaven shed tears and Satan shuts the gates of Hell, to keep him 
out." 
Most of the knockers, who added a few sour notes to the other-
wise harmonious fanfare of the promotional horn tooters, repre-
sented the larger and well-established older cities. Henry Watter-
son, editor of Louisville's Courier-journal, denounced booms in 
general and warned that "the 'boom' is the devil's own invention, 
ftrst to rob the victim of his money and then the 'boomer' of his 
soul. Cities are not built by 'booms.' They are the merest artillcial 
stimulants, compounded of brandy, printer's ink and midnight, 
and as fatal to the community to which they are applied as a dyna-
mite shell." Another critic claimed that "the price of over two 
hundred dollars a front foot for mud a foot deep, and as likely to 
become town property as a lot in the desert of Sahara, is sufficient 
evidence of the lunacy of the purchasers." Yet another kicker 
sneered that "land which cost a few dollars per acre is cut up into 
lots and sold for thousands. Then the boomer looks out for ftelds 
that are new, pastures that are green, and suckers that are fresh . 
. . . There are booms and booms and boomerangs." Even the ed-
itor of the Middlesborough News complained at the height of the 
boom of the "mass of advertisements of land sales in various parts 
of the country. . . . One almost becomes nauseated with the 
thought of corner lots." 
After the turn of the century, a discernible shift in the charac-
ter of urban promotional activities took place. Almost all of the 
localities destined to become major cities had already been 
founded, and the urban network in Kentucky, as in the nation as 
a whole, had been largely completed. During the formative peri-
od boosters had sought to secure transportation connections and 
to foster commercial enterprise in struggling young communities. 
In the twentieth century promoters labored to attract manufac-
tures and industry to already well-established centers. After 1900 
developers tended to set up more elaborate and complex promo-
85 
tional organizations, and municipal governments began to take 
over the management of development programs from private 
business groups. Communities offered a wider and more varied 
range of inducements to attract outside investors, including tax 
concessions, formalized local investment plans, comprehensive 
loan programs, and industrial parks. In place of the old "hot air" 
boosterism in which every aspect of the locality was applauded, 
development agencies began to publish detailed statistical reports 
which included data on land and plant availability, sources of raw 
materials, transportation, utility services, markets, living costs, 
housing, education, recreational facilities, and cultural amenities. 
In the early years of the twentieth century, American cities 
began to work out systematic industrial development plans which 
featured the use of formally constituted industrial development 
corporations. One of the earliest and most widely known of these 
was the quasi-public Louisville Industrial Foundation, established 
in 1916 at a time when local business conditions were seriously de-
pressed and workers were moving away to more promising local-
ities. Louisville civic leaders organized a drive for a "Million-Dol-
lar Factory Fund" which would be placed under the control of a 
privately owned and managed corporation. The chief purpose of 
this corporation would be the economic advancement of the 
Louisville area through industrial development. Through enthusi-
astically worded newspaper articles, pamphlets, and speeches, 
business leaders appealed to both enlightened self-interest and 
civic patriotism. One "pep" leaflet shouted "COMPATRIOTS! 
Louisville's psychic hour booms! The tragic question is: Charge or 
Retreat? Our future chance is a bid for action!" The organizers 
achieved their goal in a mere eleven days. The articles of incor-
poration of the nonprofit Louisville Industrial Foundation re-
vealed a combination of private business characteristics and quasi-
public motives, proclaiming that "the nature of its business shall 
be to advance and develop the City of Louisville and vicinity in-
dustrially." The foundation served as a kind of industrial bureau, 
collecting and distributing information and data concerning the 
Louisville area, compiling reliable briefs on land sites suitable for 
manufacturing concerns, and answering business inquiries. It 
used its funds to make low-interest medium-term loans to manu-
facturers who could not obtain "the equivalent amount of capital 
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on comparable terms" elsewhere, to be used to construct or en-
large plants and to purchase or modernize mechanical equipment. 
By operating a revolving loan fund, the foundation was able to 
reuse its capital to support industrial development. During its first 
three decades the foundation succeeded in attracting almost fifty 
manufacturing enterprises whose combined operations greatly ex-
panded the economy of the city. The Louisville Industrial Founda-
tion, economist Ernest). Hopkins concluded, performed "a stra-
tegic role in rounding out and supplementing Louisville's struc-
ture of organized finance. " 
Despite the new emphasis on such technical aspects of urban 
promotion as precise data and specialized information, traces of 
the old booster enthusiasm could still be found in promotional ef-
forts. In the spring of 1927, for example, three Louisville promot-
ers made a 3,000-mile roundabout trip in a shiny white Model T 
Ford touring car called the Louisville Booster Car. The purpose of 
their journey was to let people know that Louisville had become 
the "premier industrial location of America." One side of their 
car carried the exaggerated message that Louisville's population 
had jumped 48 percent since 1920, from 234,891 to 347,774, 
while a silver spare-tire cover bore the inscription "Fastest Grow-
ing City in the South." The boosters carried letters and pamphlets 
from Mayor Arthur Will to the mayors of the cities on the tour, in-
viting them to visit the Falls City and "enjoy true Kentucky hospi-
tality." In two weeks the promoters visited over sixty cities, in-
cluding Dayton, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Detroit, Chicago, Phil-
adelphia, Atlantic City, Syracuse, Boston, and New York. In 
Manhattan the Louisvillians were greeted by MayorJimmy Walker 
and their automobile "purred over the streets of Gotham gleam-
ing from a vigorous polishing." Everywhere the boosters stopped 
they attracted crowds of curious onlookers, in part because, as a re-
porter noted, "these messengers of goodwill wore apparel in har-
mony with the eye-arresting glamour of their car-white flannel 
knickers and caps, red-checked golf hose, patterned sweaters, and 
white belted motoring coats embroidered on the back in red silk 
'From My Kentucky Home. '" Upon their return to Louisville, the 
boosters were greeted by a ftre department band and trium-





COMIC song-and-dance man Thomas D. Rice came to Louis-
ville for the 1828-1829 theatrical season as a member of Samuel 
Drake's illustrious touring company. At a stable located near 
Drake's City Theatre, Rice observed the movements of an elderly 
slave named Jim Crow, described by contemporary Noah Ludlow 
as "a vety black, clumsy negro." As the slave tended his chores, he 
shuffled about, singing a little tune and, on the refrain, executing 
an awkward jump. Rice decided to incorporate the slave's man-
nerisms into a blackface routine designated in the theater's pro-
gram as "the comic Negro song of 'Jim Crow.'" Outfitted in tat-
tered clothing, Rice strode the boards, grinning broadly and sing-
ing: 
First on de heel tap, den on de toe, 
Ebery time I wheel about I jumpJim Crow. 
Wheel about an' turn about an' do jis so, 
An' ebery time I wheel about I jump Jim Crow. 
The Louisville audience went "wild with delight," demanding en-
core after encore of the routine. When Rice made his New York 
debut in 1832, the patrons called him back at least twenty times 
to repeat "his celebrated song of Jim Crow." Rice became the first 
blackface comedian in theatrical histoty to be featured in his own 
act, and he would later be acknowledged as the "father of Anier-
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ican minstrelsy." For almost a decade he was the greatest drawing 
card on the American theater circuit, as audiences clamored for 
performances of blackface comedy, song, and dance. To these 
white audiences, Jim Crow represented the reassuring stereotype 
of the Negro: guileless and childlike, irrepressible and uninhib-
ited, happy and contented. 
Subsequent generations of Americans would recognize the 
nameJim Crow as the designation for an entire system of race rela-
tions based upon segregation. It was particularly significant in this 
regard that Rice originated the minstrel character Jim Crow in the 
city, rather than on the farm or the plantation. For segregation as 
a method of social control also originated in the city, and was de-
veloped to meet peculiarly urban needs. In Louisville as in cities 
throughout Dixie, the "peculiar institution" of slavery broke 
down. The network of restraints so effective in isolated rural set-
tings proved far less effective in the volatile world of the city. As 
the chains of slavery weakened, anxious whites in antebellum 
cities devised an elaborate system of segregation to govern rela-
tions between the races and to reimpose order and control. 
On the eve of the Civil War, slavery was disintegrating in the 
cities of Kentucky and the South. In Louisville slaves comprised 
less than 10 percent of the total population in 1860, and during 
the preceding decade the number of bondsmen had declined 
from 5,432 to 4,903. Forty years earlier, by contrast, the system 
had seemed as viable in the city as on the plantation. In 1820 
slaves constituted more than one-fourth of Louisville's entire pop-
ulation, and over 50 percent of the city's white inhabitants owned 
one or more slaves. Bondsmen performed nearly all of the un-
skilled and menial labor in southern cities. They built the munic-
ipal installations, handled most domestic chores, and worked in 
factories, warehouses, and shops. Slaves served as carters, porters, 
hack drivers, general handymen, stevedores, grave diggers, boot-
blacks, servants, cooks, waiters, laundresses, and domestics. "Al-
most all of the labor is performed by slaves," traveler James 
McBride remarked while visiting early Lexington. "They are the 
only waiters, and very few of the white people can wait upon 
themselves in the smallest matter." Slavery declined in southern 
cities not because it proved economically inefficient or unprofita-
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ble, but rather because characteristics inherent in urban life weak-
ened the traditional foundations and structure of the "peculiar in-
stitution" and transformed the slaves themselves in ways white 
southerners found objectionable. 
Contemporary observers recognized that urban slaves differed 
from their country cousins. Even before 1800, a visitor described 
country slaves as "contented, sober, modest, humble, civil and 
obliging," in contrast to their urban counterparts, whom he 
found "rude, unmannerly, insolent, and shameless." In 1835 the 
editor of the Louisvzlle Public Advertiser complained that "ne-
groes scarcely realize the fact that they are slaves [in the city]. They 
become insolent, intractable, and in many instances wholly 
worthless. They make free negroes their associates, and imbibe 
feelings and imitate their conduct, and are active in prompting 
others to neglect their duty and to commit crime." The distinc-
tions berween rural and urban slaves were so noticeable that even 
mid-nineteenth-century vaudeville reflected them. Jim Crow 
competed for audience attention with city-bred Zip Coon, a styl-
ishly outfitted, strutting dandy from Broadway who claimed to be 
a "larned skolar. " 
Some observers maintained that the very fabric of urban life 
undermined the system of servitude. John S.c. Abbott, a sympa-
thetic northern traveler, stated in 1859 that "the atmosphere of 
the city is too life-giving, and creates thought .... The city, with 
its intelligence and enterprise, is a dangerous place for the slave. 
He acquires knowledge of human rights, by working with others 
who receive wages when he receives none; who can come and go at 
their pleasure, when he from the cradle to the grave must obey a 
master's imperious will. ... It is found expedient, almost neces-
sary, to remove the slave from these influences, and send him 
back to the intellectual stagnation and gloom of the plantation." 
One southerner told Abbott bluntly that "the city is no place for 
niggers. They get strange notions in their heads, and grow discon-
tented. They ought, everyone of them, be sent back on to the 
plantations." A Falls City observer reported in 1848 that "slavery 
exists in Louisville ... only in name, [for] there are rwo things 
that always, and under all circumstances, abrogate slavery. The 
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first is a dense population, ... the next [is] the intelligence of 
slaves. Both of these are silently and imperceptibly working their 
legitimate results." Frederick Law Olmsted similarly concluded 
that "slaves can never be brought together in denser communities 
but their intelligence will be increased to a degree dangerous to 
those who enjoy the benefit of their labor." 
As urban life gradually transformed slavery, the white residents 
of southern cities expressed increasing concern and alarm. "The 
evil lies," a committee of worried urban residents concluded in 
1859, "in the breaking down [of] the relation between master and 
slave-the removal of the slave from the master's discipline and 
control, and the assumption offreedom and independence on the 
part of the slave, the idleness, disorders, and crime which are con-
sequential." Since few owners could profitably employ all their 
hands, slaves were allowed to hire their own time, paying their 
owners a percentage of their earnings. These bondsmen were fre-
quently permitted to live away from their master's residence as 
well. Concerned citizens constantly urged municipal authorities to 
tighten the control over slaves. As early as 1800, "numerous com-
plaints" reached Lexington's trustees about slaves "being per-
mitted to hire themselves, and keep houses that disturb the peace 
and quiet of society." One Louisvillian grumbled that "those who 
hire their own time, not only act without restraint themselves, but 
their example induces others to believe that they can take the 
same liberties ... ; that they can work or playas they please." 
Owners could not prevent slaves from congregating with free 
blacks and with whites in the workplace, in back streets and alleys, 
in rented rooms and out-of-the-way houses, in churches and grog 
shops. "Free persons of color," described by one southerner as oc-
cupying "a sort of uncertain and undefined position in our 
midst," gravitated to the cities and became proportionately the 
most highly urbanized group in the Old South. One Louisville of-
ficial in 1829 labeled the freedmen "an unprofitable and danger-
ous part of the population," and municipalities passed ordinances 
condemning contacts between free blacks and hired-out slaves as 
threats to racial order. In 1851 the editor of the Louisville Daily 
Democrat expressed the widely held opinion that "the free negro 
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question is the most insoluble of all the social problems of the 
day, and stands as a practical sarcasm on all the theories of aboli-
tion and emancipation. " 
White residents of southern cities sought to maintain discipline 
and dominance by selling off young Negro males to rural planta-
tions and by tightening emancipation procedures. In addition, 
and most importantly, they developed a new and intricate system 
of racial deference more appropriate to urban life than traditional 
slavery. This new system embodied most of the features that 
would later be identified as segregation. As historian Richard C. 
Wade noted, "segregation sorted people out by race, established a 
public etiquette for their conduct, and created social distance 
where there was physical proximity. . . . Increasingly public policy 
tried to separate the races whenever the surveillance of the master 
was likely to be missing. To do this, the distinction between slave 
and free Negro was erased; race became more important than 
legal status; and a pattern of segregation emerged inside the 
broader framework of the 'peculiar institution.'" 
Under the new arrangement, blacks both slave and free were 
excluded entirely from public accommodations or were restricted 
to separate and generally inferior facilities. Taverns, restaurants, 
hotels, and public grounds were always off-limits to Negroes. Cul-
tural and recreational establishments segregated the races when 
they did not exclude blacks altogether. Similarly, white and black 
were kept apart in jails, poor houses, hospitals, and cemeteries. 
When Karl Bernhard visited Louisville in 1825 he found the city'S 
most important hospital facilities to have "roomy and well aired 
apartments for the white patients, and in the basement, those for 
the negroes and coloured persons." Practices regarding specific in-
stitutions differed from city to city, and no community could ever 
bring about the complete separation of the races. But segregation 
was everywhere extensive enough to serve as a constant reminder 
to blacks of their inferior position. 
The Civil War intensified the problem of race relations in 
southern cities by eliminating the last vestiges of human chattel 
slavery. The editor of the Datly Louisville Democrat confessed in 
1865 that "this Negro question is a much greater puzzle than the 
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slavery question." Freedmen flocked to the cities as havens from 
the insecurities and isolation of plantation life and as centers of 
educational and occupational opportunity. Louisville's black pop-
ulation jumped from 6,810 in 1860 to 14,956 a decade later, an 
increase of 120 percent. During each of the last three decades of 
the nineteenth century the Falls City's black population rose by at 
least 35 percent. By 1900 the Negro population of the city stood at 
39,139, and nearly one out of every five Louisvillians was black. 
This influx of blacks and the resultant problem of social control 
greatly troubled whites. In their view the Negroes "infested" the 
cities, "clogged" the streets, and threatened the restoration of 
peace and prosperity. 
The postwar urban race crisis in the South was resolved by 
widening and tightening the system of segregation. White urban 
southerners at first attempted to exclude blacks from urban ser-
vices and public accommodations entirely. When exclusion failed, 
they imposed an elaborate system of rigid segregation, sanctioned 
by custom, public policy, and law. After 1890, at the state level, 
Jim Crow laws ratified the policies of segregation already firmly 
entrenched in the cities and transformed de facto arrangements 
into de jure ones. The Supreme Court's 1896 ruling in the case of 
Plessy v. Ferguson established the "separate but equal" principle 
as the law of the land. In the cities, facilities had been separate 
since before the Civil War, and they had also been invariably 
unequal. 
Between 1865 and 1890, the system of segregation in Louisville 
was extended and elaborated. The police force, fire department, 
city jail, hospitals, and work house all were segregated. The pas-
senger depot of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad separated 
the races in waiting rooms and lavatories, and on the trains them-
selves blacks were not seated in first-class coaches even when they 
held first-class tickets. The Opera House and the Masonic Temple 
reserved special sections for Negroes, and there were "negro 
bars," "negro billiard rooms," and "resorts for ebony-colored 
gentlemen." In 1869 the editor of the Coun'erJournal com-
plained that blacks were attempting to thrust themselves on 
whites in certain hotels and on steamboats where they were man-
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ifestly unwelcome. "Some negroes know their place, and some do 
not," he insisted, "and those that do not will always be numerous 
enough to make themselves a disgusting nuisance." 
The city of Louisville provided separate buildings for the "indi-
gent colored population" in 1869, on the recommendation of the 
attending physicians. "As the political status of the black is now 
changed, and some provision must be made for their sick and 
poor, we suggest that cottages be erected on the Alms-House 
grounds for any future applicants for the city's charity," the doc-
tors advised municipal authorities. "As it now is, if the keeper of 
the Alms-House is compelled to receive them, there is no alterna-
tive but to place them in the same building with the whites. This 
is objectionable, and should be attended to in time." City author-
ities attended to it at once, and a group being shown the premises 
in 1870 reported merrily that in "the apartments for negroes ... 
may be found some jolly old remnants of the slave times." 
In 1875 the General Council appropriated funds to erect a sep-
arate building on the grounds of Louisville's House of Refuge for 
"uncontrollable colored boys, who, though vicious, are yet too 
young to send to the Work House or Penitentiary. " The white and 
Negro youngsters were kept apart at all times, except perhaps 
while at work in the greenhouse. Blacks were not permitted to 
work with whites in the shoe-shop, engine room, or cane-seating 
shop. In 1881, when colored youngsters were put to work in the 
cane-seating shop, white youths were no longer employed there. 
The boys ate in separate dining rooms, studied with separate 
teachers in separate classrooms, and slept in separate dormitories. 
Even a proposed library was to have separate branches for each 
race. "A library in each department is very much needed," an of-
ficial advised the General Council in 1879. "I would therefore ask 
the privilege of purchasing about two hundred volumes for the 
[white] boys ... and about one hundred for the colored children 
as a nucleus or a beginning. These books of course must be care-
fully selected." It was never suggested that Negro boys occupy the 
same facility as the white boys, even though authorities recog-
nized that maintaining segregated facilities "makes the duties 
more exacting and laborious, both upon the physician and the 
general care-takers." 
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Louisville established a system of education for black children 
in 1871, designed to be completely separate from its white coun-
terpart. The city's new charter provided that "neither the General 
Council of the city of Louisville nor the Board of Trustees of said 
schools shall suffer children of the African race to become pupils 
of said schools with white children." Louisvillians took pride in 
their accomplishments in education, but were so concerned about 
racial matters that it proved difficult to find a suitable location for 
the first Negro school. "There is no little anxiety manifested by 
the people living in this district in regard to locating this school," 
the CounerJournal reported. "One great objection urged against 
some of the bids is the close proximity of the property offered to 
the Seventh ward school. Persons of all political opinions who 
send their children to school on the corner of Fifth and York 
streets, object to this school being anywhere near that school 
house, on the ground that it will either be a practical mixing of 
the children or the boys of the two schools will be continually 
fighting." 
Evety community contrived the separation of the races in most 
areas of daily life, but specific arrangements differed from city to 
city and there were always exceptions to the general pattern. In 
Louisville, as the CounerJournal reported in 1870, there was "a 
preconcerted attempt to test the legal right of the city railway cor-
porations to forbid the riding of negroes or colored men upon 
their cars." Two blacks filed suit against the Central Passenger 
Railroad Company in the United States District Court, and in May 
1871 Judge Bland Ballard ruled that chartered companies could 
not designate what class or race of citizens they would transport. 
Fear of federal intervention produced sullen local compliance with 
the ruling, and Louisville streetcars remained desegregated from 
that point on. But the editor of the CourierJournal warned his 
readers in the aftermath of the streetcar incident that "the conflict 
which extremism has brought is serious and bodes danger. Its 
practical solution seems to us to be for the present the complete 
separation of the two races, giving to each its share in the common 
lot. The blacks have their place at the theater. They have their 
churches. They should have their schools and their railway car-
riages and their street cars and their department at the hotels .. 
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This appears to be the only feasible outlet to our present compli-
cations. The races do not desire to be huddled together, and can-
not be safely huddled together." 
Although the races could never be said to have "huddled to-
gether," whites and Negroes did live in closer proximity during 
the early nineteenth century than they would in later decades. In 
the 1820s and 1830s blacks were widely dispersed throughout the 
metropolises of Dixie. Slaves usually lived behind their masters' 
houses in cabins facing alleyways lined with the shacks of other 
slaves and free blacks. Negro housing was not geographically seg-
regated in antebellum southern cities, and the typical pattern pro-
vided for a virtual mixture of white and black in each section of 
town. In Louisville, the assessment books of 1834 reveal that each 
of the city's five wards, except the fifth, was about half Negro. 
)egli's city directory of 1845 listed Louisville's population by race 
and ward and disclosed the absence of residential segregation or 
even of significant Negro concentrations. An important purpose 
of this residential mixture was to keep blacks divided and thereby 
prevent the development of a cohesive Negro society. 
By the 1840s and 1850s, a measure of residential segregation 
had begun to appear in southern cities. As the system of slavery 
weakened, bondsmen drifted away from their masters' homes and 
found new lodgings along with free Negroes in shantytown settle-
ments on the outskirts of the cities, as far away from white surveil-
lance as it was possible for them to get. There was not full residen-
tial segregation-few neighborhoods, blocks, or streets became 
solidly black-but clusters of Negroes began to emerge on the 
fringes of the cities. During the immediate post-Civil War period, 
this trend toward clusteflng became more pronounced. 
After 1880, although residential segregation continued to in-
crease, whites began to move outward to the suburban periphery 
while blacks moved back toward the center of town and concen-
trated in what grew to become inner-city ghettoes. This redistri-
bution of the races occurred in part because revolutionary devel-
opments in mass transportation shattered the boundaries of the 
compact "walking cities" and enabled white inhabitants with 
means to move out to quieter, cleaner, and less congested "street-
car suburbs." A changing occupational structure, moreover, 
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meant that more blacks began to be employed in tasks other than 
working in the homes of whites. An acute housing shortage dur-
ing a period of extraordinary urban expansion, militant white ra-
cism, and a desire among blacks to live near family and friends re-
inforced the concentration of Negroes in downtown neighbor-
hoods. By the 1890s Louisville's black ghetto was developing in 
two sections along the eastern and western flanks of the central 
business district, and heavily black areas with nicknames such as 
"Smoketown" and "Little Mrica" had emerged. An analysis of 
the federal census ward figures indicated that between 1870 and 
1920 there was a progressive increase in the index of residential 
segregation in Louisville, as in other southern cities. In 1870, for 
example, the Falls City'S tenth ward was 20 percent black, with 
2,255 Negroes and 9,161 whites. Fifty years laterthe ward had be-
come 69 percent black, with 8,385 Negroes and only 3,784 
whites. 
As with most other aspects of urban life, the housing blacks in-
habited was both increasingly separate and decidedly unequal. In-
vestigator Janet E. Kemp, author of the 1909 Report 0/ the Ten-
ement House Commission o/Louisville, reponed that poor blacks 
lived in "peculiarly depressing" conditions in basement dwellings 
that were "very poorly lighted and ventilated," and in tenement 
houses originally constructed for single families but redesigned to 
accommodate from two to eight families. The "Tin House" -de-
scribed as "a large colored tenement ... built of wood, but 
sheathed in tin" -housed thirty-one families in thirty-seven 
rooms "that are less attractive, less clean, less wholesome than 
many stables." The tenants were provided with "sanitary accom-
modations that can only be described as revolting and indecent, 
and which contaminate every breath of air that is drawn by the 
tenants in the rear apartments." These "sanitary accommoda-
tions" consisted of "four ill-kept privy compartments over one 
common vault which was full to overflowing" and a "leaking yard 
hydrant" located a distance of 135 feet from the apartments in the 
front of the house. The commission, nevertheless, found cause for 
optimism. "The negroes take such conditions with a sort of come-
day"go-day, happy-go-lucky philosophy, and make merry at their 
discomforts," Kemp reponed. In 1928, ThomasJackson Woofter, 
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Louisville's black ghetto, 1909: "Buzzards' Roost" 
Jr .• and his colleagues concluded in their study of Negro Problems 
in Cities that in Louisville black families" live in houses not fit for 
work animals [and] children are familiar with vice before they start 
to school." By that date the central city ghetto had fully emerged. 
giving a concrete. physical dimension to a now complete and per-
vasive system of segregation. 
At the close of World War II. although blacks had achieved 
important victories in the courts and had significantly improved 
their economic status. the pattern of segregation and discrimina-
tion remained largely intact in Louisville and in cities throughout 
the South. Law and custom required that Negroes be born in seg-
regated hospitals. attend segregated schools and churches. live in 
segregated neighborhoods. eat in segregated restaurants. watch 
movies in segregated theaters. play in segregated parks. and. after 
death. be buried in segregated cemeteries. Kentucky'S Day Law. 
sponsored in 1904 by state representative Carl Day. required the 
physical separation of Negro and white students at all levels of 
public and private education. and further decreed that "no text-
book issued or distributed under this act to a white school child 
shall ever be reissued or redistributed to a colored school child," 
and vice versa. Racial patterns in Louisville differed little from 
those of the cities of the deep South. with the exceptions that 
public transit facilities had been desegregated since 1871 and that 
blacks could vote without hindrance and had gained a foothold in 
public office. 
Between 1945 and 1965. a largely Negro-led middle class 
movement. fired by the conviction that change had become both 
possible and necessary. set out to topple the entire edifice of offi-
cially sanctioned segregation and discrimination. Through legal 
action and direct action protests blacks hammered away at the sys-
tem of Jim Crow with a determination and a moral fervor which 
brought victory in one arena after another. In 1949. Louisville his-
tory teacher and civil rights activist Lyman T. Johnson. working 
with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People. brought suit against the University of Kentucky to gain 
admission to the graduate school. The federal court. on the basis 
of the "separate but equal" doctrine. ordered the University of 
Kentucky to admit blacks to its graduate school and to its colleges 
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of law, engineering, and pharmacy because the Negro colleges in 
the state did not offer courses in these areas. This decision forced 
the Kentucky legislature to amend the Day Law, allowing blacks 
to enroll in any institution of higher learning provided that the 
governing body of that institution approved and that a compara-
ble course of study was not offered at the black colleges. In 1950 
and 1951, Louisville's Roman Catholic colleges, the Southern 
Baptist and Presbyterian theological seminaries, and the Univer-
sity of Louisville, all opened their doors to Negro students. The 
Louisville Free Public Library, which had opened its main branch 
to Negroes in 1948, desegregated all of its neighborhood branches 
in 1952. Other breakthroughs came in the city's police and fIre 
departments and in the nursing schools of local hospitals. Louis-
ville Negroes gained admission to the local medical society and 
the bar association, and enforced segregation at the Greyhound 
Bus Terminal came to an end. In 1954 the mayor of Louisville an-
nounced that thenceforward all civil service positions in city de-
partments and agencies would be fIlled on the basis of merit with-
outregard to race. 
None of these advances came easily or without struggle. In 
1947, when four Negro ministers asked the mayor of Louisville to 
desegregate the city's parks, the mayor told them that he would 
"not take the responsibility for setting a precedent which, I am 
convinced, would touch off a race riot. Compared to other cities 
Louisville has had exceptionally good race relations. The colored 
people of this community have their own Chickasaw Park. If I 
were to throw open the other parks to them, it would give the 
hoodlums of both races the opportunity they seek to cause trou-
ble-trouble which would engender bitterness and hate that 
would take years to overcome." Law suits were introduced, and in 
1951 the federal district court, declaring that it was "not a ques-
tion of segregation, but of deprivation," ruled that Louisville 
must either let Negroes play on city golf links and fish in the park 
lake or else provide blacks with "separate but equal" facilities. 
Unable to afford the expense of building duplicate facilities, the 
city yielded and in 1952 opened the golf courses and the lake to 
Negroes. The following year the city sponsored a three-week pro-
duction of The Tall Kentuck.ian, a drama about Abraham Lin-
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· coIn, at the amphitheater in Iroquois Park. Since this tribute to 
the "Great Emancipator" was not performed in the Negro parks, 
blacks were admitted to the normally segregated amphitheater 
during the run of the play but were thereafter barred again. Negro 
attorneys argued in circuit court that if segregation could be sus-
pended for three weeks there seemed to be "no reason for the rule 
at all any more." Blacks lost the case, but the following year the 
directors of the Louisville Park Theatrical Association voted to sell 
tickets to "anyone." 
In 1954, despite these advances and after seven years of recur-
rent and still-pending litigation, Louisville's major parks and all 
of the community's swimming pools remained segregated. In 
early May of that year, a white baseball team from Charlestown, 
Indiana, came to Louisville to play a black baseball team from 
Central High School. Because the game was to be held in black 
Chickasaw Park, the director of parks refused to sanction the inter-
racial contest and Central had to forfeit the game. Within days of 
this incident a unanimous Supreme Court handed down its long-
awaited opinion in the case of Brown v.the Board o/Education 0/ 
Topeka, Kansas, overturning Plessy v. Ferguson and proclaiming 
that "in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate 
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inher· 
ently unequal. " 
On September 10, 1956, when Louisville peacefully and 
smoothly desegregated its public schools, the city achieved instan-
taneous recognition and acclaim as a "liberal" border city and a 
model for the rest of the nation to follow. The next morning, a 
front page article in the New York Times announced that segrega-
tion had "died quietly" in Louisville. "When the history of this 
proud Southern city is written, this day will undoubtedly go down 
as an historic landmark," the Times' education editor predicted. 
"Historians will note that a social revolution took place that may 
advance the cause of integration by a generation. Even in the 
South, it was shown here, integration can be made to work with-
out violence." An accompanying editorial in the Times main-
tained that "Louisville is a city of many claims to fame, but no 
achievement so well commands the quiet satisfaction of a job well 
done as the orderly unexcited acceptance of desegregation within 
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the public schools that took place there .... Yesterday as schools 
opened there were no mobs, no pickets, no need for calling the 
Guard to put out fires. The people of Louisville proved once again 
that theirs is an enlightened, civilized city, revering a great past 
but ready to move on with the times." The Louisville story was 
broadcast over the Voice of America, and people from Europe, 
Asia, and Mrica visited the Kentucky metropolis to learn more 
about the city's accomplishment. Superintendent of Schools 
Omer Carmichael met with President Dwight D. Eisenhower at 
the White House, appeared on nationally televised public affairs 
programs, and received honorary degrees the following spring 
from Harvard and Yale universities, Dartmouth College, and the 
University of Kentucky. 
Despite the accolades to this presumed "social revolution," a 
number of difficult problems remained to be solved in the 
schools. Desegregation proceeded peacefully in Louisville pri-
marily because Carmichael's plan contained a "free choice or per-
missive aspect." This provision allowed parents to transfer their 
children to schools other than those to which they had been as-
signed by simply entering such a request. Almost all of the white 
parents whose children had been reassigned to formerly all-black 
schools requested and received transfers for their children to 
schools with little or no racial mixing. Only eighty-nine white 
pupils, out of a total white student population of 33,831, at-
tended formerly all-black schools during the fall of 1956. The 
president of the local Parent-Teachers Association described this 
"permissive" feature of the plan as "a good safety valve," and 
Carmichael believed that without it "we would have had a great 
deal of trouble." The superintendent defended the provision by 
contending that the Supreme Court "didn't say a word about in-
tegration. It didn't order integration. It forbade compulsory seg-
regation." The desegregation plan also stipulated that no black 
teachers were to be reassigned to formerly white schools. Carmi-
chael claimed that "the average white teacher is considerably su-
perior to the average Negro teacher in competence as a person to 
teach children," despite the fact that considerably more of the 
black teachers had earned baccalaureate and advanced college de-
grees than had their white counterparts. In an "exclusive inter-
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view" published in U.S. News & World Report, Carmichael in-
sisted that differences in "culture" made black teachers inferior 
educators. "How can a person come out of a slummy, crime-
ridden area of the city, with poor churches and few of the things 
that go to enrich life-how can a person come out of such a back-
ground the equal of one who comes out of a more cultured home 
in a more cultured community?" the superintendent asked. Fol-
lowing the desegregation of Louisville public schools in the fall 
of 1956, therefore, most white children attended schools staffed 
entirely with white teachers and integrated with but a handful of 
black pupils. Most of the black children attended schools staffed 
entirely with black instructors and integrated either not at all or 
with but a handful of white pupils. On September 20, 1956, the 
editor of the Louisville Defender, a black weekly newspaper, 
stated that "the task is not finished because less than 10 per cent 
of the Negro children are integrated in Louisville schools [and] 
Negro teachers are still relegated to mostly all-Negro schools." 
If the struggle to desegregate the schools was just beginning in 
1956, so also was the effort to end discrimination in public accom-
modations in Louisville. In that year the NAACP Youth Council 
planned a series of demonstrations to protest segregation in the 
city's downtown area. A group of young people led by Lyman 
Johnson marched and picketed against the policy of the dime 
stores to deny Negroes service at their lunch counters even though 
the stores depended heavily on black customers. In mid-195 7, 
after almost six months of weekend demonstrations, the dime 
stores capitulated. The protesters then turned to the drugstore 
lunch counters, picketing for over a year without success. The 
struggle came to a sudden climax in December 1958 when the 
mayor of Kingston, Jamaica, while visiting Louisville was refused 
service at a Walgreen Drug Store and lodged a protest. The inci-
dent produced so much bad publicity that Walgreen's manage-
ment abruptly ended all racial restrictions at irs lunch counters, 
and the other drugstores soon followed suit. 
In 1959, the Louisville chapter of the NAACP prepared to 
launch an all-out campaign against discrimination in downtown 
hotels, theaters, restaurants, and cafeterias. Large-scale demon-
strations began in late 1959, focusing on the exclusionaty policies 
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Picketers outside Louisville 's Brown Theater 
in December 1959 
of the theaters . That holiday season, when the Brown Theater pre-
sented the motion picture version of the all-black folk opera Porgy 
and Bess, Negroes made much of the irony of their not being per-
mitted to see the production. By late 1961, after several years of 
protests, an economic boycott, political wrangling, arrests, and 
bad publicity for the community, the city's white civic leaders 
concluded that segregation was tuining Louisville's progressive 
reputation in the field of civil rights . Accordingly, they issued a 
policy statement in which they put their "moral weight" behind 
desegregation and declared that" it is desirable that the inevitable 
action take place before the generally good atmosphere of the 
Louisville community deteriorates." On May 14,1963, the Louis-
ville Board of Aldermen passed a public accommodations ordi-
nance prohibiting any place "providing food, shelter, recreation, 
entertainment or amusement" to the public from refusing to serve 
a person on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. 
The demonstrations, the economic boycott, use of the ballot to 
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help elect less objectionable candidates, and the desire of white civ-
ic leaders to maintain the city's liberal reputation, all contributed 
to the final victory. Louisville's civil rights leaders recognized that 
the struggle for equality was far from over, but they did not let 
this stop them from celebrating the passage of the public accom-
modations ordinance the following day by going" out to dinner ... 
As the fust city south of the Mason-Dixon line to pass a public 
accommodations law, Louisville once again captured the national 
spotlight and received much favorable publicity. The mayor of the 
city spoke for many of his fellow citizens in 1963 when he stated 
that "the stories of violence in other cities should make us proud 
to live in Louisville. We enjoy national prestige for sane and sensi-
ble race relations." The National Municipal League and Look mag-
azine presented Louisville an All-American City Award, and the 
August 13, 1963, issue of Look carried a highly favorable article 
entitled "Louisville, Kentucky: The City that Integrated without 
Strife." The following year the Civil Rights Act barred racial dis-
crimination in public accommodations throughout the land. 
By the mid-1960s, the civil rights movement had largely suc-
ceeded in toppling the system ofJirn Crow and in outlawing offi-
cially sanctioned segregation and discrimination in public facil-
ities and accommodations. Constitutionally, blacks had become 
fust-class citizens. They had ended decades of disfranchisement 
and had achieved better educational and employment opportuni-
ties. With the success of the legal quest for equality, the first stage 
of the modern civil rights movement had come to an end. 
Louisville's Human Relations Commission, established in 1962 
and one of the first such commissions in the country, conceded 
that vast progress had been achieved in the areas of education and 
public accommodations. But it maintained that problems relating 
to housing and employment were still largely unsolved because 
"these areas are much more complex and confront long-estab-
lished customs based on a heritage of prejudice." The following 
year Louisville journalist Hunter S. Thompson published an arti-
cle entitled" A Southern City with Northern Problems." Thomp-
son suggested that "what is apparent in Louisville is that the Ne-
gro has won a few crucial battles, but instead of making the break-
through he expected, he has come up against segregation's second 
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front, where the problems are not mobs and unjust laws but cus-
toms and traditions .... The white power structure has given way 
in the public sector, only to entrench itself more firmly in the pri-
vate. And the Negro-especially the educated Negro-feels that 
his victories are hollow and his 'progress' is something he reads 
about in the newspapers. The outlook for Louisville's Negroes 
may have improved from 'separate but equal' to 'equal but sep-
arate.' But it still leaves a good deal to be desired." In the same 
year LymanJohnson warned that Louisville was undergoing an un-
wholesome transformation. "The affluent white people are mov-
ing out of town," he declared, "leaving Louisville to the Negroes 
and the poor whites." The more than 400 race riots that erupted 
in American cities during the "long, hot summers" from 1964 
through 1968 dramatized the depths of black frustration, despair, 
and rage. The distance separating affluent, suburban whites from 
poverty-stricken, inner-city blacks seemed to be widening. In 
1968 the National Advisoty Commission on Civil Disorders, 
known as the Kerner Commission, gloomily reported that "our 
nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white-sep-
arate and unequal. " 
"White flight" to the suburbs contributed to the "resegrega-
tion" of the Louisville public schools. Between 1956 and 1965, 
the number of students attending desegregated schools had in-
creased each year. By 1965, 20 percent of the city'S pupils were at-
tending schools in which neither race constituted two-thirds of the 
total enrollment. Beginning in 1965, however, there was a rever-
sal of this trend. By 1970 more than 95 percent of the students in 
Louisville attended schools in which one race predominated. In 
the early 1970s, Louisville and surrounding Jefferson County were 
found to be in violation of federal school desegregation standards. 
In the spring of 1975 the city and county systems merged to be-
come the Jefferson County School System. In July of that year a 
federal district court, implementing a 1974 appellate court deci-
sion, ordered the community to initiate a metropolitan-area-wide, 
!=ross-district busing program for the purpose of bringing about 
school desegregation. Louisville was the first major city in the na-
tion ordered to carry out such a plan. Following the Brown deci-
sion in 1954, Louisville's public school districts had acted to fulfill 
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the new legal requirements "with all deliberate speed" and with-
out specific court decrees. Twenty years later the city's public 
school districts resisted federal court orders every step of the way. 
As classes began in the fall of 1975, thousands marched in anti-
busing demonstrations which in places turned so violent and ugly 
that state troopers and National Guardsmen had to come in to 
help local police restore order. Louisville and its schools once again 
made national headlines, but this time the publicity was de-
cidedly unflattering. "Louisville found itself abruptly face-to-face 
with a community crisis-and with a violently racist image to rival 
that of Birmingham and Boston," Roger M. Williams declared in 
an article in Saturday Review. 
At the close of the 1970s, Americans and Kentuckians, blacks 
and whites, could reach no consensus on the meaning of the his-
tory of race relations in the cities or on the prospects for the fu-
ture. Urban historian Richard C. Wade argued that "the seventies 
have simply tamped down the flames while the ashes still smol-
der," and concluded darkly that "if we do not begin to unite the 
metropolis and to disperse the ghetto in the next few years, the 
eighties will be a decade of renewed tension and turmoil and will 
bear out [abolitionist] Wendell Phillips' grim prophecy of a hun-
dred years ago: 'the time will come when our cities will strain our 
institutions as slavery never did. ", Louisville business consultant 
Katherine Peden, who served as a member of the Kerner Commis-
sion during the late 1960s, was equally pessimistic. "How much 
longer will we be able to have such a large segment of our society 
deprived of opportunities the rest have?" she asked. "If we were 
sitting on a powder keg ten years ago, I can't see that anything 
much has been done to defuse it." 
Other observers, reviewing the same events, interpreted their 
meaning quite differently. Historian Harvard Sitkoff contended 
that in the field of race relations "recent changes have been so dra-
matic that it is difficult to recall the sense of shame and resigna-
tion so common among Afro-Americans at the start of the 1960s, 
especially in the South. Students, Negro and white, have largely 
forgotten the trauma involved in having to 'test' a public restau-
rant, or the worry that if you did get served a hostile waitress 
might have spit in your soup. Few now understand the dread of a 
107 
black family setting out in 1955 to drive from Atlanta to Houston: 
the anxiety of being refused service by motels and gas stations; the 
confusion about where to purchase a cup of coffee or a hambur-
ger. It is hard to remember that in the mid-1960s, Southern 
blacks were still going to jail for using a 'white' public toilet or 
drinking fountain, or that Negroes often could not sit where they 
wanted to on buses and trains .... In ending legal inequality 
and the Jim Crow caste structure, the United States has demon-
strated its capacity to change. For the fust time in history Amer-
icans now stand on the verge of an age in which the races have 
more in common than what divides them." 
Louisville educator Lyman Johnson remembered the indigni-
ties and injustices of the earlier decades well. He lived through 
that period of extraordinary change, and helped bring that change 
about in Kentucky as one of the Commonwealth's most eloquent 
and effective champions of civil rights. In 1949 Johnson had to go 
to court to gain admission to the University of Kentucky; thirty 
years later that institution awarded him an honorary doctorate in 
letters. "Considering the conditions that prevailed when I first 
came to Louisville in 1933, and the amount of change there has 
been since then, I don't see why we shouldn't be optimistic about 
the future," Johnson declared. He believed that "everything the 
Negro has won in Louisville has been won by fighting. Not by vi-
olence, but by insistence." Johnson recognized that "the battle is 
still raging," and at the age of seventy-one, though retired, he ran 
for election to a term on the Jefferson County school board. He 
won the race, and assumed his new duties in 1978 with the inten-
tion of "raising a little hell with everything that seems slipshod 
and inefficient in the system." On December 7, 1980, at the ded-
ication of a middle school renamed in johnson's honor, former 
Louisville school administrator Milburn Maupin suggested that 
many black youngsters in Jefferson County knew little of John-
son's accomplishments in the field of civil rights. But, Maupin as-
serted, in part "because of him they'll go to the lunch counters of 
their choice, go to the universities ... of their choice, [enter] the 
vocations of their choice, ... and sit in the armchairs of their 




CRUCI BLE OF CUL lURE 
IN 1937, JOURNAUST George R. Leighton published an article in 
Harper's Magazine entitled "Louisville, Kentucky: An American 
Museum Piece." Leighton charged that Louisville had become 
"the city oflet-well-enough-alone," and had prematurely entered 
upon an "ossified dotage." "That any genuine intellectual life 
could flourish in such an atmosphere was of course impossible," 
he sneered. "In the sciences there was a stygian darkness. Poetry 
was represented by the maunderings of Madison Cawein; the high 
point in the novel was Mrs. Wiggs of the Cabbage Patch." Any-
one possessing an "active intellect was apt to move away," for all 
that remained of the creative vitality of the once-thriving commer-
cial emporium was a certain "moth-eaten, moribund 'charm.'" 
In 1955 writer William Manchester reassessed cultural life in 
the Falls City and discovered evidence of a profound metamor-
phosis. In an article published in Harper's entitled "Louisville 
Cashes In on Culture," Manchester drew an analogy to the world 
of professional golf and proclaimed that Louisville was "the Ben 
Hogan of American cities. It has staged a spectacular comeback, 
rising, in less than two decades, from stagnation to prosperity." 
The city'S leaders, he maintained, "are convinced that [Louis-
ville's] greatest resource is a reputation for intellectual vigor .... 
Here is the only American city which h~ ever used culture as an 
indusrrial asset. Louisville has succeeded where other Southern 
cities have failed because it has deliberately made itself a pleasant, 
stimulating place to live." 
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Contemporary observers agreed that in the brief period of eigh-
teen years Louisville had undergone a striking transformation 
from ossified "museum piece" to cultural showpiece. The com-
munity'S symphony orchestra, under the leadership of founder 
and conductor Robert S. Whitney, had spearheaded this cultural 
renaissance. Louisville's imaginative and eccentric mayor, Charles 
P. Farnsley, had developed the ideas and formulated the plans 
that had brought Louisville international acclaim as a "world 
musical center." Whitney reflected that "it was Farnsley's com-
prehension of the value of the fine arts in raising the 'image' of a 
community in the eyes of the world that made his contribution so 
remarkable .... Charlie said, 'Athens was a much smaller city 
than Louisville, and our city, in its own way, can go down in the 
history books too.'" 
In 1937, the year Leighton's article appeared in Harper's, the· 
Louisville Civic Arts Association set out to establish a civic orches-
tra. Amateur and semiprofessional orchestras had served Louisville 
for varying periods of time since 1822, but none had ever gained a 
firm foothold. The Board of Directors of the Civic Arts Associa-
tion realized that in order to create a first-rate permanent orches-
tra they would have to secure the services of a talented conductor 
who possessed the proper credentials, experience, and tempera-
ment. "The man must be able to train a raw orchestra," one pa-
tron of the arts declared, "be a real musician and-terribly impor-
. tant-know how to meet people, go to parties, kiss hands, [and] 
remember dowagers." The board hired thirty-three-year-old pi-
anist, composer, and conductor Robert Whitney to conduct and 
develop the semiprofessional, part-time Louisville Civic Or-
chestra. 
In December 1947, after a decade of struggle, the orchestra's 
prospects were bleak. The ensemble's debt had grown annually 
and had surpassed $40,000. Concert audiences had become so 
small that the orchestra's management offered the musicians a 10 
percent commission on any tickets they could sell. Local arts pa-
trons had given generously to the Louisville Philharmonic Progress 
Fund to enable the orchestra to payoff its debt and establish itself 
on a fum financial basis. But the orchestra's Board of Directors 
believed that these same people would not be willing to contrib-
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ute repeatedly to "bail the orchestra out." The board reluctantly 
concluded that if the orchestra could not earn its own way during 
the 1947-1948 season, the enterprise would have to be aban-
doned. 
Early in 1948 the Louisville Philharmonic Society, which had 
succeeded the Civic Arts Association as the orchestra's sponsoring 
body, elected Charles Farnsley its president. Farnsley was some-
thing of a student of history, and had concluded that solutions to 
at least some twentieth-century problems could be found by 
studying eighteenth-century customs and traditions. He had 
worked out a series of changes which he believed would strength-
en and revitalize the Louisville Orchestra, and he called Whitney 
to his office to discuss these measures with him. 
The plan Farnsley outlined contained three major features. He 
proposed first of all that Whitney trim the number of musicians 
from eighty or so down to about fifty. The resulting ensemble 
would resemble the classical court orchestras of the eighteenth 
century for which Haydn and Mozart had composed their music. 
Farnsley argued that the smaller orchestra would provide Whitney 
the opportunity to weed out the weaker players, would be less ex-
pensive to maintain, and would be easier to take on tour and into 
broadcast studios. He next suggested that the orchestra adopt the 
eighteenth-century custom of presenting a new piece of music at 
every concert. Urging the conductor to "let concert-going be an 
adventure-an occasion to hear something new and challenging," 
Farnsley proposed that the orchestra take the money normally 
spent to bring in a guest soloist and use it instead to commission a 
new piece of music tailor-made for an orchestra of classical size. 
The Louisville Orchestra would then give the new work its "world 
premier." Finally, predicting that the long-playing records which 
had just been put on the market would "be as revolutionary for 
music as the invention of the printing press was for the written 
word," Farnsley proposed that the Louisville Orchestra plan to re-
cord the new works of music it commissioned. "If you follow my 
suggestions," Farnsley concluded, "the orchestra will be heard on 
the radio networks, it will record, and, if you commission a new 
work for each concert, the orchestra will be imitated by other or-
chestras and you'll be famous. " 
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The astonished conductor found Farnsley's plan very appeal-
ing. A composer himself, Whitney believed that the work of liv-
ing composers was being neglected "to the great detriment of the 
art" in favor of what he termed "sure-fire" music. He thought to 
himself that "if only 25 percent of what Farnsley predicts comes to 
pass, it will still be a big step forward." Whitney therefore agreed 
to try to implement the plan. Several days after their meeting the 
city's Board of Aldermen appointed Farnsley to succeed the com-
munity's recently-deceased mayor. Farnsley would not be able to 
retain the presidency of the Philharmonic Society, but he would 
be able to do more for the orchestra in his capacity as mayor of 
Louisville. Indeed, he wasted no time in organizing the Louisville 
Fund, a community chest for all the arts and the first such "um-
brella" organization of its kind in the country. 
When the board of the Philharmonic Society voted to continue 
to sponsor the orchestra during the 1948-1949 season, Whitney 
set about putting Farnsley's ideas into practice. The conductor re-
duced the size of his ensemble and began to perform his concerts 
in a smaller auditorium. The orchestra commissioned new works 
of music, invited the composers to Louisville to conduct their own 
compositions, and undertook to introduce a world premier at 
every subscription concert. Music critics from around the country 
began to take interest in the Louisville Orchestra's innovative pro-
grams. There were some objections raised locally to the new and 
frequently harsh-sounding scores, but Whitney held firm to his 
belief that music "is an art, not a commodity." In March 1949 
Whitney informed the orchestra's directors that "much as we wish 
to sell more tickets to our subscription concerts we must not judge 
our value to the community by that criterion alone. Our true pur-
pose is to nurture fine music in this city and build soundly for the 
future so that our children and grandchildren will inherit a musi-
cal tradition of excellence." 
Declining attendance at the orchestra's concerts, however, pre-
cipitated another crisis. The new music had failed to attract addi-
tional subscribers and had in fact alienated many regular concert-
goers. On December 23, 1949, the president of the Philharmonic 
Society and the president of the Louisville Fund notified Whitney 
that the orchestra's directors had concluded that the next pair of 
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subscription concerts should be the ensemble's last. AfterJanuary 
5th the musicians would be paid and the entire debt-ridden enter-
prise would be "liquidated." Whitney remembered the Christ-
mas of 1949 as "one of the darkest moments of my life." 
The conductor began to work feverishly, however, for he knew 
that he had an extraordinary score for the upcoming concert. The 
orchestra had commissioned the gifted ballerina and choreogra-
pher Martha Graham to prepare a new work for the dance, and 
she in turn had selected one of America's foremost composers, 
William Schuman, to create the music. Graham chose the biblical 
story of Judith as her theme, and conceived a work in which a sin-
gle dancer would perform as "soloist-with-orchestra." The ensem-
ble, considered an integral part of the presentation, was seated on 
the stage rather than in the pit. The performance of Judith, A 
Choreographic Poem on the evening of January 4, 1950, was the 
turning point in the history of the Louisville Orchestra. The orig-
inality and brilliance of the concept and the superb execution of 
the work produced a glorious triumph. Critics from all over the 
country attended the premier and wrote feature stories for the 
major newspapers and national magazines praising the successful 
and popular program as well as Whitney'S efforts to further the 
cause of new music in Louisville. Instead of closing its doors the 
Louisville Orchestra became famous throughout the world, and, 
as Whitney recalled, "no more was said about liquidating the or-
chestra." On December 29, 1950, the Louisville Orchestra per-
formed Judith and five other works by living composers at New 
York City'S Catnegie Hall to great acclaim. The critic of the New 
York World Telegram and Sun declared that the Louisville Or-
chestra "gave a program that in daring and novelty put New 
York's own name bands to shame." When Paul Hindemith went 
to Louisville that same season for the premier of his Sin/onietta in 
E he proclaimed that "what this country needs is more Louisville 
Orchestras. " 
The success of Judith provided the Louisville Orchestra the op-
portunity to put the work on a long-playing record. In September 
1950 the orchestra recorded two works by William Schuman, 
Judith and Undertow, for the Mercury Record Corporation. Ever 
since record companies had begun tb produce the long-playing 
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discs in commercial quantities in 1947, Farnsley had wanted to 
capitalize on the new invention to promote the Louisville Orches-
tra. During the fall of 1952, each time the mayor went to New 
York City to sign city bonds, he made appointments to see offi-
cials of the Rockefeller Foundation. Farnsley gathered the neces-
sary information and put together an ambitious grant application. 
On April 7, 1953, he announced that the Rockefeller Foundation 
had awarded the Louisville Orchestra $400,000 to be used over a 
four-year period to commission and record new pieces of music. 
The grant provided for the commissioning of forty-six new works 
each year, and the foundation stipulated that at least one-third of 
the composers had to live outside the United States. The orchestra 
would introduce four new works each month to local audiences at 
special weekly concerts, and would issue one new long-playing 
record each month as well. The LPs would be recorded by Colum-
bia Records, distributed by the Louisville Philharmonic Society, 
sold on a yearly subscription basis, and issued to the Voice of 
America, Radio Free Europe, and educational radio stations at 
home and abroad interested in contemporary music. This grant 
represented the ftrst involvement of a major national foundation 
with an American symphony orchestra. Musical Journal described 
the commissioning and recording project as "the most revolution-
ary development in contemporary musical history." 
The Louisville Orchestra achieved an international reputation 
during the 1950s. Conductors, composers, foreign ambassadors, 
and music lovers throughout the world became aware of the or-
chestra's efforts to nurture new music and listened to its record-
ings. "Allow me to express the utmost admiration for your unique 
achievements in Louisville," Dimitri Mitropoulos, music director 
of the New York Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra, wrote to 
Whitney. "Your encouragement of contemporary music and com-
posers has had repercussions all over the world and has . . . def-
initely put Louisville on the map as a world musical center." The 
music critic of the Chicago Sun Times proclaimed in December 
1954 that Louisville had eclipsed such international cultural cen-
ters as New York, London, and Paris as a leader in the fteld of con-
temporary orchestral music. Three years later Life magazine her-
alded a "unique civic renaissance" taking place in "Culture's New 
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Kentucky Home," and declared that "Louisville is caught up in a 
civic cultural renaissance that is without parallel in the country." 
Farnsley dreamed up other original schemes to promote the 
Louisville Orchestra, not all of which proved successful. At one 
point he suggested that the orchestra ought to play contemporary 
music continuously, every afternoon and evening, ftfty-two weeks 
a year! "The motion picture theaters were his model and he 
wanted admission prices for these concerts to be the same as 
theirs," Whitney recalled. "He felt that anyone passing by at any 
time should be able to drop into Columbia Auditorium and, for a 
nominal fee, listen to contemporary music." Whitney patiently 
explained that he would need several orchestras and musicians 
with truly prodigious abilities in order to perform concerts in this 
marathon fashion, and he ftnally convinced Farnsley to abandon 
the idea. 
Had Whitney attempted to implement Farnsley's plan, how-
ever, the conductor might well have encountered severe difficul-
ties in persuading passersby to "drop into Columbia Audito-
rium." For throughout this era, angry patrons continually ex-
pressed their unhappiness over the orchestra's performances of the 
little understood and less appreciated unorthodox music. In Feb-
ruary 1952 composer and guest conductor Nicolas Slonimsky led 
the Louisville Orchestra in an entire evening of contemporary 
compositions. During the third selection a prominent and exas-
perated local sculptor stood up, shouted "PHOOEY," and stormed 
out of the hall. Some in the audience followed him, and those 
who remained responded to the conductor and orchestra at the 
end of the evening by shouting and stomping their feet in disap-
proval. Courier-Journal music critic William Mootz stated that" in 
most respects, it was a dismal, disillusioning evening." A de-
fender of the orchestra's policies wrote in the Louisville Times that 
"very few people limit their reading to classical literature. If they 
did so, they would have little conception of modern trends of 
thought .... Music is not a live art unless it is performed. If it re-
mains on paper on the shelf it dies and our horizons close in upon 
us .... Do we want a static organization playing a limited reper-
tory, or do we want a group of alive and alert musicians who are 
able to enrich our lives and broaden our appreciation?" Most 
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Conductor Robert S. Whitney and the Louisville Orchestra, 
as depicted by artist GeorgeJoseph 
Louisvillians, however, agreed with Mootz's argument that "in 
order to stay alive, the Louisville Orchestra must draw on a large 
and diversified audience .... It must satisfy the lover of Bach as 
well as the admirer of Bartok, capture the housewife who likes her 
T chaikovsky as well as the businessman who finds his greatest 
source of pleasure in the melodies of Schubert." 
The Slonimsky disaster discouraged everyone except the irre-
pressible Farnsley. "From now on we will perform just one con-
temporary work on each concert," he chortled, "and people will 
be so relieved [that] we will hear no more complaints about the 
matter." On March 2, 1952, the CourierJournai published Whit-
ney's response to his critics. The conductor explained that "the 
purpose of the commissioning policy is three-fold: to encourage 
the contemporary composer, to recognize the importance of the 
creative artist in a living art-form, and to provide for Louisville au-
diences the opportunity for participating in the creative musical 
activity of the century. I recognize the validity of the present crit-
icism of overemphasis on contemporary music. In the future my 
aim will be to maintain a balance of new and novel music with 
great art works from the past. At the same time I also intend to 
present each season several solo artists of highest artistic attain-
ment." In January 1953, with the commissioning project in its 
fifth season, an optimistic Whitney wrote Farnsley that" our audi-
ences now approach our programs with an eager interest. A pre-
conceived distaste for anything new or reflecting the spirit of our 
age seems to be dwindling rapidly. Our new works are no longer 
accepted in the spirit of tolerant resignation, but with a marked 
degree of anticipation and in many cases real enthusiasm." Yet 
disgruntled listeners continued to grumble about "the premier 
performances of modern din" and the "modern cacophonic pro-
grams," and one writer claimed that he subjected himself to the 
new music "for the same reason that the Irishman hit his 
thumb-'it feels so good when you stop.'" In December 1954 the 
CounerJournafs music critic confessed that "the truth is that, de-
spite its international fame, the Louisville Orchestra is in much 
the same predicament as the prophet not without honor save in 
his own country." 
The Rockefeller Foundation and the Louisville Orchestra had 
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hoped that the commissioning and recording project would be-
come completely self-sustaining. Farnsley had predicted that 
1,000 subscriptions would be registered during each of the four 
years under the grant, which would have generated sufficient in-
come to continue the enterprise. He compared the monthly re-
lease of new recordings to the regular publication of scholarly and 
professional journals, and believed that composers, conductors, 
and music libraries everywhere would subscribe to the LPs. After 
the ftrst year, however, only 300 subscriptions had been received, 
and the project never came close to enrolling the estimated 5,000 
subscribers needed to make the endeavor self-supporting. The 
Rockefeller Foundation provided an additional $100,000 during 
the ftnal year of the grant period, and in 1961 Broadcast Music In-
corporated endowed the orchestra with $62,000 to commission 
and record new works of music. The president of BMI explained 
that the Louisville Orchestra was "the obvious choice [to receive 
the award since] it has done more for contemporary music than 
any other orchestra in the United States." 
After 1960, although the orchestra could no longer afford to 
commission new works on a large scale, the ensemble continued to 
produce the highly regarded recordings. The number of subscrip-
tions climbed to 2,500, a significant proportion of which be-
longed to universities, libraries, and schools of music which auto-
matically entered renewals. Many of the subscriptions were held 
abroad, and, perhaps not surprisingly, more of the records went to 
subscribers in London than to purchasers in Louisville. "The re-
cordings are extraordinarily good," the director of contemporary 
projects for BMI declared. "In Europe they can't believe that the 
Louisville group is not one of the 'majors' -one of the big city or-
chestras, like the Boston, the Philadelphia, or the New York Phil-
harmonic. Of all conductors I know, Whitney has conducted more 
contemporary music and done it better." The Louisville Orchestra 
changed the name of its series from the Commissioned Records to 
the First Edition Records, cut the number of new releases from 
twelve to six per year, and remained the only orchestra in the 
world which recorded and distributed LPs under its own label. 
Whitney strove to make the recordings representative of the 
new music being composed at the time. Accordingly, few of the 
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compositions commissioned reflected extreme experimentation or 
innovation, and contemporary music authoriry Philip Hart was 
, "impressed with the general conservatism" of the body of music. 
Several of the commissioned works have entered the repertory of 
the modern symphony orchestra and have been described by crit-
ics as masterpieces. These works include William Schuman's 
judith, Elliott Carter's Vanations for Orchestra, Peter Mennin's 
Fifth and Sixth Symphonies, Aaron Copland's Orchestral Van·-
ations, Walter Piston's Fifth Symphony, Roger Sessions's Idyll of 
Theocritus, and Luigi Dallapiccola's Vanazioni per Orchestra. 
Overall, however, Hart concluded that "in its aggregate the Louis-
ville First Edition repertory rather reminds one of catalogs of 
music in the eighteenth century, filled with composers now for-
gotten and only occasional mentions of such masters as Mozart 
and Haydn." Nevertheless, the Louisville Orchestra's recordings 
of hundreds of symphonic works by scores of modern composers 
comprise what promises to remain the most important historical 
introduction to the creative output of mid-twentieth-century clas-
sical music. 
In 1965 Whitney and the Louisville Orchestra played the cen-
tral role in the musical portion of the White House Festival of the 
Arts. The music critic of the Washington Post concluded that the 
conductor and his ensemble "have far outstripped every other 
American orchestra in their services to contemporary music in gen-
eral and American music in particular. For more than a decade 
and a half, Louisville has commissioned works from the leading 
composers of the world, out of every age bracket. Moreover, they 
have not only performed these new scores in their regular concerts 
but have given them permanent form in the most distinguished 
series of phonograph records yet issued." At the conclusion of the 
1966-1967 season, Robert Whitney retired after thirty years as 
conductor of the Louisville Orchestra. The ensemble continued its 
innovative tradition under Whitney'S successor, and in 1980 the 
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers pre-
sented the Louisville Orchestra an award for "adventuresome pro-
gramming of contemporary music. " 
During the late 1970s, Actors Theatre of Louisville similarly 
gained worldwide recognition as a major force in the performing 
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arts. The theater achieved its international reputation by doing for 
drama precisely what the Louisville Orchestra had done for music 
two decades earlier. Beginning in 1976, An launched a New Play 
Program and began to commission and produce new theatrical 
works. The theater sponsored an annual "Great American Play 
Contest" in order to discover the newest scripts written by un-
known as well as established talents, and each winter mounted 
productions of the winning entries in its "Festival of New Amer-
ican Plays." At the same time An initiated a commissioning 
project which led to the development of over sixty works by Amer-
ican authors during the late 1970s. The theater encouraged prom-
ising playwrights by awarding them stipends and by sponsoring 
developmental workshops and readings. By 1980, An had pre-
sented the world premiers of almost fifty new plays, and the num-
ber of scripts annually reviewed by the theater's literary depart-
ment had ballooned to 4,000. "We take special pleasure in dis-
covering new writers, and working with them on their first plays," 
ATL's producing-directorJonJory explained. "The theater is ex-
cited about its commitment to the playwright, a commitment of 
many years, and we are anxious to work with American writers at 
every level of their development and provide a forum for their 
work. . . . If we can assist new works [to] find their way into the 
general repertory, we're happy. We like to feel that, in the next 
century, some of the dramas we've introduced will still be playing 
around America. " 
In 1980, Newsweek. magazine's drama critic reported that "the 
annual Festival of New American Plays at Actors Theatre of Louis-
ville has become just about the biggest event in American region-
al theater. The festival has developed into an international theat-
rical bazaar, attracting playgoers, critics, agents and producers 
from all over the United States and [from] as far away as England, 
Italy, France, Germany, Poland, and even Australia." A surprised 
English theater critic remarked that same year that "there are five 
major British critics here [and] I don't ever remember seeing them 
in the same place at the same time." In 1980 the drama critic of 
the London Observer suggested that An's "festival of new Amer-
ican plays . . . is probably the most ambitious event of its' kind in 
the English-speaking theatre." His counterpart on the Wall Street 
120 
Journal declared that "once a year, when the Actors Theatre of 
Louisville holds its Festival of New American Plays, Louisville, 
Kentucky, becomes the center of the American. theatrical uni-
verse." The drama critic of the Washington Post agreed with his 
enthusiastic colleagues and proclaimed that "for a few days last 
weekend, Louisville, Kentucky, became the theater capital of the 
Western world." 
In the space of only five years An achieved international ac-
claim and produced an impressive number of highly regarded new 
works. D.L. Coburn's The Gin Game and Beth Henley's Cn'mes 
of the Heart received the Pulitzer Prize for drama in 1978 and 
1981, respectively, while Marsha Norman's Getting Out won the 
1978 Outer Critics' Circle Award. The drama critic of the Austra-
lian recognized that "Louisville audiences liked being in at the 
birth of something," and Jory certainly did not have to contend 
with the hostility to the presentation of new works that Whitney 
had encountered. In fact, the theater was able to sell practically all 
of its tickets on a season subscription basis. Actors Theatre re-
ceived the Margo Jones Award in 1978 for the discovery and pro-
duction of new American plays, the Schubert Foundation'sJames 
N. Vaughan Memorial Award in 1979 for "exceptional achieve-
ment and contribution to the development and growth of profes-
sional theater," and a special American Theatre Wing Antoinette 
Perry Award in 1980 for outstanding theatrical achievement. No 
American theater had previously won all three of these prestigious 
awards. 
During the post-World War II period American cities had be-
come increasingly aware that the performing and visual arts could 
significantly enhance their prospects for economic growth. Charles 
Farnsley had understood this fact earlier than most. As William 
Manchester reponed in 1955, Farnsley was "convinced that cul-
ture, industry, and retail business are woven together-that the 
progress of one affects the progress of the others .... The theory 
[behind his plans was] that industries which are really desirable 
want decent homes and cultural facilities for their employees." In 
the decades after 1945 cities discovered that Farnsley had been 
correct and that they needed to provide a hroad range of cultural 
amenities in order to attract the "really desirable" service-based 
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industries along with their highly trained, well educated, mobile, 
and salaried personnel. A 1977 Fortune magazine market research 
survey revealed that decisions involving the location of a corporate 
headquarters were based primarily upon the personal preferences 
of company executives and upon factors such as the arts which had 
come to be associated with a high" quality of life. " 
In 1978 the United States Conference of Mayors highlighted 
the economic importance of cultural attractions in a position 
paper entitled The Taxpayers' Revolt and the Arts. "All too often, 
in times of budgetary constraints, appropriations for the arts seem 
an unnecessary frill," Atlanta mayor MaynardJackson wrote in the 
report's introduction. "We believe that money for the arts, rather 
than representing an unnecessary, easily cut expenditure, repre-
sents instead an investment which generates further revenues for 
the cities upon which future city vitality depends." Indeed, econ-
omists estimated that every dollar spent for the arts generated be-
tween three and four dollars in return, directly through salaries, 
the purchase of services, and the rental of buildings, and indi-
rectly through hotel bookings, restaurant patronage, and retail 
sales. "As a mayor of a major urban center," Jackson declared, "I 
have strongly endorsed the use of the arts as a significant tool for 
the restoration and revitalization of the central city .... The arts 
are the very highest expression of urban life; and the cultural en-
richment that is possible in an urban setting is the highest and 
most eloquent justification of the city itself; the arts and the city 




I N 1970 THE FEDERAL census revealed that, for the first time in the 
history of the Commonwealth, a majority of Kentuckians lived in 
cities. In statistical terms, 52.3 percent of the state's total popula-
tion of slightly over 3.2 million lived in the 102 cities of 2,500 
people or more. Kentuckians had gone to town, and although 
they might entertain a wistful and superficial nostalgia for "the 
good old days," they had no intention of returning to the land. 
As historian Thomas D. Clark pointed out, urban Kentuckians 
"love nothing better than to reminisce about those other times. 
They drive out on Sunday afternoons to dig through the weeds in 
search of familiar landmarks, to review the scenes of their child-
hood, and to remark on the changes, but at sundown they hustle 
back to town." 
Throughout the twentieth century, the proponion of Ken-
tucky's inhabitants living in cities had continued to grow, and the 
state's network of cities had become more extensive and complex. 
The Bluegrass region and its fringes experienced substantial urban 
development, with the rise of new suburbs outside Lexington and 
with the growth of places like Berea, Lancaster, and Wilmore to 
the south, Morehead to the east, and Lawrenceburg to the west. 
Older centers such as Lexington and Bardstown came to life and 
once again began to forge ahead. Lexington's dynamic growth 
during the 1960s and 1970s was stimulated by the arrival of large 
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Metropolitan Lexington, looking toward the southeast across downtown and the campus of the University of Kentucky 
manufacturing fIrms such as International Business Machines, by 
the expansion of the University of Kentucky, and by the develop-
ment of a large-scale health care industty. The city's population 
jumped from less than 63,000 in 1960 to more than 204,000 in 
1980 as the rejuvenated "Athens of the West" surged past such 
cities as Des Moines, Dayton, Knoxville, and Fort Wayne and 
threatened to challenge Louisville for urban supremacy within the 
Commonwealth. 
Upstart towns and cities arose and vied with economic rivals for 
primacy and power. Radcliff boomed after Wodd War II as "the 
Post Town of Fort Knox," its population soaring from a few hun-
dred to 15,000 as the fort developed into a permanent, major mil-
itary installation. Radcliff's rapid expansion created anxiety in 
neighboring Elizabethtown and gave rise to a spirited urban ri-
valry between the two Hardin County communities. Older Eliza-
bethtown, which billed itself "Kentucky's Hub City," was 
founded well before the Civil War and took pride in being a 
"fIne, established city." But its brash young rival branded it a 
"very old city" to which people would move only "if they had rel-
atives or a job there." A Radcliff booster declared that, unlike 
Elizabethtown, his community was "growing by leaps and 
bounds. People moving here can get in on the ground floor. 
There's room to grow." An Elizabethtown promoter smugly dis-
missed such claims and insisted that "it's obvious that opportuni-
ties are better here than in Radcliff. " 
Both Elizabethtown and Radcliff, along with dozens of other 
communities, benefItted from the construction of a network of 
roadways throughout Kentucky and from the increasing use of 
automobiles and trucks. The building of the Purchase, Western, 
and Blue Grass parkways stimulated the development of towns 
and cities along the routes of the new highways. The almost uni-
versal adoption of the automobile after 1945 sparked a suburban 
explosion on the "crabgrass frontiers" of the state's larger and 
older urban centers. Satellite cities developed in the northern 
Kentucky-Greater Cincinnati area around Covington and New-
port, in the Louisville-Jefferson County area and to its south, and 
in the vicinity of Ashland and Paducah. Nationally, the suburban 
trend had become so pronounced that the 1970 federal census re-
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vealed that, for the first time in American history, more residents 
of metropolitan areas lived outside the central cities than within 
them. Kentucky'S metropolitan population conformed to the na-
tional pattern, as slightly more than half of the state's metropol-
itan residents lived in suburban communities outside the political 
boundaries of the central cities. 
The growth of sprawling metropolitan regions has been one of 
the most significant developments in the urban history of the 
twentieth century. By 1980, 45 percent of Kentucky'S total pop-
ulation had come to reside within seven Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas. The Census Bureau defined an SMSA as consist-
ing of an entire county which contained a central city of 50,000 or 
more inhabitants, plus adjacent counties considered economically 
and socially integrated with the central city according to an elab-
orate set of criteria. Census officials ignored the somewhat arbi-
trary political boundaries of the states in charting the contours of 
metropolitan regions, and hence five of the seven SMSAs in Ken-
tucky included portions of one or more neighboring states. The 
Huntington-Ashland SMSA spread over portions of West Vir-
ginia, Kentucky, and Ohio, while the Greater Cincinnati-Coving-
ton-Newport complex took in parts of Ohio, Kentucky, and Indi-
ana. Both the Greater Louisville and the Evansville-Henderson 
areas straddled the Ohio River and included portions of Kentucky 
and Indiana, while the Clarksville-Hopkinsville region took in 
parts of Kentucky and Tennessee. Only the Owensboro and Lex-
ington SMSAs lay entirely within the borders of the Common-
wealth. 
Rapid urban growth, suburbanization, and the rise of metro-
politan areas dramatically altered the daily lives of average Amer-
icans in Kentucky as elsewhere; During the 1960s and 1970s, in 
the midst of a widely publicized "urban crisis," social scientists, 
journalists, and urban affairs commentators highlighted aspects of 
change and novelty in urban society and t,ended to ignore ele-
ments of continuity. To most observers the giant metropolis of the 
automobile age seemed only remotely related to the industrial city 
of the railroad era, the commercial emporium of the steamboat 
age, and the frontier community of the turnpike period. Yet a 
closer examination of two centuries of urban life in the nation and 
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in the Commonwealth revealed that, despite the extraordinary 
amount of change, there had been a substantial although far less 
widely appreciated thread of continuity in the urban experience. 
Noise pollution, for example, seemed to many a peculiarly 
modern urban problem associated principally with motorcycles, 
diesel trucks, power mowers, police sirens, jet aircraft, jackham-
mers, and rock-and-roll music. A United States Census Bureau 
study released in 1976 indicated that more than half of all Amer-
icans considered noise the most annoying of all contemporary 
urban problems. Courier-Journal environmental reporter Jim Det-
jen argued in a 1978 anicle headlined "Hues and Cries ofToday's 
Life Threaten Your Sound Barrier" that "noise is more than an 
annoyance. It interrupts sleep, concentration and conversation. It 
induces stress. It causes nausea and high blood pressure. It has 
been linked to mental illness, sexual inhibitions, ulcers and birth 
defects. It also makes you deaf." Kentucky state legislator Bruce 
Blythe, representing Jefferson County, referred to noise as "a new 
kind of pollution." 
Yet urban residents complained of the discomfort caused by 
unwanted noise long before the modern era of automobiles, air-
planes, and amplifiers. Benjamin Franklin grumbled about the 
"thundering of coaches, chariots, chaises, wagons, drays and the 
whole fraternity of noise" that assailed the ears of late eighteenth-
century Philadelphians. Industrialization inflicted a "diabolical 
symphony" of "unadulterated noise" on harried city dwellers, 
whose eardrums were pierced by "the whir of machinery, the 
shriek of whistles, the clang of bells, [and] the strident grind of 
trolleys." An article published in Louisville's Courier-Journal in 
1877 revealed the extent to which noise disrupted the lives of the 
community's inhabitants. "Before retiring, the citizens shut down 
the windows, put a clothes pin upon their noses, fill their ears full 
of putty and then ram their heads under a pillow to keep from 
being awakened at midnight by pork-house whistles," the writer 
asserted. "The people in the East End only sleep the fore pan of 
the night during hog-killing season. Everybody sits up from mid-
night till daylight cursing the inventor of steam and the son-of-a-
sea-cook who invented the whistle .... The only good pork-
house whistles do is they keep the East End police from going to 
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sleep." Shortly after the turn of the century the chairman of the 
Committee on Noise of the American Civic Association insisted 
that, if boards of health could prevent a person "from polluting 
his neighbor's water-supply with typhoid germs, they can forbid 
him from congesting his neighbor's air with sounds that breed in-
sanity." 
In the late twentieth century, city dwellers became increasingly 
conscious of environmental problems and complained of the 
choking air pollution. "Thousands of Louisville residents dare not 
leave their air-conditioned homes on days when pollution is bad," 
Courier-Journal columnist John Filiatreau wrote in 1978. "People 
who walk around downtown complain of mysterious headaches, 
notice that their skin grows gummy, apologize for red, weepy 
eyes, suffer chest pains, find themselves short of breath." Com-
mentators and experts blamed the automobile as the principal 
source of this problem. "Automotive pollutants have a strangle-
hold on Louisville, making its air the worst of any city in the 
Southeastern United States," the Courier-Journal's environmen-
tal reporter declared in 1978. "Each year, Jefferson County's 
384,000 cars, 62,000 trucks and 23,000 other motor vehicles spew 
an estimated 265,000 tons of pollutants into the air we breathe . 
. . . While the vehicles congest the streets, their exhausts cloud 
the city's economic future and endanger its citizens' health." 
The air pollution problem too, however, can be traced back 
over the course of centuries. In 1661, for example, a fellow of the 
Royal Society of London named John Evelyn published Fumtfu-
gium: Or the Inconvenience of the Aer and Smoake of London 
Dissipated, a tirade against the "Hellish and dismall Cloud of 
SEA-COALE" and the "impure and thick Mist, accompanied with a 
fuliginous and filthy vapour," which caused "Catham, Phthis-
icks, Coughs, and Consumptions [to] rage more in this one City, 
than in the whole Earth besides." In Louisville, Henry McMurtrie 
complained in 1819 of "the foul and pestilent airs of a pent-up 
city," and Charles Dickens observed during a visit in 1842 that 
"the buildings are smoky and blackened, but an Englishman is 
well used to that appearance, and indisposed to quarrel with it." 
In 1849 a newcomer to the Falls City was surprised to discover that 
"when we put the water pitcher out the window to cool, it be-
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comes filled with floating black particles, and the children's arms 
and faces are not more than fIfteen minutes after washing free 
from soot. " The increasing number of factories in the city and the 
widespread use of coal to heat businesses and homes produced so 
much smoke that a roving journalist found Louisville in 1866 con-
siderably less charming and elegant than he had assumed it would 
be. "Masses of smoke, belched from numberless chimneys, keep 
the place in a perpetual fog, and, descending in showers of soot, 
produce a monotone of color not cheering to the sight," he de-
·clared. "Thus Louisville ... turns out to be in fact only a rival of 
Pittsburgh." Indeed, some thought Louisville even surpassed the 
notorious Pennsylvania steel town in smoke and dirt. A cartoon 
printed in the Cou17:erJournal in 1913 entitled "Louisville's Un-
enviable Reputation" depicted an early model biplane flying 
above a city obscured by a dense, black haze. "I should say that 
judging by the smoke we are now flying over Pittsburgh," one 
aviator declared. "No, Boy, That's Louisville," the other re-
sponded. "You know they DO see the sun once in a while in Pitts-
burgh." 
Although observers have written about air pollution for dec-
ades and even centuries, not until recently did many people con-
sider it a "problem" important enough to demand serious atten-
tion. In 1955, for example, Louisville magazine, a publication of 
the city's Chamber of Commerce, carried an article headlined 
"Air Pollution Standards, Opposed by Local Industry as 'Disl.S-
trous' to Some Firms, Postponed Indefinitely," in which the au-
thor smugly boasted that proposed pollution control regulations 
had been successfully "warded off." Three years later the Couner-
Journal and the Louisville Times, both owned by the same pub-
lisher, ran an advertisement in the trade journal Advertising Age 
proudly proclaiming that the Ohio River Valley was "the Ruhr of 
America" and depicting a skyline of smokestacks belching soot 
into the atmosphere. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, such a view symbolized material growth and prosperity 
and the desired triumph of a progressive urban and industrial civ-
ilization over the savagery of untamed nature. Only after about 
1960 had this image come to represent a deteriorating quality of 
life rather than a rising standard of living. As the newspapers' ed-
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Metropolitan Louisville, looking toward the west across downtown and the West End 
itors admitted in 1976, "those were the good old days, when 
Progress was partly defined by how sooty the air was, and we were 
euchered like nearly everyone else. A few people were trying to 
sound the alarm, but most Americans didn't start thinking seri-
ously about the deterioration of our air and water until publica-
tion of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962." 
Environmental problems associated with the automobile made 
some Americans of the late twentieth century nostalgic for the by-
gone days of the horse and buggy. They did not suspect, however, 
that their ancestors had blamed the horse for producing the same 
set of problems which they themselves attributed to the motor car: 
air contaminants harmful to the health, obnoxious odors, and dis-
turbing noise. HistorianJoel A. Tarr noted that "health officials 
in Rochester, New York, calculated in 1900 [that] the fifteen 
thousand horses in that city produced enough manure in a year to 
make a pile 175 feet high covering an acre of ground and breeding 
sixteen billion flies, each one a potential spreader of germs." Pub-
lic health officials in cities across the country charged that wind-
blown dust from pulverized manure damaged eyes and irritated 
respiratory organs, while the "noise and clatter" of city traffic ag-
gravated nervous disorders. 
By the turn of the ~entury, writers in popular and scientific 
journals had begun to demand "the banishment" of the horse 
from American cities and to argue that the solution to the prob-
lem of urban transportation lay with the "horseless carriage." One 
authority predicted that the replacement of horses by motor vehi-
cles would "benefit the public health to an almost incalculable 
degree," while another declared that "this crusade against the 
horse is a warfare of science against the visible unsanitation and 
the unseen pestilence of cities. The horse must make way for the 
motor." Some even promoted the automobile as a panacea for the 
physical and psychological problems which stemmed from the 
hectic pace of urban life. "It is the greatest health giving in-
vention of a thousand years," publisher Frank A. Munsey ex-
claimed in 1903. "The cubic feet of fresh air that are literally 
forced into one while automobiling rehabilitate worn-out nerves 
and drive out worry, insomnia, and indigestion. It will renew the 
life and youth of the ovetworked man or woman, and will make 
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the thin fat and the fat-but I forbear." Contemporaries did not 
consider mass transportation a particularly happy alternative to 
the horse. Nineteenth-century newspapers carried numerous com-
plaints against the streetcars, railways, and trolleys, which pointed 
out that "people are packed into them like sardines in a box, with 
perspiration for oil," and that "ladies and gentlemen are com-
pelled to sit down on seats sticky with nastiness, breathe loath-
some air, and look out of cracked windows that are splashed with 
dirt from one end to the other." The generation of the turn of the 
century, then, hailed the automobile as a marvelous innovation 
which would at once solve the problems caused by the horse and 
by mass transit. 
Late twentieth-century defenders of the city decried the exodus 
to the suburbs which the automobile had accelerated, little realiz-
ing that suburban growth had been an integral part of the process 
of urbanization for over 150 years. During the decades after 1830, 
mass transportation transformed compact "walking cities" into 
modern metropolises as the affluent moved to outlying "streetcar 
suburbs." Increasingly, rich and poor lived further apart, residen-
tial neighborhoods became remote from commercial and indus-
trial districts, and the journey to work from house or apartment to 
office or factory became longer and more time consuming. Al-
though post-World War II critics castigated the suburbs as sterile, 
child-centered enclaves of conformity, previous generations had 
celebrated suburban retreats as arcadian "middle landscapes" 
combining the best features of city and country life. In 1898 Brit-
ish planner Ebenezer Howard declared that "town and country 
must be mam"ed, and out of this joyous union will spring a new 
hope, a new life, a new civilization." Three years later Cornell 
University educator Liberty Hyde Bailey observed that "it is be-
coming more and more apparent that the ideal life is that which 
combines something of the social and intellectual advantages and 
physical comforts of the city with the inspiration and peaceful joys 
of the country." Most Americans applauded William Smythe in 
1922 when he offered theln "city homes on country lanes" com-
bining "the cream of the country and the cream of the city, leav-
ing the skim-milk for those who like that sort of thing." 
Suburbanization appeared to many a new phenomenon after 
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1945 in part because, until fairly recently, suburbs simply did not 
remain suburbs for very long. Eager to enjoy urban services and to 
be incorporated into the larger community, most "streetcar sub-
urbs" willingly gave up their separate identities and independent 
legal status and rapidly became urban neighborhoods. In conse-
quence, city boundaries kept expanding and largely kept pace 
with population growth. The annexation of predominantly res-
idential suburbs enabled Louisville, for example, to expand in 
area from five to sixty square miles during the hundred or so years 
after 1850. In the twentieth century, however, suburban resis-
tance made annexation increasingly difficult, city boundaries 
stopped expanding, and urban populations began to level off and 
even decline. As historian Kenneth T. Jackson pointed out, 
"without exception, the adjustment of local boundaries has been 
the dominant method of population growth in every American 
city of consequence .... What was called the growth of Chicago 
or Philadelphia or Memphis was actually the building up of res-
idential communities on their edges .... If annexation had not 
been successful in the nineteenth century, many large cities would 
have been surrounded by suburbs even before the Civil War." 
Viewed another way, had annexation continued to be successful in 
the twentieth century, the populations of cities like Louisville 
would have kept on growing. Indeed, during the 1970s, although 
the city of Louisville lost population, the Louisville metropolitan 
area continued to expand and suburban Oldham and Bullitt 
counties grew more rapidly than any other counties in the state. 
Mter 1900, as suburbs increasingly elected to remain politically 
independent, metropolitan areas experienced governmental frag-
mentation. By 1979, there were within Jefferson County more 
than eighty incorporated municipalities and more than one hun-
dred separate taxing authorities. A number of observers con-
cluded that one or another form of metropolitan government of-
fered the best alternative to annexation as a means of solving the 
problems of overlapping responsibilities and duplication of ser-
vices. In 1972 the residents of Lexington and Fayette County 
voted to consolidate their city and county governments into a sin-
gle, unified "urban county government." Political scientist W.E. 
Lyons concluded in 1977 that "after four years of operation, the 
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Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government is on the verge of 
fulfilling many of the promises made by the proponents of mer-
ger." Difficult problems remained to be solved, however, and the 
results of similar experiments in other cities were not overly en-
couraging. But by adding more than 65,000 residents to the Blue-
grass city overnight, the consolidation of Lexington and Fayette 
County did help Lexington to become the fourth fastest-growing 
city in the United States during the 1970s. 
The inability of cities to annex their suburbs in the twentieth 
century created severe fmancial strains on urban areas. As the af-
fluent moved beyond municipal boundaries and as commercial 
and industrial activities relocated beyond corporate limits, cities 
had to contend with rising needs and shrinking tax bases. Com-
mentators bemoaned the demise of the "self-sufficient city" capa-
ble of solving its own problems and the increasing need for mu-
nicipalities to go hat-in-hand to the federal government for assis-
tance. Yet, during the first decades of their history, the earliest 
cities in the Commonwealth had been anything but self-suffi-
cient. Urban officials had to go "running down to Frankfort" to 
plead with state legislators for broadened powers, expanded city 
charters, and greater taxing authority in order to provide essential 
services and cope with mounting problems. Lexington's trustees 
complained in 1796 that they could not insure "the health, safety 
and convenience" of the town's inhabitants, while Louisville offi-
cials declared two decades later that their city's revenues were "en-
tirely insufficient to answer the purposes of the town." A similar 
complaint was voiced early in the twentieth century. "The mod-
ern city has done its work and a change is coming," industrialist 
Henry Ford predicted in 1924. "The city has taught us much, but 
the overhead expense of living in such places is becoming unbear-
able. The cost of maintaining interest on debts, of keeping up 
water supply, sewerage and sanitary systems, the cost of traffic 
control and policing great masses of people are so great as to offset 
the benefits of the city. The cities are getting too heavy and are 
about doomed." 
During the 1960s and 1970s urban planners and administrators 
struggled to revive older downtown areas and central business dis-
tricts. In 1977 CounerJournal reporter P.W. Woolsey suggested 
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that Louisville's Main Street, after a prolonged slump, was "re-
bounding" as an entertainment and cultural center. "It was not 
until our era that Louisville turned toward the river instead of 
away" from it, Woolsey asserted. Yet fifty-six years earlier a writer 
for that same newspaper had proclaimed that "Main Street, like 
the old gray mare, ain't what she used to be. However, this fact 
will be related in paeans of joy tomorrow instead of in the plain-
tive tones appropriate to the case of the old gray mare." This 1921 
account explained that Main Street, once Louisville's major 
wholesale district, had experienced a decline but was being rejuve-
nated. The writer observed that twenty-six fIrms had moved to 
Main Street during the previous two years, that a number of busi-
nesses which had been renting space had purchased property, and 
that there were only a few vacancies for sale or rent. Even though 
Main Street was thus revitalized in the 1920s and revitalized once 
again two generations later, at the end of the 1970s developers in 
Louisville as in other cities were still trying to pump new life into 
sluggish downtown areas with some combination of new perform-
ing arts centers, shopping complexes, sports arenas, convention 
centers, office and bank towers, and rehabilitated older structures. 
Officials could not agree, however, on what, if anything, could 
cure the problems of declining central business districts. A possi-
ble solution to these problems was unveiled one bright June day 
in 1978 when a former Miss Nudity International took a promo-
tional stroll down Louisville's River City Mall to advertise her en-
gagement at a local nightclub, "dressed in a scant green bikini, 
four-inch high heels and red hair." Proclaiming that "nudity is re-
freshing," she took the bikini off, prompting one excited on-
looker to predict that "this will bring people back to the down-
town area." Indeed, about one hundred spectators had gathered 
to observe the proceedings, but urban planners seemed uninter-
ested in the possible implications for downtown revitalization. 
Observers and preservationists complained during the 1970s 
that the historic fabric of cities was being demolished only to be 
replaced by monotonous, unimaginative, and unimpressive exam-
ples of contemporary architecture. They argued that the identities 
and personalities of cities suffered ineparable damage when dis-
tinctive older buildings designed by local architects and built by 
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local craftsmen using locally available materials were replaced by 
modern office towers, apartment complexes, and shopping cen-
ters virtually indistinguishable from those put up elsewhere and 
everywhere. The editors of the CourierJournal suggested in 1978 
that Louisville had become the "Home of [the] Demolition 
Derby," and maintained that "for all the clamor. . . about pres-
ervationists' blocking progress, it's hard to recall a single case in 
Louisville in which a new building hasn't been built because his-
tory stood in the way. Bit by bit, our heritage is vanishing. The 
end of this will come when nothing worth preserving, or unique 
to Louisville, is left to fight for." Small numbers of urban res-
idents had in fact been complaining for many decades about what 
Walt Whitman had termed the "pull-down-and-build-over spir-
it." In their 1967 study A History o/Urban America, urban histo-
rians Charles N. Glaab and A. Theodore Brown dismissed the ef-
forts of "traditionalists and others" who "sought to preserve struc-
tures which had been historically significant," and observed that 
"the thrust of American urbanization has always destroyed the old 
to make way for the new; urban development has always involved 
urban redevelopment. " 
During the 1970s, however, preservationists finally proved able 
to attract large audiences sympathetic to their point of view. Cities 
established landmark and historic preservation districts, residents 
formed neighborhood and city-wide preservation alliances, and 
Americans generally seemed to acquire a heightened appreciation 
of the value of significant architecture. In the second edition of A 
History 0/ Urban America, published in 1976, Glaab and Brown 
revised their earlier view and admitted that "it had become in-
creasingly clear that rebuilding in cities, judged by whatever set of 
values or standards one might choose, did not only represent 
change but also decline in the quality of craftsmanship and style 
in the urban building art." A report published in Time magazine 
in 1979 concluded that "if the past decade has produced a single 
cultural bench mark of note, it has been the remarkable turn-
about in Americans' estimation of their bricks-and-mortar legacy." 
By the 1970s, energy shortages, a faltering economy, and the 
environmentalist movement had all encouraged the "adaptive 
reuse" of highly prized and distinctive examples of local architec-
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ture. The emphasis in historic preservation had shifted away from 
"reverential restoration of old buildings" toward the moderniza-
tion and reuse of these structures while maintaining their original 
character. "Several years ago, preservation meant restoration-
making the old mansion into a museum, a monument to the 
past," Barbaralee Diamonstein of the New York City Landmarks 
Preservation Commission explained in 1978. "Today preservation 
does not, and emphatically should not, mean merely restoration. 
An important aspect of the preservation movement at present is 
the recycling of old buildings-adapting them to uses different 
from the ones for which they were originally intended." In Louis-
ville, an old Greek Revival-style bank and the adjacent warehouse 
were adapted to house Actors Theatre, while a former dry goods 
store was redeveloped to serve as the home of a new Museum of 
History and Science. 
During the 1960s it became fashionable to speak and to write 
about the "urban crisis," the "sick, sick cities," and the" death of 
the city." Author Norman Mailer pointed to a "middle-class lust 
for apocalypse," and Daniel P. Moynihan, formerly director of the 
Joint Center for Urban Studies of Harvard University and the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, argued in 1969 that the word 
"crisis" was "everywhere: on every tongue; in every pronounce-
ment." Even an issue of Glamour magazine featured a beautiful 
black coed on the cover and posed the intriguing question: "The 
Urban Crisis: What Can One Girl Do?" Social critic Lewis Mum-
ford wrote ominously of "necropolis," the city of the dead, and 
the "long, hot summers" of race riots during the mid-1960s in-
spired other cataclysmic visions. At the end of the 1970s, com-
mentators continued to depict urban problems as intractable and 
overwhelming and to raise the specter of crisis and catastrophe. In 
1978, for example, Courier-Journal columnist John Filiatreau 
pointed to the growing body of "doomsday" pronouncements re-
garding our polluted "urban wastelands" and declared that "in 
recent weeks I've seen four people wandering around downtown 
[Louisville] wearing surgical masks-an image that is fairly apoc-
alyptic." 
Yet even such cataclysmic visions, seemingly so appropriate to 
the late twentieth century, did not really represent a new develop-
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ment in the history of thought about urban life. During the late 
nineteenth century, the unexampled dislocations which accom-
panied urbanization, industrialization, and immigration gener-
ated analogous fears of impending catastrophe. In 1879 social 
critic Henry George, in his influential book Progress and Poverty, 
predicted that unless the harsher iniquities of urban and indus-
trial life were soon remedied they would create "a despotism of 
the vilest and most degrading kind .... The sword will again be 
mightier than the pen, and ... carnivals of destructive brute 
force and wild frenzy will alternate with the lethargy of a declin-
ing civilization." Courier-Journal editor Henry Watterson warned 
throughout these years that the conflict between Negro and white 
in the cities would eventually explode in a bloody "war of the 
races." In May 1886 a bomb was thrown into the midst of a group 
of policemen attempting to break up an anarchist rally in Chi-
cago's Haymarket Square, and the incident sparked nightmares of 
revolutionary upheaval. 
Only a month after the Haymarket affair an obscure writer 
named Caleb Ross published a lurid short story entitled "The De-
struction of Louisville," which developed the idea that" the inev-
itable struggle between capital and labor" would end in carnage 
and devastation. "The handwriting had been written upon the 
wall of every city in the United States for years," Ross wrote som-
berly. "It needed but little prescience to see that we were standing 
upon the edge of a volcano." Peering into the abyss, Ross imag-
ined that "the anarchists and communists who had been driven 
from New York and Chicago had fixed on Louisville as their point 
of rendezvous, and by careful management came into control of 
the labor organizations." In November 1887 the "bloodiest riots 
ever known in the history of the world" erupted. "Toward dusk 
we could see the flames shooting up in every direction from the 
beautiful residences that lined Third and Fourth streets south of 
Broadway." A little over a year later the city lay in ruins. "From a 
city of 180,000 inhabitants it has shrunk now to some 40,000 or 
50,000. Away up Third and Fourth streets for miles there is a bar-
ren showing of blackened walls and eyeless windows. The grass is 
growing in the yards and on the sidewalks, and on Main Street 
only two or three feeble factories are endeavoring to sustain the 
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ancient reputation of the city, but apparently in vain. The place 
seems to have a curse upon it .... The streets seem so desolate . 
. . . A death-like silence rests upon the place [which] was once the 
most flourishing city of the South .... The Louisville that is, how 
different from the Louisville that was!" 
The cities "that are" do in fact differ greatly from the cities 
"that were," and in most respects they are better places in which 
to live. Urban residents in the late twentieth centuty lived longer 
and healthier lives than had previous generations, and enjoyed a 
quality of life and standard of living which their ancestors had 
only dreamed about. In terms of food, living space, creature com-
forts, and even personal security, the residents of contemporaty 
cities could be considered far better off than their predecessors. 
"Considering the rapidity of urbanization in the United States 
since 1820, the failings of cities seem rather less significant than 
their accomplishments," urban historians Kenneth T.Jackson and 
Stanley K. Schultz concluded in 1972. "At no other time was so 
much-schools, houses, mass-transit facilities, sewers, factories, 
hospitals-built so rapidly for so many." Harvard University edu-
cator Edward C. Banfield, one of the more influential academic 
specialists in urban affairs and the former director of President 
Richard M. Nixon's Task Force on Model Cities, reached a similar 
conclusion in his controversial 1970 study The Unheavenly City. 
"The plain fact is that the ovetwhelming majority of city-dwellers 
live more comfortably and conveniently than ever before," he 
maintained. "By any conceivable measure of material welfare the 
present generation of urban Americans is, on the whole, better off 
than any other large group of people has ever been anywhere." 
Banfield contended that the widespread alarm over a presumed 
urban crisis in the recent past stemmed neither from a failure to 
bring about reforms nor from a series of genuine emergencies. He 
argued rather that Americans believed in the existence of an 
urban crisis because "the improvements in performance, great as 
they have been, have not kept pace with rising expectations. In 
other words, although things have been getting better absolutely, 
they have been getting worse relative to what we think they 
should be . ... To a large extent, then, our urban problems are 
like the mechanical rabbit at the racetrack, which is set to keep 
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just ahead of the dogs no matter how fast they may run. Our per-
formance is better and better, but because we set our standards 
and expectations to keep ahead of performance, the problems are 
never any nearer to solution. Indeed, if standards and expecta-
tions rise foster than performance, the problems may get (rel-
atively) worse as they get (absolutely) better." 
Banfield's conclusions have been widely challenged and de-
bated, and at the end of the 1970s there was little agreement 
about the state of the cities or about their future prospects. What 
did seem clear was that American and Kentucky cities had weath-
ered many "crises." They had served as dynamic agents of mod-
ernization, spearheading advances in economic, social, and cul-
turallife. They had provided a vital "safety valve" for econom-
ically distressed agricultural areas and small towns. They had 
made a "good life" with a high standard of living possible for an 
increasingly large proportion of the population. And they had 
continued to represent, in the words of the municipal reformer 
Frederic C. Howe, "the hope of democracy." In 1906 Howe had 
written that "the city has become the central feature in modern 
civilization and to an ever increasing extent the dominant one." 
In 1980 the city remained the central and dominant feature of our 
civilization and continued to perform its classical civilizing func-
tions in the Commonwealth as throughout America. The attrac-
tions of urban life remained as powerful as they had been at the 
turn of the century, when journalist Finley Peter Dunne's fic-
tional bartender-philosopher Martin J. Dooley had spoken in his 
thick Irish brogue of the compelling lure of the city. "Ye might 
say as Hogan does, that we're ladin' an artyficyal life," Mr. 
Dooley declared, "but, be Hivins, ye might as well tell me I ought 
to be paradin' up and down a hillside in a suit iv skins, shootin' 
the antylope an' the moose, be gory, an' livin' in a cave as to 
make me believe I ought to get along without sthreet cars an' ilic-
tric lights an' illyvators an' sody wather an' ice. 'We ought to live 
where all the good things iv life comes from,' says Hogan. 'No,' 
says I. 'Th' place to live is where all the good things iv life goes 
to.'" 
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143 
Growth of Southern Ci1lilization, 1790-1860 (New York, 1961), chapter 
11, "Town Life," 247-70. 
Broader studies include James F. Richardson, Urban Police in the 
United States (port Washington, N.Y., 1974); Nelson Manfred Blake, 
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and Her Southern Alliance, 1865-1890" (Ph.D. dissertation, Universiry 
of Kentucky, 1965); Jesse C. Burt, Jr. , "Edmund W. Cole and the Strug-
gle between Nashville and Louisville and Their Railroads, 1879-1880," 
FCHQ 26 (April 1952): 112-32; and ErnestJ. Hopkins, The Louis1lille In-
dustrial Foundation: A Study in Community Capitalization of Local In-
dustries (Atlanta, 1945). Jean Howerton Coady tells the story of the 
Louisville Booster Car in "Nostalgic Odyssey," CourierJournai & Times 
Magazine (May 22, 1977),21-24. Keith 1. Bryant, Jr. , provides a context 
for appreciating the historical significance of Louisville's Union Station 
in "Cathedrals, Castles, and Roman Baths: Railway Station Architecture 
in the Urban South," Journal of Urban History 2 (February 1976): 195-
230. 
A good account of Owensboro's promotional efforts is Lee A. Dew, 
"Owensboro's Dream of Glory: A Railroad to Russellville," FCHQ 52 
Oanuary 1978): 26-45. Urban growth in the mountains of Kentucky is 
treated in D.H. Davis, "Urban Development in the Kentucky Moun-
tains," Annals of the Association of Amencan Geographers 15 Oune 
1925): 92-99; Stuart Seely Sprague, "The Great Appalachian Iron and 
Coal Town Boom of 1889-1893," Appalachian Journal 4 (Spring-
Summer 1977): 216-23; Charles Blanton Roberts, "The Building of Mid-
dlesborough-A Notable Epoch in Eastern Kentucky History," FCHQ 7 
Oanuary 1933): 18-33; John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Qui-
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escence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Urbana, Ill., 1980), 
chapter 3, "The Impact of Industrial Power: The Shaping of a Company 
Valley," 47-83, an interpretive account of Middlesboro's "boom" and 
"bust"; and Thomas A. Kelemen, "A History of Lynch, Kentucky, 
1917-1930," FCHQ48 (April 1974): 156-76. 
A comprehensive overview of this period of American urban history is 
Blake McKelvey, The Urbanization of Amenca, 1860-1915 (New Bruns-
wick, NJ., 1963). 
Chapter 5 
Richard C. Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820-1860 (New 
York, 1964), is an original and provocative treatment of a neglected sub-
ject. An interesting statistical analysis which takes issue with some of 
Wade's conclusions is Claudia Dale Goldin, Urban Slavery in the Amer-
ican South, 1820-1860: A Quantitative History (Chicago, 1976). 
The relationship between race relations and American minstrelsy is 
examined in James H. Dormon, "The Strange Career of Jim Crow Rice 
(with apologies to Professor Woodward)," Journal of Social History 3 
(Winter 1969-1970): 109-22. Two studies with information on Lexing-
ton's black community are Herbert A. Thomas, Jr., "Victims of Circum-
stance: Negroes in a Southern Town, 1865-1880," RKHS 71 Guly 1973): 
253-71; and John Kellogg, "Negro Urban Clusters in the Postbellum 
South," GeographicaiReview67 Guly 1977): 310-2l. 
The history of race relations in Louisville after 1865 is covered in Zane 
1. Miller, "Urban Blacks in the South, 1865-1920: The Richmond, Sa-
vannah, New Orleans, Louisville and Birmingham Experience," in Leo F. 
Schnore, ed., The New Urban History: Quantitative Explorations by 
American Historians (Princeton, 1975), 184-204; Judith Walzer 
[Leavitt], "Segregation in Louisville, 1867-1890" (seminar paper, Uni-
versity of Chicago, 1966); Marjorie M. Norris, "An Early Instance of 
Nonviolence: The Louisville Demonstrations of 1870-1871," Journal of 
Southern History 32 (November 1966): 487-504; George Carlton 
Wright, "Blacks in Louisville, Kentucky, 1890-1930" (ph.D. disserta-
tion, Duke University, 1977); Darlene Walker Eakin, "Preparation for 
the Desegregation of the Louisville School System" (M.A. thesis, Univer-
sity of Louisville, 1974); John Marshall Thompson, "School Desegrega-
tion in Jefferson County, Kentucky, 1954-1975" (Ed.D. dissertation, 
University of Kentucky, 1976); "Is • Voluntary , Integration the Answer?" 
U.S. News & World Report 41 (October 5,1956): 46-56,142-49; Omer 
Carmichael and Weldon James, The Louisville Story (New York, 1957); 
George C. Wright, "Desegregation of Public Accommodations in Louis-
145 
ville, Kentucky: A Long and Difficult Struggle in a 'Liberal' Border 
City" (manuscript); Hunter S. Thompson, "A Southern City with 
Northern Problems," in The Great Shark Hunt: Strange Tales from a 
Strange Time (New York, 1979), 38-46, originally published in 1963; 
Roger M. Williams, "What Louisville Has Taught Us about Busing," 
Saturday Review 4 (April 30, 1977): 6-10, 51; and Regina M. Monsour, 
"The Political Efficacy ofLyman Tefft]ohnson" (M.A. thesis, University 
ofLouisville, 1978). 
Three valuable interpretive essays are Zane L. Miller, "The Black Ex-
perience in the Modern American City," in Raymond A. Mohl and]ames 
F. Richardson, eds., The Urban Experience: Themes in Amen'can History 
(Belmont, Cal., 1973), 44-60; Richard C. Wade, "Historical Analogies 
and Public Policy: The Black and Immigrant Experience in Urban Amer-
ica," in Robert F. Oaks et aI., Essays on Urban Amen'ca (Austin, 1975), 
127-47; and Harvard Sitkoff, "Race Relations: Progress and Prospects," 
in]ames T. Patterson, ed., Paths to the Present: Interpretive Essays on 
American History since 1930 (Minneapolis, 1975), 183-227. 
Chapter 6 
The cultural life of modern Louisville and the history of the Louisville 
Orchestra are examined in George R. Leighton, "Louisville, Kentucky: 
An American Museum Piece," Harper's Magazine 175 (September 
1937): 400-421; William Manchester, "Louisville Cashes In on Culture," 
Harper's Magazine 211 (August 1955): 77-83; "Culture's New Kentucky 
Home," Life 42 (April 8, 1957): 125-30; Fred Powledge, "City in Transi-
tion," New Yorker 50 (September 9, 1974): 42-83; Carole C. Birkhead, 
"The History of the Orchestra in Louisville" (M.A. thesis, University of 
Louisville, 1977); Robert S. Whitney, "In Retrospect: The First Thirty 
Years of the Louisville Orchestra, 1937-1967" (manuscript); and Philip 
Hart, Orpheus in the New World: The Symphony Orchestra as an Amer-
ican Cultural Institution (New York, 1973), chapter 9, "Louisville Or-
chestra," 192-211. The value of the performing arts to the economic vi-
tality of modern cities is the theme of The Taxpayers' Revolt and the 
Arts: A U.S. Conference of Mayors' Position Paper (Washington, D.C., 
[1978]). 
Chapter 7 
The histoty of change and continuity in urban life is reflected in Sam 
Bass Warner,]r., The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of lIs 
Growth (Philadelphia, 1968); Blake McKelvey, The Emergence of Melro-
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politan America, 1915-1966 (New Brunswick, N.]., 1968); H.]. Dyos, 
"Some Historical Reflections on the Quality of Urban Life," in Henry J. 
Schmandt and Warner Bloomberg, Jr., eds., The Qutllity of Urban Life 
(Beverly Hills, 1969), 31-60; Otto 1. Bettmann, The Good Old Days-
They Were Terrible! (New York, 1974); Martin V. Melosi, ed., Pollution 
and Reform in American Cities, 1870-1930 (Austin, 1980); Joel A. Tarr, 
"Urban Pollution-Many Long Years Ago," American Heritage 22 (Oc-
tober 1971): 65-69, 106; Glen E. Holt, "The Changing Perception of 
Urban Pathology: An Essay on the Development of Mass Transit in the 
United States," in Kenneth T. Jackson and Stanley K. Schultz, eds., 
Cities in Amencan History (New York, 1972),324-43; Peter]. Schmitt, 
Back to Nature: The Arcadian Myth in Urban America (New York, 
1969); Kenneth T. Jackson, "Metropolitan Government Versus Subur-
ban Autonomy: Politics on the Crabgrass Frontier," in Jackson and 
Schultz, Cities in Amencan History, 442-62; W.E. Lyons, The Politics of 
City-County Merger: The Lexington-Fayette County Expen'ence (Lexing-
ton, Ky., 1977); Richard C. Wade, "The End of the Self-Sufficient City: 
New York's Fiscal Crisis in Histoty," Urbanism Past & Present 3 (Winter 
1976-1977): 1-4; F.W. Woolsey, "Louisville's Rebounding Main 
[Street]," Courier-Journtll & Times Magazine (September 11, 1977), 14-
21; Barbaralee Diamonstein, Buildings Reborn: New Uses, Old Places 
(New York, 1978); Caleb Ross, "The Destruction of Louisville," South-
ern Bivouac n.s. 2 Qune 1886): 49-58; Edward C. Banfield, The Unheav-
enly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis (Boston, 1968, 
1970); Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Soulless City," American Hen/age 20 
(February 1969): 5-8, 78-85; James C. Starbuck, "The Use and Abuse of 
the American City" (St. Louis, 1973);James F. Richardson, "Perspectives 
on the Contemporary City," in Mohl and Richardson, The Urban Experi-
ence, 222-38; and Richard C. Wade, "America's Cities Are (Mosdy) Bet-
terThanEver," AmencanHerillZge 30 (February/March 1979): 4-13. 
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